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We are then confronted with the question of whether this court should
lend its aid to a practice that deprives any working man of ... the only
thing he has to sell-his hours or minutes of labor.2
Should workers walk from the plant gate to their work stations on
their own time? Or should employers who benefit from the economies
associated with huge factories compensate employees for the five, ten, or
fifteen-minute walk? After almost a half-century, it is difficult to recap-
ture the intensity of a confict 3-over what was after all only a minor
aspect of the federal wage and hour law-which the New York Times
called "one of the greatest legal-economic controversies in American his-
tory. . . ."I In particular, the attention that employers and the press
lavished on the trial of one such monetarily insignificant "portal-to-por-
tal" claim in federal court in 1947 has been unique in the postwar history
of labor law.5
1. REPORTS OF THE INSPECTORS OF FACTORIES FOR THE HALF YEAR ENDING 30th APRIL,
1860, at 56 (C. 2689, 34 Parl. Pap. 1860).
2. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 60 F. Supp. 146, 149-50 (E.D. Mich. 1943).
3.
Only occasionally does it occur that the subject matter of lawsuits in the courts be-
comes matter of great public concern to the entire body politic. Among these in the past
are the Dred Scott decision, the Gold Clause cases, and perhaps, the NRA case. [Tihe
course of the present cases on so-called portal to portal pay has attracted wide public
attention and much daily comment in the press. These conditions bring to the fore the
effect of political and economic conditions and relationships on judicial decisions in a
much more forceful way than ordinarily occurs even in cases in which the court's deci-
sion between private litigants has a profound effect on political and economic history.
Axley, The Problem of Portal to Portal Pay, 1947 Wlsc. L. REv. 163, 163. The author of the
Supreme Court portal-pay cases, Frank Murphy, wrote his brother that "not even Dred Scott, the
Dartmouth College case, and Marbury v. Madison had caused 'as much interest and excitement' as
the Mt. Clemens opinion." 3 S. FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 332 (1984).
4. White, Government Asks Portal Case Ban; Origin 'Trifling,' N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1947, at 1,
col. 8.
5. "It has been years since a Federal district judge, with one exception [the John L. Lewis
contempt case], has found himself in a situation with such grave possibilities." Krock, Picard in
Portal Test, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1947, at 6, col. 4.
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The fervor with which all parties invested this portal-to-portal dis-
pute coincided with-and was a sideshow of-the campaign that capital
conducted between 1945 and 1947 to reclaim the power, sovereignty, and
control that it had been forced to cede to labor and the state during
World War IL. When unions resisted,7 "labor-management relations ap-
pear[ed] to be rushing toward a fateful climax."' Overshadowed histori-
cally, although not contemporaneously, by the debate over Taft-
Hartley's incursions into the rights workers secured under the National
Labor Relations Act,9 the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (the "Portal-to-
Portal Act") has receded into oblivion. Known today only to, and taken
for granted by, specialists in labor-law litigation, the Portal-to-Portal
Act's political and economic origins have become relegated to
obscurity. 0
6. See Kerr, Employer Policies in Industrial Relations, 1945 to 1947, in LABOR IN POSTWAR
AMERICA 43, 46-47 (C. Warne ed. 1949); D. BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS
ON THE TWENTIETH CENTURY STRUGGLE 173-214 (1981); H. HARRIS, THE RIGHT TO MANAGE:
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS POLICIES OF AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE 1940s, at 130 (1982); N. LICH-
TENSTEIN, LABOR'S WAR AT HOME: THE CIO IN WORLD WAR 11220 (1987); S. JACOBY, EMPLOY-
ING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY, 1900-1945, at 241-74 (1985).
7. For an unusual portrait of the strikes of this period, see G. LIpSrrz, CLASS AND CULTURE IN
COLD WAR AMERICA: "A RAINBOW AT MIDNIGHT" (1981).
8. Stark, Portal Pay Issue Intensifies The Wage Dispute, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1946, § 4, at 3,
col. 3.
9. When the Republican-dominated Eightieth Congress convened in January 1947, Senator Wi-
ley, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that his portal-pay hearing "was the first
subcommittee hearing held under the auspices of the Republican Party since 1933 on a matter of
national importance." Portal to Portal Wages" Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947) [hereinafter Portal to Portal Wages].
10. Emblematic of this political amnesia is that the major monograph devoted to labor problems
during the first three years of the Truman administration never even alludes to the portal pay issue
or legislation (although the bibliography includes a reference to a hearing and an article on the
Portal-to-Portal Act). A. McCLURE, THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE PROBLEMS OF
POSTWAR LABOR, 1945-1948, at 254, 257 (1969). The following major works on the Truman ad-
ministration also fail even to mention the issue: A. HAMBY, BEYOND THE NEW DEAL: HARRY S.
TRUMAN AND AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1973); B. COCHRAN, HARRY TRUMAN AND THE CRISIS
PRESIDENCY (1973); THE TRUMAN PRESIDENCY (M. Lacey ed. 1989). A biography of the general
counsel of the United Automobile Workers during the period under review fails to mention the
portal struggle. C. JOHNSON, MAURICE SUGAR: LAW, LABOR, AND THE LEFT N DETROIT 1912-
1950 (1988). None of the numerous articles on the controversy published by the New York Times
was reprinted in an anthology including thirty pages of articles on labor from the reconversion
period. See LABOR AND MANAGEMENT 16497 (R.B. Morris ed. 1973). A major exception is J.
SEIDMAN, AMERICAN LABOR FROM DEFENSE TO RECONVERSION 259-61 (1976). At the other ex-
treme, a major history of the working day misstated the practical impact of portal-pay suits, claim-
ing that "[b]y January 1947, workers had won nearly $6 billion in over 1,500 such cases," when in
fact they had merely filed these cases, ultimately prevailing in none. D. ROEDIGER & P. FONER,
OUR OWN TIME: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR AND THE WORKING DAY 266 (1989).
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As an essay in disinterment and reform, this Article presents a com-
prehensive political, economic, and legislative history of the Portal-to-
Portal Act," analyzing the unusual way in which litigation shaped the
contours of the statute which the Portal-to-Portal Act amended, the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA" or the "Act"). As part of a larger war-
time and postwar labor conflict, the portal suits were both a calculated
effort to maximize bargaining pressure on big business and a hapless ven-
ture by the Congress of Industrial Organizations ("CIO") to secure large
recoveries from employers without due consideration of the possible re-
actions by capital and the state or of the repercussions for unorganized
workers. Ultimately the Portal-to-Portal Act's restrictive impact has
fallen on low-paid workers and extends far beyond the issue of walking
time.
This analysis of the Portal-to-Portal Act begins with an economic
and historical discussion of the significance of the definition of compensa-
ble worktime under protective statutory regimes (§ I). The relevance for
the portal controversy of the trends in overtime during and immediately
after World War II is reviewed in § II. Following this discussion is a
study of two mining cases that crucially shaped the political and jurispru-
dential contours of the portal pay dispute (§ III). Attention then shifts to
the major industrial portal suit, Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Com-
pany, in which the Supreme Court set the stage for mass litigation and
congressional intervention (§ IV). § V offers a detailed legislative history
of the Portal-to-Portal Act beginning with efforts at the state level to
blunt the impact of FLSA by shortening the applicable statutes of limita-
tions. § VI and § VII look at the contemporary significance of the Por-
tal-to-Portal Act, from the relationship between mandatory norms under
FLSA and consensual bargaining, to the most significant achievement of
the Portal-to-Portal Act, the elimination of class actions. The lessons to
be learned from the portal litigation of the 1940's are summarized in
§ VIII.
11. One aspect of the Portal-to-Portal Act that will not be analyzed is its constitutionality,
which was upheld in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 887 (1948). Among the numerous articles appearing on this issue is Brown, Vested Rights and
the Portal-to-Portal Act, 46 MICH. L. Rav. 723 (1948).
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I. WHEN AND WHERE DOES THE WORKDAY BEGIN AND WHO
DECIDES?
A. The Importance of Travel and Preparatory Time
[M]ost of these actions have been entered into... against employers always
ready and willing to chisel a little free work from the men and women who
work for them.12
The demand for so-called travel and preparatory time is at first sight
merely "[o]ne of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up...,"
namely "that between the effort of every man to get the most he can for
his services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to
get his services for the least possible return."13 More particularly, the
demand for travel and preparatory time appears as "righteous"1 4 resist-
ance by employees against efforts by employers to avoid an obligation to
pay for all'the employees' time that the employers have at their disposal.
Thus, rather than an example of haggling over terms, unions projected
the portal pay issue as a form of theft. In this sense the controversy was
a venerable one that differed little from the labor-capital controversy re-
counted by Karl Marx for his own period."
In order to fully understand the significance of the Portal-to-Portal
Act, it must be recalled that portal pay disputes arise peculiarly in statu-
tory settings. Significantly, the most prominent portal pay cases involved
piece-rate workers. Before the advent of FLSA, such workers had rela-
tively little interest in whether they were paid specifically for portal type
time. If these workers were members of the stronger trade unions, they
may have succeeded in negotiating enhanced piece rates that reflected or
somehow accommodated travel time and preliminary and postliminary
activities. If they did not have the bargaining power to achieve such ad-
justments, they had no other recourse.
1 6
For example, under the English Factory Acts, which regulated and
specified the hours during which women and children could be em-
12. 93 CONG. REc. 1488 (1947) (Rep. Sabath, Dem. Ill.).
13. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 103, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14. Senator Pepper used this word to characterize one of the portal cases. 93 CONG. REc. 2301
(1947).
15. 1 K. MARx, DAS KAPrrAL 206-11 (1867), republished in K. MARx & F. ENGELS,
GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA), 11:5 at 184-88 (1983).
16. Industrial collective bargaining agreements even in the 1940s typically contained numerous
provisions mandating payments for various kinds of preliminary, postliminary, and waiting time.
For a sample of such provisions, see Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, and For Other
Purposes. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 93-101 (1947) [hereinafter Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay].
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ployed, employers sought to begin the work day early and to keep the
workers at work until after the end of the statutory working day. The
factory inspectors in the 1850s reported how "snatching a few minutes"
or the "petty pilferings of minutes"17 could cumulatively result in im-
pressive profits": "Five minutes a day's increased work, multiplied by
weeks, are equal to two and a half days of produce in the year...
And then as now:
The profit to be gained by it appears to be, to many, a greater temptation
than they can resist; they calculate upon the chance of not being found out;
and when they see the small amount of penalty and costs, which those who
have been convicted have had to pay, they find that if they should be de-
tected there will still be a considerable balance of gain.
1 9
In the United States, the conflict over the compensability of walking
time intensified as firms, in order to take advantage of economies of scale
and vertical integration, invested their capital in larger and larger plants,
the layout of which required workers to walk long distances from the
initial entry point to their individual work station. The mammoth mili-
tary production facilities built during World War II reinforced this
trend. In the metal products industries, for example, on which war pro-
duction had its greatest impact, establishments employing more than
2,500 wage earners increased their employment by almost eight-fold,
while their share of all workers rose from 18.6 per cent to 48.8 per cent
from 1939 to 1945.20 Even by 1947, when the effect of wartime concen-
tration had in part dissipated in the wake of demobilization, the number
of manufacturing plants in this largest category had increased by 186 per
cent vis-A-vis 1939, while the number of workers employed in them had
risen by 208 per cent.21
17. REPORTS OF THE INSPECTORS OF FACTORIES FOR THE HALF YEAR ENDING 31st Ocro-
BER, 1856, at 48 (C. 2153, 3 Parl. Pap. 1857 Sess. 1).
18. REPORTS OF THE INSPECTORS OF FACTORIES FOR THE HALF YEAR ENDING 31st OCTo-
BER, 1851, at 5 (C. 1396, 23 Parl. Pap. 1852). "'If you will allow me,' said a highly respectable
master to me, 'to work only ten minutes in the day over time, you put one thousand a year in my
pocket.'" REPORTS OF THE INSPECTORS OF FACTORIES FOR THE HALF YEAR ENDING 31st OcTO-
BER, 1856, at 48 (C. 2153, 3 Parl. Pap. 1857 Sess. 1).
19. REPORTS OF THE INSPECTORS OF FACTORIES FOR THE HALF YEAR ENDING 31st OcTo-
BER, 1856, at 34 (C. 2153, 3 Parl. Pap. 1857 Sess. 1).
20. ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND WORLD WAR II: REPORT OF THE SMALLER WVAR
PLANTS CORPORATION TO THE SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN SMALL BUSI-
NESS, S. Doc. No. 206, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., Table C-6, at 337 (1946). The largest subgroups within
this industrial classification were aircraft production and shipbuilding. For data on the subgroups,
see id., Table C-4, at 330-36.
21. If the number of employees in manufacturing establishments can serve as an indicator of
plant size, large plants (with more than 2,500 employees) developed as follows:
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At the height of the portal controversy in 1947, more than two-
thirds of all workers employed in these largest plants were concentrated
in the transportation equipment, primary metals, machinery, and electri-
cal machinery industries. 2 Almost one-third worked in steel mills and
motor vehicle plants alone. 3 This industrial structure, in turn, geo-
graphically concentrated almost two-thirds of these large-plant workers
in the six states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, Illinois,
and Indiana. 4 By no coincidence, then, the bulk of the portal litigation
arose in these industries and states.2 5 In addition, these large factories, as
capital intensive and heavily organized, formed the focus of an intense
conflict between the CIO and large capital.
Contemporary liberal and leftist26 commentators tended to argue
that employers required an economic incentive to modify their plants so
that workers might share in the economies of scale.27 The conservative
business press, however, rejected this position. Thus as early as 1944,
Business Week asserted that "time spent in travel or in changing clothes
is not productive time. There is no way for alert management to absorb
Total Employees in Plants
Employees Average No. as % of all
in Large Employees in Manufacturing
Year Plants Plants Large Plants Employees
1929 195 910,740 4,670 11.5
1939 176 824,532 4,685 10.5
1947 504 2,541,700 5,043 17.8
1958 533 2,654,500 4,980 17.2
1967 674 3,628,800 5,384 19.6
1982 482 2,445,800 5,074 13.7
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 1939 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, 119-21 (1942); U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, 1 1967 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, Tables 1 and 2, at 2-4 and 2-5 (1971); U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, GENERAL SUMMARY, pt. 2, Table 1,
at 1-3 (1985).
22. Calculated according to data in U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 1947 CENSUS OF MANU-
FACTURES, Table 1, at 97-98 (1950).
23. Id. at 125, 136.
24. Id. at 143-44.
25. See EXEMPTING EMPLOYERS FROM LIABILITY FOR PORTAL-TO-PORTAL WAGES IN CER-
TAIN CASES, S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-4, 22-25 (1947).
26. That is, the part of the left that had not rejected FLSA as having shown the fallacy of trying
to solve economic problems with social welfare measures because the Act did not thoroughly revalue
wage-price relationships, redistribute national income, or deal with the root problems of technologi-
cal, seasonal, and cyclical unemployment. See, eg., Burstein, The Fair Labor Standards Act-A
Legal and Economic Study, 6 LAW. GUILD REV. 576 (1946).
27. See, eg., Mezerik, Time Is Money, THE NATION, Feb. 1, 1947, at 121-23; Morse, Economic
Aspects of the Portal-to-Portal Pay Question, 7 LAW. GUILD REv. 29, 32 (1947).
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nonproductive costs. They can only be passed on to the consumer."28
Without acknowledging the disconfirmation, the magazine two years
later reported that in response to portal suits, employers were relocating
gates and eliminating waiting at time clocks.2 9 From a somewhat differ-
ent perspective, the Wall Street Journal editorialized on the subject re-
peatedly. Its basic insight was that since workers produced nothing
while engaged in portal-to-portal travel:
For the long run future it may make little difference in total wages whether
they are reckoned on the basis of the time a man spends in the plant or on
the basis of the time aman actually spends handling the tools or running
the machines.... [H] ourly rates reckoned on the longer period will for the
long run be lower than those reckoned on a shorter period. If the union
leaders think that they can fool their following into believing they are get-
ting something for nothing, they have a low opinion of the intelligence of
the followers. °
The implication was that the immediate result of the imposition of portal
pay would be a redistribution of income from profit to wages, which,
because the total income generated by the firm (or the economy) was not
increased, would, through the mechanisms of equilibrium, work itself
back to the status quo ante. With the wage-profit ratio relatively immu-
table, the unchanged wage bill would merely translate into a lower
hourly rate for a longer workweek.
What this much-ado-about-nothing analysis overlooked was that,
once travel time became compensable, the innovations that firms under-
took to reduce such time would lower unit labor cost and result in pro-
ductivity increases "as real as those due to the introduction of new labor-
saving machinery.""1 Moreover, once those changes took place, the
travel time saved could be devoted to directly productive labor, thus en-
hancing total output. In the alternative, workers could use the freed-up
time as additional leisure. In effect, then, the half-hour used by employ-
ees in portal-to-portal travel could be used in self-directed pursuits. In
the latter case, to be sure, until the capital investment in these innova-
tions was amortized, either the firm or the consumer would bear the costs
of the workers' extra free time. By way of contrast, under the earlier
28. Bus. WK., Oct. 7, 1944, at 123. In the very next issue, Warner & Swasey, a machine manu-
facturer that later became a defendant in a portal-pay suit, published an advertisement on the inside
front cover sounding the same theme. Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 1944.
29. Bus. WK., Nov. 23, 1946, at 102, 104. THE NATION, Dec. 28, 1946, at 759, included a
similar report.
30. Portal-to-Portal, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1946, at 6, col. 12. The same view was presented in
"Walking Time" Pay, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1947, at 6, col. 2.
31. Morse, supra note 27, at 32.
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regime, workers had disproportionately borne the costs of the inefficient
layout of mines, mills, and plants in the form of curtailed leisure. Even-
tually, however, "the extra cost of portal-to-portal pay, spread over the
entire wage bill, will be a small matter, as is now the cost of social secur-
ity, which in its day, according to the N.A.M. [National Association of
Manufacturers], promised revolution and bankruptcy."32
B. FLSA in the Travel and Preparatory Time Debate
Northern manufacturing corporations had by and large acquiesced
in FLSA so long as they believed that its minimal standards would have
little or no impact on their wage policies or managerial prerogatives.
Since they already paid their employees wages far in excess of the new
statutory minimum and premium pay for overtime, compliance with
FLSA did not appear burdensome. 3
Implementation of FLSA, however, turned out to be trickier than
envisioned. In order to determine the amount of wages owed, it was nec-
essary to count the number of hours worked. Although the definition of
an "hour" might be simple enough, that of "work" was fraught with
dispute. Perhaps no worker had seriously urged that the FLSA clock
started running the moment she walked out the front door of her house,
but did it begin as soon as she walked in the employer's front door? Or
did the employee have to make it all the way to her work station before
her time was her employer's time? And who had the final authority to
make that determination? Was it within the sole discretion of the em-
ployer to set those bounds? Did pre-FLSA customs carry over? Did the
agreement of the parties prevail, even where there was no bargaining be-
cause of the employer's overwhelming power?34 Or did FLSA control
the situation? And if so, who interpreted the law, the Wage and Hour
Administrator or the courts? Such questions prompt the formulation of
a labor-capital conflict in terms of whether the employer has breached a
statutory obligation by failing to pay for all the hours worked or whether
the employees have committed a breach of faith by abrogating long-
standing customs in favor of demands for payment of time that tradition-
ally was not expressly compensated.
32. Mezerik, supra note 27, at 122.
33. See Linder, Paternalistic State Intervention: The Contradictions of the Legal Empowerment
of Vulnerable Workers, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 733, 745-51 (1990).
34. Frank Cooper, who represented the employer in the major industrial portal-pay case, stated
"that the definition of the phrase 'hours worked' belongs at the bargaining table." Sugar & Cooper,
Pro and Con-"Portal to Portal" Pay Suits, 26 MICH. ST. B.J. 7, 11 (1947).
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From the vantage point of large industrial capital, this entire line of
inquiry was far more than it had signed up for in accepting FLSA. By
the time the postwar wave of portal pay suits had acquired the status of a
movement, capital was clearly not amused. The general counsel for Re-
public Steel Corporation told Congress that the "net effect" of the recent
Supreme Court decisions had been,
to pervert the [A]ct from an instrument of righteous correction against
sweatshop employers into an instrument to destroy the great majority of
industrial employers in this country.... There is grim irony in the fact that
the higher the wages paid by the particular employer, the more oppressive
ate the provisions of the [A]ct as interpreted by the Supreme Court.35
The Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce, a
group composed of representatives of the largest industrial entities in the
United States such as General Motors, Du Pont, U.S. Steel, Ford, Alcoa,
and Standard Oil of New Jersey, informed Congress that:
Industry has felt from the beginning that the construction put upon the
Fair Labor Standards Act by the Supreme Court was a complete misinter-
pretation of congressional intent.... Businessmen do not believe that Con-
gress intended to make any radical change in the practices or customs
governing the relationship between employer and employee as to when his
compensation started or how much it should be provided that the statutory
minimum wage were paid and that employees received time and a half their
usual rate when working more than 40 hours a week.3 6
Capital thus viewed the portal campaign as an attempt by unions
not strong enough to achieve additional wage advances on their own to
use the state-in the form of an administrative agency and the courts-to
vindicate these wage claims for them. Ironically, argued capital, the stat-
utory basis for this interference with the free operation of the labor mar-
ket and the contest between labor and capital had not even been designed
to aid unions, whereas the low-paid unorganized workers whom FLSA
was meant to bolster37 were not participants in the litigation. 8 More-
over, if labor prevailed on the portal claims, many employers would be
35. Portal to Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 52 (statement by Thomas Patton).
36. Id. at 615 (statement by Subcommittee of Business Advisory Council on Attitude of Indus-
try on Portal to Portal, as submitted by William Foster, Undersecretary of Commerce).
37. For a clear statement of the motivations behind paternalistic labor legislation, see Robertson
v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 287 (1897) (treating seamen "as deficient in that full and intelligent re-
sponsibility for their acts which is accredited to ordinary adults," Congress enacted a wage payment
statute on their behalf).
38. Lee Pressman, general counsel of the CIO and an organizer of the litigation campaign,
testified before Congress that he knew of no portal suits brought by unorganized workers. Regulat-
ing the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 166.
[Vol. 39
CLASS STR UGGLE A T THE DOOR
compelled to restructure the layout of their plants in order to reduce
their liability for portal wages. Not only had management not foreseen
such an incursion into its sphere of dominion, but, depending on the
technology of each factory and industry, such encroachment could lead
to significant shifts in competitiveness among reputable employers.39
Workers, especially in the early days of FLSA and in the context of
organizing campaigns in the wake of the Depression, may have tended to
view statutory overtime claims as part and parcel of an overall bargain-
ing process, which might have to be traded off for more important con-
cessions from the employer. FLSA promoted such thinking because the
rights it conferred upon workers were a cake they could eat and still
have. In other words, when it was to their advantage, employees could
decline to vindicate "a demand for the 'last measurement of justice' to
which [they] may be entitled."0 But since, as the Supreme Court was to
rule, employees could not waive their rights under FLSA,4 1 they could
always' renege on such implied waivers and re-open the issue--even to
the point of bankrupting the employer.43 It was this class bias inherent
in the logic of FLSA that infuriated employers in the portal pay contro-
versy. In order to subvert this policy of unilateral rights, employers (and
their dissenting supporters on the Supreme Court) sought to drive a con-
ceptual and statutory wedge between unorganized and organized em-
ployees. Because it was undisputed that federally granted statutory
rights preempted contractual agreements, unionized employers argued
that Congress had really intended to confer the statutory rights embod-
ied in FLSA solely on low-paid and unorganized workers, whom they
did not employ.' The unionized employees, with whom employers did
enter into binding agreements, Congress allegedly did not so privilege.
So long as firms paid minimum wage and overtime, these workers could
consent to any arrangements they wished, including customary practices
as to when the workday and compensable work time began. This differ-
39. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 202(a)).
40. Portal to Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 658 (testimony of Arthur Pettit, attorney, Winthrop,
Stimson).
41. See infra § VI.
42. That is, within the limitations period, which, before the Portal-to-Portal Act, was rather
long in some states. See infra § V.
43. See Linder, The Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J. LEGIS. 151
(1990). For a fictional representation of this policy from the standpoint of a trade unionist in Mex-
ico, see B. TRAVEN, DME BAUMWOLLPFLOCKER 124 (1983).
44. See infra § III.
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ence in portrayal of unionized employees and unorganized workers
formed the core of the portal-pay dispute.
This core, however, was not always on public display because the
unions failed to adopt or to project a consistent and principled position
on their members' status under FLSA. Stymied in their initial collective
bargaining efforts to secure wages for all the time their members placed
at the disposal of their employers, unions appealed to the Wage and
Hour Administrator and finally to the federal courts to vindicate these
claims. Unless they were to win on a technicality, unions had to legiti-
mate their position by reference to socially recognized moral grounds. If
they permitted their adversaries to stake out higher moral ground, the
CIO should have anticipated ultimate defeat. Capital, which cast its
postwar struggle to recover supremacy at the point of production as
righteous resistance to judicial perversion of congressional intent and of
employers' just expectations, directed its appeal to the new Republican
majority in Congress. It was this struggle between labor and capital over
the possible new contours of their relationship in the postwar period 4 as
displaced to the plane of legislation, interpretation, implementation, liti-
gation, adjudication, and renewed litigation, that animated the portal-to-
portal controversy.
II. FROM THE FIGHT AGAINST, TO THE FIGHT FOR, OVERTIME
Remember, the long struggle for the 8-hour day was not a struggle for 8
hours of work. It was a struggle for 16 hours away from work.46
The question of back wages for employees whose travel time did not
extend their workweek beyond forty hours was "academic" because, with
rare exceptions, the lowest hourly wage rate in the unionized industrial
sector exceeded the FLSA imposed statutory minimum by the end of
World War II.41 Portal litigation was therefore exclusively a creature of
the maximum hours provision of FLSA. Whereas relatively few workers
45. The unresolved status of this conflict emerged at the National Labor-Management Confer-
ence convened by President Truman in November 1945, where the Committee on Management's
Right to Manage was unable to reach agreement because the labor members, while conceding that
"[the functions and responsibilities of management must be preserved if business and industry is to
be efficient... and provide more good jobs," thought "it unwise to specify and classify" them or "to
build a fence around the rights and responsibilities of management on the one hand and the unions
on the other." Div. LABOR STANDARDS, U. S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 77, THE PRESI-
DENT'S NATIONAL LABOR MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 5-30, 1945: SUMMARY AND
COMMITTEE REPORTS 61 (1946).
46. Sugar, The Truth About "Portal to Portal," 7 LAw. GUILD REV. 23, 25 (1947).
47. Portal to Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 191-94 (testimony of Lee Pressman).
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actually found their wages increased by the minimum wage provision of
FLSA, many workers received overtime pay under FLSA by the time the
militarization of the economy began to extend the normal work week
beyond forty hours.4" Indeed, while the statutory minimum wage of
thirty to forty cents per hour became moot during the war, when a tight
labor market made fifty cents the de facto minimum,4 9 it was the longer
work week that largely sustained the increase in real weekly earnings.
50
Thus the average workweek for production workers in manufacturing
industries rose by one-fifth, from 37.7 hours in 1939 to 45.2 hours in
1944.51 The transition from the Depression to a full-capacity war econ-
omy also transformed the functioning and socio-economic purposes be-
hind mandatory overtime payments: "Union members had originally
favored overtime pay as a means of sharing work .... In the 1940s,
however, overtime pay was transformed into a means of increasing work-
ers' earnings, rather than one of limiting the length of the workweek.
The change took place during World War II, when workers started to
rely on premium pay to keep pace with inflation.
' 52
48. Of the more than twelve million employees covered by FLSA in April 1939, the Department
of Labor estimated that fewer than 700,000 were receiving less than the statutory minimum (thirty
cents); of the 2,400,000 working overtime (then more than forty-two hours), 1,664,000 or slightly
more than two-thirds were not receiving time and one-half. By far the largest industry that had to
reduce hours or pay overtime was sawmills (with more than 100,000 such employees), followed by
foundry and machine shops, and furniture manufacturing. See U. S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, FIRST AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, FOR THE CALENDAR
YEAR 1939, at 3643, 158-60 (1940).
49. See Amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., chart V at 860 (1945) (statement of Chester Bowles
showing straight-time hourly rates of factory workers in the summer of 1945). Whereas in 1942
7,500,000 employees were being paid forty cents or less per hour, by the end of the war the National
War Labor Board "automatically approved increases first up to 40 and later to 50 cents an hour."
SEIDMAN, supra note 10, at 129.
50. "Because most factory wage workers are working more intensely and for longer hours, they
have been able to maintain their spendable earnings and to save." Tolles, Spendable Earnings of
Factory Workers, 1941-43, 58 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 477, 478 (1944).
51. 4 Minimum Wage Standards and Other Parts of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193&
Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
2618 (1947) (supplementary statement of the Wage and Hour Administrator). See also H.M.
DotrIy, Review of Basic American Labor Conditions, in LABOR IN POSTWAR AMERICA 109, 117-18
(C. Warne ed. 1949).
52. R. SCHATZ, THE ELECTRICAL WORKERS: A HISTORY OF LABOR AT GENERAL ELECTRIC
AND WESTINGHOUSE 1923-1960, at 159 (1983). For an extended argument that the overtime provi-
sion of FLSA was intended by President Roosevelt as a diluted accommodation of the demand by
the AFL for work sharing and a thirty hour work week and that the crucial turning point occurred
in 1933 when those forces in the New Deal advocating increased production and employment pre-
vailed over the continuing struggle for shorter hours, see B. HUNNICUTT, WORK WITHOUT END:
ABANDONING SHORTER HOURS FOR THE RIGHT TO WORK 147-208 (1988). The most important
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Not surprisingly, some in Congress sought during World War Il to
curtail the right that millions of workers had recently secured to statu-
tory premium pay for long hours.53 In part because statutory overtime
could no longer fulfill the function of sharing work as full employment
approached,54 a number of bills were offered in 1942 to relieve employers
(and ultimately the Treasury, which was paying the bills submitted by
war contractors) of the burden of premium pay.5" Senator O'Daniel of
Texas seized the initiative in March by submitting a bill that would have
eliminated all restrictions on hours of labor and provided the same wage
for all hours.56 In explaining a later version of the bill, the senator en-
gaged in no hyperbole when he stated that "[t]he change would please
practically every employer of labor in America. They would rejoice at
having the legislative shackles of premium pay for so-called overtime re-
moved."5" O'Daniel's explanation of the effect of the elimination of pre-
relevant legislative history may be consulted in Thirty-Hour Work Week." Hearings Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933); THIRTY-HoUR WEEK
BILL, H. R. Doc. No. 124, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933); Thirty-Hour Week Bill: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Labor, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933); Thirty-Hour Week Bill: Hearings Before the
House CommL on Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). See also G. FARR, THE ORIGINS OF RECENT
LABOR POLICY 59-76 (Univ. Colo. Studies Ser. in Econ. No. 3, 1959); S. VITToz, NEW DEAL
LABOR POLICY AND THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY 73-96 (1987). When, in the wake of
demobilization, the work week was shortened but inflation accelerated, many workers were still
eager to work overtime. R. SCHATz, THE ELECTRICAL WORKERS: A HISTORY OF LABOR AT GEN-
ERAL ELECTRIC AND WESTINGHOUSE 1923-1960, at 159. In this context it is therefore wrong to
view the CIO's demand for portal pay as motivated by an interest "in shortening the working day by
compelling employers to recognize that the day began from the moment the laborer came onto the
premises until the moment he left." W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY 1932-1968, at 162 (1970).
53. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Ch. 676, § 7, 52 Stat. 1060, 1063 (1938) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 207 (1990)). For a rhetorical description and denunciation of the anti-FLSA drive, see 93
CONG. REC. 2266 (1947) (statement of Sen. Thomas, Dem. Ut.).
54. But see U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS IN WARTIME: ANNUAL REPORT,
WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISION, FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE
30, 1942, at 3-4 (1943) (defending overtime provision as "attracting labor in a democratic way,
without compulsion, to the war industries where it was needed"). The Wage and Hour Administra-
tor devoted an extraordinary amount of space in his annual report for 1940 to refuting claims that
the forty-hour week was inconsistent with national defense preparedness. U.S. DEP'T. Op LABOR,
ANNUAL REPORT, WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1940, at 1-
72 (1941). In addition to discouraging longer workweeks, premium pay for overtime also is designed
to compensate workers for the disproportional wear and tear caused by long hours, See Mechmet v.
Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 825 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1987).
55. For a very brief and uninspired account, see R. YOUNG, CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS IN THE
SECOND WORLD WAR 59-61 (1956).
56. 88 CONG. Rc. 2380 (1942) (S. 2380).
57. Id. at 8705 (S. 2884).
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mium pay was, however, novel. While the bill neither compelled workers
to work overtime nor dealt with hourly wages at all, it did,
embrace the age-old, time-tested, true economic philosophy that an em-
ployee should be paid the full amount per hour that his services are worth
for each and every hour he works, instead of being paid less per hour for
earlier hours of the day when he is most efficient and productive, and more
per hour for the later hours, when he may be fatigued and less productive,
as our present 40-hour workweek law provides.58
Although ultimately neither O'Daniel's proposed amendment of § 7
of FLSA19 nor any competing proposal was adopted in 1942' or later,6"
President Roosevelt did issue an executive order banning premium pay
for work performed on Saturday or Sunday "except where such work is
performed by the employee on the sixth or seventh day worked in his
regularly scheduled workweek." 62
As previously mentioned, large employers in general, but especially
those that had entered into collective bargaining agreements, did not find
compliance with FLSA burdensome because they were already paying in
excess of the minimum wage and time and one-half for overtime.63 A
58. Id.
59. See id. at 8706 (text of proposed S. 2884).
60. Under S. 2232, submitted by Senator Reed of Kansas, premium pay would not have been
mandatory until after forty-eight hours. Id. at 1328. Many of the other bills would have suspended
all hours limitations for the duration of the war. H.R. 6616, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 CONG. REC.
1381 (1942) (Smith, Va.); H.R. 6823, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 CONG. REc. 2838 (1942) (Peterson,
Ga.); H.R. 7731, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 CONG. Rac. 8491 (1942) (Ramspeck); H.R. 6689, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess., 88 CONG. REc. 1771 (1942) (Lambertson); H.R. 6795, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88
CONG. REc. 2535 (1942) (Boren); H.R. 6796, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 CONG. REc. 2535 (1942)
(Wickersham); H.R. 6826, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 CONG. Rnc. 2838 (1942) (Colmer); H.R. 6835,
77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 CONG. REc. 2838 (1942) (Thomas, Tx.); H.R. 7054, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88
CONG. REC. 4009 (1942) (Cole, N.Y.).
61. Senator O'Daniel continued to introduce his bill for several sessions as did other Congress-
men. In the first session of the Seventy-Eighth Congress (1943) the following bills were offered: S.
190, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REc. 36 (1943); S. 237, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REC. 71
(1943); H.R. 992, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REC. 116 (1943); H.R. 1804, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.,
89 CONG. REc. 894 (1943); H.R. 2071, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REc. 1525 (1943); H.R.
2107, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REc. 1636 (1943). In the first session of the Seventy-Ninth
Congress (1945), the following bills were offered: S. 369, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. Rc. 370
(1945); H.R. 1194, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REc. 126 (1945). In the second session of the
Seventy-Ninth Congress (1946), the following bills were offered: H.R. 6647, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 92
CONG. REc. 6189 (1946). In the first session of the Eightieth Congress (1947), the following bills
were offered: S. 160, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 221 (1947).
62. Exec. Order No. 9240, 3 C.F.R. 1207 (1938-1943). For a discussion of the conflict over non-
statutory premium time for weekend work, see Lichtenstein, supra note 6, at 96-108; Premium Pay
Provisions in Selected Union Agreements, 65 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 419 (1947).
63. See 1943 U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS IN WARTIME: ANNUAL RE-
PORT, WAGE & HOUR DivIsION, FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1942, at 5.
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number of decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court
in the 1940s, however, interpreting the "regular rate" to which the fifty
per cent premium applied,' did give them pause." Counsel for the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers ("NAM"), "the most influential ide-
ological holding company for American industry," 66 expressed large
capital's exasperation with the enforcement priorities of the Wage and
Hour Administrator when he urged the latter to focus on sweatshops
rather than on regular-rate cases "where the wages and employment con-
ditions are far superior to anything remotely intended to be covered by
the wage-hour law."'67 When it finally dawned on large capital that rela-
tively highly paid organized workers were also protected by FLSA, it
began to lobby Congress to cut back on some of the Supreme Court's
expansive interpretations of the regular rate for overtime purposes. 8
Thus in the course of testifying before Congress on the issue of portal pay
in 1945, NAM advocated further changes in FLSA unrelated to that
problem 9.6  Although echoing the views of Supreme Court dissenters in a
number of FLSA cases to the effect that Congress never intended the Act
to impinge on the outcomes of legitimate collective bargaining,70 NAM
apparently never sought outright repeal of FLSA.
64. For analysis of the cases see Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-
1945, 59 HARv. L. REV. 321 (1946).
65. See eg., Overtime-on-Overtime-Administrative Interpretations, 10 N.A.M. LAW DiamEr
57 (1948).
66. Kerr, Employer Policies in Industrial Relations, 1945 to 1947, in LABOR IN POSTWAR
AMERICA 43, 47 (C. Warne ed. 1949). A sampling of radical contemporary opinion about NAM
may be gleaned from Messiahs of Feudalism, 52 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1615 (1935); The NAM
through the Ages, 93 NEW REPUBLIC 184 (1937); Hirsch, What is Big Business Up To?, FORUM AND
CENTURY, July 1938, at 3.
67. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 448 (statement of Ray-
mond Smethurst). Smethurst taught law at George Washington University and co-edited a casebook
on FLSA. CASES ON THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 (FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR
LAW) (R. Smethurst & R. Haslam eds. 1949). Haslam was also counsel for NAM.
68. In the course of the post-Portal-to-Portal Act hearings on FLSA, Representative Owens
(Rep. Ill.) suggested that premium overtime payments be calculated only on the minimum wage,
leaving organized workers to bargain for their own overtime. 4 Minimum Wage Standards and
Other Parts of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2515-17 (1947). The Wage and Hour Admin-
istrator opposed such a change. Id. at 2611-12. Other changes in overtime, dealing with so-called
overtime on overtime and irregularly scheduled hours, were enacted in the 1949 amendments to
FLSA, ch. 352, § 1, 63 Stat. 446 (1949); ch. 736, § 7, 63 Stat. 912 (1949).
69. Limiting the Time for Bringing Certain Actions under the Laws of the United States: Hearing
Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 21-23 (1945)
(testimony of Raymond Smethurst, counsel, NAM); Portal to Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 106-07
(testimony of Raymond Smethurst, counsel, NAM).
70. In various cases, Justices Roberts, Jackson, Stone, Frankfurter, and Burton stressed this
point repeatedly without success. See infra §§ III and VI.
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Demobilization in 1945 brought about a significant reduction in the
length of the workweek and, concomitantly, of real earnings. For exam-
ple, in the core sectors of military production, durable goods manufac-
turing, the organizing base of the CIO, average weekly hours plummeted
by one-seventh from April 1945 (46.5 hours) to June 1946 (39.8 hours).
As a result of postwar inflation, real weekly earnings of workers in these
industries declined during this period by one-sixth. Although the length
of the workweek leveled off by the beginning of 1947, inflation continued
unabated, and thus real earnings continued to decline, so that by the
height of the portal-pay movement in February, real weekly earnings in
durable goods manufacturing had dropped by 21.8 per cent since the end
of the war in Europe.71 While workers' real wages were falling and labor
was unable to persuade either the Democratic-controlled Seventy-Ninth
or the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress to raise the minimum
wage, 2 the Truman administration was reporting that "it is plain that
business in general is receiving exceptional profits.,
73
Of particular relevance to the labor movement was the federal gov-
ernment's conclusion that in 1947 "profits on the whole were above the
levels necessary to furnish incentives and funds for the expansion of busi-
71. Derber & Netreba, Money and Real Weekly Earnings During Defense, War, and Reconver-
sion Periods, 64 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 983, table 1 at 987, table 2 at 989, table 3 at 996 (1947). For
all manufacturing the corresponding decline was 16.6 per cent. A similar trend was reported for net
spendable weekly earnings of manufacturing workers (a category which takes into account social
security taxes). See Epstein & Snyder, Urban Price Trends, in LABOR IN POSTWAR AMERICA 137,
143-44 (C. Warne ed. 1949).
72. A number of bills introduced in the Seventy-Ninth Congress proposed not only increasing
the minimum wage to seventy-five cents, but also authorizing industry committees to set wage differ-
entials for skilled workers. Proposed Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Labor, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-20 (1945) (H.R. 3914, 3928, 4222, 4130, 3844,
3837, 3719); Amendments of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1945) (S. 1349); 1 Minimum Wage
Standards: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm on Education and Labor, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 21-25 (1947) (H.R. 40). For a summary of these failed legislative initiatives, see H.
Weiss and R. Gronewald, Wage and Hour Laws, in LABOR IN POSTWAR AMERICA 239, 240-45,
252-53 (C. Warne ed. 1949). For an impassioned and empirically supported plea for raising the
floor, see U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE WAGE & HOUR AND PUBLIC CON-
TRACTS DIVISIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1946, at 46-50 (1947). The Wage and Hour Administrator re-
peatedly urged these recommendations to Congress, in accordance with his duty under § 4 of FLSA,
until it finally amended FLSA in 1949 to raise the minimum wage to seventy-five cents. See U.S.
DEP'T. OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISION ANN. REP. FISCAL YEAR
1947, at 45-49 (1948); U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISION
ANN. REP. FISCAL YEAR 1948, at 57-61 (1949).
73. THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS, JAN. 8, 1947, at 5 (1947).
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ness and to promote the sustained health of the economy."'74 These eco-
nomic relationships fit well into the CIO's position that industry's
increased profits could comfortably accommodate wage increases.75 In
the so-called first-round of postwar wage increases,76 which extended
from the end of the war in Japan to the spring of 1946, the pattern called
for a rise of about eighteen per cent in weekly earnings.7 7 But with the
increase in the cost of living advancing more rapidly than the pattern
increase of the first round,78 pressure built up for a second round of in-
creases in the spring of 1947,79 which merely "offset advances in con-
sumer prices that followed the lifting of price controls subsequent to the
'first round' of wage raises."
80
In the interim between the first and second round, in late 1946, a
time of sharply contested claims to postwar national income and of nota-
ble reductions in living standards for the working class," the labor move-
ment, especially the CIO, may have viewed the mass filing of portal pay
74. THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS, JAN. 14, 1948, at 41
(1948).
75. See Nathan, A Wage Policy for 1947 Prepared for CIO, COM. & FIN. CHRONICLE, Dec. 19,
1946, at 3209, 3246-48. For industry's response, see Terbrough, Answering Mr. Nathan, COM. &
FIN. CHRONICLE, Dec. 26, 1946, at 3378-79.
76. The stages of wage decontrol, which permitted a phased return to collective bargaining, can
be tracked through the following executive orders: Exec. Order No. 9599, 10 Fed. Reg. 10,155
(1945); Exec. Order No. 9651, 10 Fed. Reg. 13,487 (1945); Exec. Order No. 9697, 11 Fed. Reg. 1691
(1946); Exec. Order No. 9801, 11 Fed. Reg. 13,435 (1946). For contemporary explanation, see U.S.
DEP'T. OF LABOR, THE NATIONAL WAGE STABILIZATION BOARD: JANUARY 1, 1946-FEBRUARY
24, 1947 ([ca. 1947]); H.M. Douty, Wage Policy, and the Role of Fact-Finding Boards, 62 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 537 (1946).
77. H.M. DOUTY, Review of Basic American Labor Conditions, in LABOR IN POSTWAR
AMERICA 109, 121 (C. Warne ed. 1949). Forty per cent of manufacturing workers received in-
creases in excess of the pattern, forty per cent received below-pattern increases, while twenty per
cent received no increase. The average for manufacturing as a whole was about eleven per cent.
When the final waves of the first round had spread out by October 1946, the aggregate average
reached 16.5 per cent. Id. at 122.
78. THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS, JAN. 14, 1948, at 39
(1948).
79. According to John Dunlop, a wage increase had become "necessary both from considera-
tions of politics and industrial relations" and "was essential, given the temper of wage earners and
the facts of labor organizations." Dunlop, The Decontrol of Wages and Prices, in LABOR IN POST-
WAR AMERICA 3, 5 (C. Warne ed. 1949). Bernstein argues that the framework policy provided by
the federal government was inept. Bernstein, The Truman Administration and Its Reconversion Wage
Policy, 6 LAB. HIsT. 214 (1965). See also Goodwin & Herren, The Truman Administration:
Problems and Policies Unfold, in EXHORTATION AND CONTROLS: THE SEARCH FOR A WAGE-PRICE
POLICY 1945-1971, at 9-48 (C. Goodwin ed. 1975).
80. Trends in Urban Wage Rates, September 1947, 66 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 45 (1948).
81. Significant light was shed on the class-differential impact of demobilization and inflation on
the real standards of living of representative classes in an eight-part front-page series entitled Family
Fortunes in the Wall Street Journal, which ran from December 18, 1946 to January 11, 1947.
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suits as furnishing additional bargaining strength. 2 Although the CIO
publicly asserted that portal pay was a completely separate issue from
general wage increases, 3 the press generally regarded the litigation as a
bargaining lever positioned to buttress demands for second-round wage
increases . 4 The CIO does not appear to have effectively projected the
principle at stake in its campaign." In any event, the press did not re-
port on explanations from labor's side comparable to the pithy and easily
comprehensible value-laden broadsides from employers denouncing por-
tal claims as essentially parasitic.8 6
By the time the Supreme Court had disposed of its final FLSA por-
t6l case in the fall of 1946,87 even NAM recognized that "[tihere [wa]s no
question that time spent in a manufacturing establishment walking from
a time clock to the place of employment, to the bench" was compensa-
ble.88 Yet only one portal pay settlement was prominently reported in
the fall of 1946. Involving Dow Chemical in Michigan and District 50 of
the United Mine Workers (the "UMW"), it was reached without resort
to litigation once it became "obvious to the company that the union
could collect portal-to-portal pay for its members by going to court, if
necessary, under the precedent set in the Mt. Clemens case."8 9 Business
Week expressly characterized the settlement as "A Second-Round Solu-
tion," which, if widely applied, might "eliminate the threat of serious
strikes without sharply boosting hourly rates."' Against the back-
ground of a six-year state statute of limitations, the agreement provided
for $360 in back wages to each of 11,000 present and former employees.
82. See, e.g., Loftus, Portal Pay Claims Reaching Billions; A Boon to Unions, N.Y. Times, Dec.
22, 1946, at 1, col. 6.
83. See, eg., Loftus, Portal Pay, Wages Separate, Says CIO, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1946, at 1,
col. 3; Portal Pay Asked By Electric Union, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1946, at 12, col. 3.
84. See, eg., The Portal-to-Portal Issue, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1946, at 16, col. 1 (editorial)
("lever for one of the largest mass wage demands in the nation's history"); Clark, U.S. Has $5 Billion
Stake in Limiting Back Wage Suits, Wall. St. J., Dec. 17, 1946, at 6, col. 5.
85. Philip Murray, the president of the CIO, thus engaged in understatement when he said that
the organization was "'interested in the application of portal-to-portal pay for all American indus-
try. The C.I.O. intends to find out why the portal-to-portal provisions in the Fair Labor Standards
Act which have long benefited the miners have not been made applicable to other wage earners.'"
Door-to-Door Pay, Bus. WK., Sept. 21, 1946, at 94, 95.
86. NAM, for example, saw portal pay demands as opening the way to new possibilities of
"'obtaining more pay without more work.'" NAM Group Seeks Labor Acts' Repeal, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 23, 1946, at 1, col. 2.
87. See infra § IV.
88. Smethurst, The Portal-to-Portal Issue, 13 VrrAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 204 (Jan. 15, 1947)
(NAM counsel delivering speech to NAM Congress on Dec. 5, 1946).




In addition to this retroactivity,91 future relief was offered in the form of
portal pay for walking from the clockroom to the lockers, clothes chang-
ing, and showering (if necessitated by chemical operations). In exchange
for this half-hour per shift of future overtime pay, the union decided to
forego its demand of a twenty-cent general wage increase.92 Although by
the end of 1946 Business Week reported that "[m]anagement recently
learned with considerable interest" of the Dow-UMW settlement,93 it ap-
pears to have served at best as a negative object lesson to employers.
Ironically, the Dow-UMW agreement interested unions-in particu-
lar, the CIO-a good deal more. Its general counsel, Lee Pressman, later
told Congress that the UMW's membership in the AFL created a com-
petitive situation which the CIO unions felt compelled to match. When
the CIO approached employers on the issue in the context of collective
bargaining, however, they responded that negotiations had become un-
necessary because Congress would soon amend FLSA to overrule the
pro-labor decisions of the Supreme Court.94 Congressional proponents
of strict anti-portal legislation insisted that the wave of portal litigation
was a conspiracy carefully orchestrated by the CIO, which they claimed
was infiltrated by Communists.9 5 Though protestations that the CIO un-
ions were passively following their membership may, in light of the obvi-
ous tactical collective bargaining consequences, seem difficult to credit,
some plausibility attaches to the claim that in fact once the inexorable
logic of the Supreme Court portal decisions became widely disseminated
by the very media that editorially fulminated against it, the pressure from
91. Management generally found retroactivity the most unacceptable aspect of portal-pay
claims. See Door to Door Pay, Bus. WK., Sept. 21, 1946, at 84.
92. A Second Round Solution, Bus. WK., Nov. 2, 1946, at 84.
93. Bus. WK., Dec. 14, 1946, at 98.
94. EXEMPTING EMPLOYERS FROM LIABILITY FOR PORTAL-TO-PORTAL WAGES IN CERTAIN
CASES, S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1947).
95. In the course of the 1947 congressional portal debates, Representative J. Parnell Thomas,
who the following year was convicted of taking kickbacks from his staff and imprisoned, asserted in
a dress rehearsal for Senator McCarthy:
As chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, I am in possession of certain
information dealing with the inspiration of the original portal-to-portal pay suit.... The
individual who is credited with concocting the idea of these suits, and the lawyer who
brought the original action ... both have long records of Communist affiliation.
93 CONG. REc. 538 (1947). Thomas was referring to Ben Riskin, the former research director of the
International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, and CIO counsel Lee Pressman. Forty years
later Riskin was "in his own words, proudest of 'helping to win the "portal to portal" decision
establishing the 8-hour day for all urderground miners in the U.S.' 2 THE COLD WAR AGAINST
LABOR 823 (A. Ginger & D. Christiano eds. 1987). Representative Rankin, another formidable
member of HUAC, charged that the portal litigation was a Communist plot to bankrupt the United
States. 93 CONG. REC. 1511 (1947).
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the rank-and-file who wanted a claim to back wages became too great to
resist. Indeed, it has even been suggested that union lawyers, apprehen-
sive of precisely the sort of congressional backlash that eventually en-
sued, unsuccessfully tried to channel the discontent.96
III. THE MINE OWNERS FAIL TO SAVE FACE-TO-FACE
A. Muscoda and the Alabama Iron Ore Miners
Certain activities are plainly "work".... Other activities fall in the hazy
penumbra; neither common understanding nor a priori reasoning will tell
us whether they are work or not. [U]nderground travel in iron mines fell
into the former category.... But walking to one's work place through a
yard and factory cannot be said to be so plainly "work" that there is no
room for a contrary understanding.
97
Organized miners furnished a powerful initial impetus to the move-
ment for portal-to-portal pay. Although accounts of this conflict have
usually focused on the alleged wartime political machinations of John L.
Lewis and the UMW designed to maneuver coal mine owners into rais-
ing wages outside the permissible limits of the so-called Little Steel
formula,98 iron ore miners in Alabama9 9 were, in point of fact, the pio-
neers in the portal pay dispute.
The UMW did not achieve its organizing breakthrough in the
Southern metal mines until the latter part of the 19 3 0 s,i"c when it suc-
ceeded in organizing the miners at the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Rail-
road Co. ("TCIR").1 °1 By the beginning of World War II, the
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers had organized
96. Telephone interview with Ernie Goodman, one of the chief portal-pay litigators in the 1940s
(April 2, 1990).
97. A. Cox, The Influence of Mr. Justice Murphy on Labor Law, 48 MICH. L. REv. 767, 807-08
(1950)..
98. See Stabilization Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 729, 56 Stat. 765 (codified as 50 App. § 961 et.
seq. (expired June, 1947)); Exec. Order No. 9250, 7 Fed. Reg. 7871 (1942); Exec. Order No. 9328, 8
Fed. Reg. 4681 (1943). The Little Steel formula was designed to enable wage increases to keep pace
with cost-of-living increases since January 1, 1941.
99. The Red Mountain mines near Birmingham recorded the second largest production in the
United States although the output was far inferior to that of the Mesabi range in Minnesota. Ten-
nessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944); Record at 4023,
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944) (No. 409).
100. See generally P. TAFr, ORGANIZING DIXIE: ALABAMA WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL ERA
110-16 (1981).
101. See Regensburger, The Emergence of Industrial Unionism in the South 1930-1945: The
Case of Coal and Metal Miners, in How MIGHTY A FORCE? STUDIES OF WORKERS' CONSCIOUS-
NESS AND ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 65, 90-92 (M. Zeitlin ed. 1983).
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not only TCIR, but also the Sloss-Sheffield and Republic Steel mines.10 2
These three companies, which owned the only substantial ore mines in
Alabama, 10 3 were all components of significant economic powers. TCIR
had been acquired by the largest steel producer, U.S. Steel, in 1907, while
Republic was the third largest steel producer in the United States; Sloss-
Sheffield Steel & Iron Corp. was affiliated with Allied Chemical & Dye
Corp., one of the largest chemical producers.)4
Precisely because the unions confronted such strong opponents, they
were unable to secure even partial travel time for such items as the trip
out of the mines. The CIO, for example, lost a strike over this issue
against Republic Steel between 1933 and 1935.'05 It was only in compli-
ance with the "Modified Portal to Portal Wage-Hour Opinion" issued by
the Wage and Hour Administrator on March 23, 1941, stating that effec-
tive May 1, 1941 the compensable workday began when the miner re-
ported at the collar of the mine,1 "6 that the Southern iron ore companies
began paying on a portal-to-portal basis. After the union, pursuant to
FLSA, again demanded back wages on behalf of 6,000 employees for
such work related travel time, which ranged from three minutes to forty
minutes at the various mines,"0 7 the employers filed a declaratory judg-
ment action10 on April 1, 1941 in the federal district court for Northern
Alabama to test the Administrator's ruling, which had formed the basis
of an agreement into which the parties entered on May 5, 1941.1°
102. Id. at 96-107. Before FLA went into effect, none of the mine owners had entered into
contracts with the unions. TCIR's first contract took effect in October 1938, Sloss-Sheflield's a year
later. Brief for Wage and Hour Administrator-Intervener at 26, Muscoda. Republic had never exe-
cuted a written agreement with the Smelters Union before the case went to trial. Brief for Petitioner
Republic Steel Corp. at 8.
103. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10.
104. See E. ARMES, THE STORY OF COAL AND IRON IN ALABAMA 517-24, 356-57, 452-57
(1910); PoOR's FINANCIAL RECORDS: 1941 INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2858, 3231, 2147,2149. A union
official stated in another context that TCIR was both "the single most profitable operation" of U.S.
Steel and "the most profitable in the entire steel industry." Amendments of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1092
(1945) (statement of David McDonald, Seey-Treas. United Steel Workers).
105. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 611-12 (1944).
106. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12. Record at 76-77.
107. Record at 121.
108. In their original petitions the plaintiff-employers made the named-defendant employees
class representatives of all their employees. Record at 34, 123, 183. This point does not appear to
have been litigated. Ironically, the Portal-to-Portal Act banned opt-out class actions, although even
earlier the courts refused to permit employees to prosecute such actions. See infra § VII.
109. Brief for Petitioner TCIR, at 5, 9; Muscoda, 321 U.S. at 592 n.3 613. The Wage and Hour
Administrator intervened in the action. Record at 304. In recounting these events, the dissent,
citing the aforementioned "Modified Portal-to-Portal Wage-Hour Opinion," states that, because por-
tal-to-portal pay "was a complete change of opinion, the Administrator announced that he would
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In retrospect it may have appeared that the plaintiff-employers
made a tactical error in seeking "a rigid definition of working time
favorable to them." 110 But given the weight of the extraordinarily sym-
pathetic facts in the miners' favor, especially in light of the conditions in
which miners had to work, the companies had little choice but to try to
deflect the court's attention from those facts. The trial judge wrote, how-
ever, that he was unable to oblige the employers' request for a declara-
tion "without consideration of the actual conditions" of transportation
"because transportation in the abstract might be construed to be a restful
and pleasurable activity for the passengers."11 The court then pro-
ceeded to describe the miners' travel conditions in some detail, including
the crowded cars, otherwise used for transporting iron ore and bearing
remnants of muck, and the overhead dangers lurking in the humid and
malodorous mines. The judge then promptly added that the recital was
"not for the purpose of censure of the plaintiffs' manner of maintenance
of their mines, for these conditions may well be normal conditions in iron
ore mines and practically inevitable."11 2 Though of little comfort to em-
ployers whose capital was immobilized in iron ore mining, the court un-
derscored its narrowly fact-specific holding by referring to the conditions
as "clearly.. .peculiar to the occupation of the men." '13 It then set forth
as additional criteria for determining whether travel time was compensa-
ble the employer's strict control and supervision of the workers "clearly
exercised in the interest of efficient operation of their mining busi-
not seek to compel ... restitution .. " 321 U.S. at 613. Since Congress did not authorize the
Department of Labor to collect back wages under FLSA until 1949, c. 736, § 14, 63 Stat. 919, the
Wage and Hour Administrator would not have been empowered to compel restitution. Indeed, the
Administrator urged Congress repeatedly to grant him such authority. See, eg., Proposed Amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act Hearings Before the House Comm. on Labor, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 867 (1945) (statement by Metealfe Walling); 4 Minimum Wage Standards and Other Parts of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 2280 (1947) (statement of Metcalfe Walling). Before
1949, the Administrator could seek to collect back wages (but not liquidated damages) by means of
consent judgments into which employers were often willing to enter for fear of a more unpleasant
alternative-namely, criminal process under § 16(a) or an injunction of the interstate shipment of
goods under § 17. See Tepper, Consent Judgments and Contempt Cases under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938, 22 B.U.L. REv. 390, 391-92 (1942); Foster, Jr., Jurisdiction, Rights, and Remedies
for Group Wrongs under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Special Federal Questions, 1975 Wisc. L.
REV. 295, 311-13.
110. Tennessee Coal, Iron & 1R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 137 F.2d 176, 183 (5th
Cir.1943) (denying reh'g).





ness." 14 That control manifested itself, for example, in the imposition of
discipline for infractions committed during the trip. The court then sum-
marized the test as to whether travel time constituted compensable work
time as whether the transportation "bears in a substantial degree every
indicia of worktime: supervision by the employer, physical and mental
exertion, activity necessary to be performed for the employers' benefit
and conditions peculiar to the occupation of mining."
115
In addition to urging the trial court to formulate a rigid definition of
working time, the mine owners also contended that the existence of a
venerable tradition in the industry not to pay for such travel time should
mandate a court decision in their favor. Ancillary to this claim was the
argument that the custom was of a kind that Congress must have
adopted in the FLSA overtime provision.1 16 The court, as it had done
with the demand for a rigid definition of work time, disposed of this posi-
tion on three levels. Empirically it found no evidence of such a custom
inasmuch as the workers were compensated on a tonnage or shift rather
than an hourly basis. 17 In tension with this conclusion was the finding
in the alternative that even if there were such a custom, "the methods of
payment of wages were dictated almost entirely by the employers. The
employees worked on the best terms they could obtain and the fact that
they could not obtain terms that would compensate them for time spent
in travelling underground to and from their working stations does not
indicate that they did not consider that time as working time."' 18 Thus,
even if Congress had meant to exempt certain wage customs from FLSA,
its intent with regard to such unilaterally imposed wage schemes could
not be divined. Finally, and potentially much more broadly, the trial
judge suggested that "it would be a mockery" of an avowedly remedial
statute if an occupational custom were permitted to avoid a congres-
sional mandate. 19 Here the court came perilously close to committing a
petitio principii since it failed to demonstrate that Congress, through
FLSA, specifically intended to cover such travel time.
In a very brief affirmance of the trial court's opinion and a denial of
114. Id.
115. Id. at 10.
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id. Before the Supreme Court, Republic Steel made the ambiguous statement that
although the wages were paid on a tonnage basis, "the rates of pay were fixed on evaluations made
on the hourly basis." Brief for Petitioner Republic Steel Corp. at 7. TCIR also used a combination
of tonnage, task, and incentive rates. Brief for Respondents at 12-15.
118. 40 F. Supp. at 8.
119. Id.
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the mine owners' petition for rehearing, the Fifth Circuit rested its deci-
sion on the trial court's last point. More ominously, however, but with a
possible nod to the controversy that was about to be unleashed, the ap-
peals court stressed that its task was to limit itself to the facts and issues
of the miners' working conditions without reference to any wider conse-
quences for other types of employment. 2 ° Though perhaps also pre-
scient, the majority was specifically responding to the dire predictions
voiced by the dissent.
The dissenter on the Fifth Circuit, Judge Sibley, stressed three equi-
table points in favor of the employers. First, even collective bargaining
agreements with strong unions excluded travel pay. Second, the travel
arrangements were "primarily for the benefit of the miner." And third,
the danger and discomfort of the trip was reflected in the pay scales.
121
Against that background, awarding double liquidated damages for time
and a half for riding time would confer upon the miners three times the
hourly rate for actual mining at the face. Finding this injustice shocking,
Judge Sibley predicted that if triple back pay were imposed on all iron
mines, "[m]any will go broke, or have to cease operations, causing a loss
of jobs to their men."1 22 As an illustration of the hardship to be ex-
pected, one of the old mines owned by the defendants required 1.5 hours
of travel time or nearly one-quarter of the seven-hour work day. A fur-
ther specter was conjured up in the form of the inevitable application of
the ruling to coal mines.
123
The owners appealed the Fifth Circuit's decision to the Supreme
Court, and Justice Frank Murphy wrote the Court's opinion. Justice
Murphy's decision arguably represents the all-time high point of sympa-
thetic FLSA jurisprudence, albeit one that did not pass unchallenged
even at the time by part of the Court. Present-day mantra-like formulaic
citations to key pithy passages of this opinion virtually never reveal the
peculiar context in which the opinion was embedded. Thus Murphy,
whom Time called "an eager beagle who is all heart-and-snuffies when-
120. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 135 F.2d 320, 322 (5th Cir.
1943).
121. Id. at 324.
122. Id. at 325.
123. Id. In denying the employers' petition for rehearing, the Fifth Circuit rejected their claim
that it was upholding the portal-to-portal theory as a matter of law. Rather, they were reaping what
they had sown inasmuch as they requested a pro-employer "rigid definition of working time": "They
now chide us for laying down such a definition against them." Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v.
Muscoda Local No. 123, 137 F.2d 176, 183 (5th Cir.1943).
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ever the legal hunt picks up the scent of something human,"' 2 4 described
the miners as crowded into ore box cars "covered with muck" in which
they are forced to ride "in a close 'spoon-fashion,' with bodies contorted
and heads drawn" to avoid the low mine ceilings: "Broken ribs, injured
arms and legs, bloody heads often result; even fatalities are not un-
known."' 25 At 3,000 to 12,000 feet in the "malodorous shafts," pro-
duced by "human sewage, resulting from a complete absence of sanitary
facilities," the "subterranean walks are filled with discomforts and hid-
den perils" including "exposed high voltage electric cables and wires"
and falling rocks.
126
Justice Jackson, who concurred in Murphy's opinion on the grounds
that the case posed no question of law or one "with a very obvious an-
swer" because, absent a "very exceptional showing of error," the
Supreme Court was bound to uphold the courts below, 127 regarded Mur-
phy's rhetorical flourishes as unnecessary to the holding. Thus privately
Jackson suggested to Murphy that the odor in the mines was irrelevant:
"'Would it alter the rights any ... if the mine smelled sweet as new-
mown hay?' "128
Jackson's austere and sanitized view of FLSA missed the point that
Murphy was trying to give to the Act: that it was designed to provide
statutory rights for employees, both organized and unorganized. For the
decidedly humanitarian tone and texture of the portal-to-portal decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court are not coincidentally the product of
Justice Murphy, who, his biographers agree, was guided by sympathy for
the working class.' 2 9 Nor was it coincidental that hard upon the graphic
124. The Judiciary Closing the Portal, TIME, Feb. 17, 1947, at 23.
125. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 595 n.9 and
596. The employers, workers, and the intervener all submitted as exhibits photographs of the miners
in the open-top cars that strongly convey the human-haulage aspects of the transportation. See
Record at 4466-67, 4509-12, 4537, 4608.
126. 321 U.S. at 596.
127. Id. at 604-05.
128. FINE, supra note 3, at 323 (quoting letter from Jackson to Murphy dated Mar. 2, 1944, in
Jackson's papers). That a plausible answer to Jackson's rhetorical question might have been yes
emerges from a release by the Wage and Hour Administrator, who had not yet determined whether,
because of the very unfavorable and hazardous conditions in the mines, the half-hour miners took to
eat underground was compensable. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 42; Record at 397-98, 403-04.
Later the Administrator determined that lunch periods of 30 minutes or more were not compensable
even if taken underground. WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL 241-42 (cumul. ed. 1944-45).
129. J.W. HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 402 (1968). R.
LUNT, THE HIGH MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT: THE POLITICAL CAREER OF FRANK MURPHY 16
(1965), also emphasizes the influence of the papal encyclicals. As mayor of Detroit in the 1930s,
Murphy apparently bought and perhaps read Marxist literature. See JOHNSON, MAURICE SUGAR:
LAW, LABOR, AND THE LEFt IN DETROIT 1912-1950, at 197 (1988).
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depiction of the travel conditions in the iron mines followed the almost
endlessly quoted affirmation of FLSA as "remedial and humanitarian in
purpose. We are not dealing here with mere chattels or articles of trade
but with rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of
their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others. Such a statute
must not be interpreted in a narrow, grudging manner." 130
While sounding humanitarian tones, Murphy did not go beyond the
lower courts' disposition of the employers' crucial claim of the existence
of a contrary custom. 131 Murphy's innovation, which triggered consider-
able scholarly criticism, focused not on the existence of custom, but on
its irrelevance: "But in any event it is immaterial that there may have
been a prior custom. . . . The Fair Labor Standards Act was not
designed to codify or perpetuate those customs and contracts which al-
low an employer to claim all of an employee's time while compensating
him for only a part of it."' 132 In an obituarial appreciation, Archibald
Cox, echoing Jackson's concurrence, regretted that Murphy had added
this principle of statutory construction. 133 And Murphy's principal biog-
rapher characterized the guideline as "a policy statement that went be-
yond the facts in Muscoda and was probably what provoked Frankfurter
to send Murphy a cautionary note after he had read the slip opinion."
134
Indeed, Fine conjectures that Murphy himself "was not as certain about
his policy as the opinion indicated" in light of his having written in the
margin of the slip opinion opposite the passage in question: "'Regardless
of well established understandings as to what constitutes compensable
work?' "135
Murphy answered his own question, though, by carefully circum-
scribing the potential expansiveness of his ruling: "This does not fore-
close, of course, reasonable provisions of contract or custom governing
the computation for work hours where precisely accurate computation is
difficult or impossible." 136 Since the travel time in the iron ore mines
could easily be calculated, however, Muscoda was not a hard case for
Murphy. Nor was it one of those "borderline cases where the other facts
130. 321 U.S. at 597.
131. His major addition consisted in what may have been an ironic citation of Blackstone to the
effect that custom "'must have been peaceable and acquiesced in; not subject to contention and
dispute.'" 321 U.S. at 602 n.17 (citing 1 Comm. 77).
132. Id. at 603.
133. Cox, supra note 97, at 805.
134. FINE, supra note 3, at 322.
135. Id.
136. 321 U.S. at 603.
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give rise to serious doubts as to whether certain activity or non-activity
constitutes work or employment." 137 Ironically, by virtue of his cen-
sured emphasis on the harsh conditions of the ore miners, Murphy fur-
nished the very grounds for distinguishing this case from those in which
employees encountered pleasant conditions of portal-to-portal travel.1 38
In a lengthy and acerbic dissent, in which Chief Justice Stone con-
curred, Justice Roberts attacked the opinion on several levels. To Mur-
phy's compassion Roberts counterposed the argument that the
compensability of travel time "should be approached not on the basis of
any broad humanitarian prepossessions we may all entertain, not with a
desire to construe legislation so as to accomplish what we deem worthy
objects, but in an effort strictly to divine congressional intent."' 139 Thus
"merely because the court thought that such activity imposed such hard-
ship on him [the employee] or involved conditions so deleterious to his
health or welfare that he ought to be compensated for them" did not
empower the Court to treat as work what neither contract nor custom of
the parties had ever so designated.1'"
It was on this issue of what Congress intended when it enacted
FLSA that the confrontation between majority and dissent became
pointed. Whereas Murphy viewed Congress as wanting "to achieve a
uniform national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work or
employment engaged in by employees covered by the Act," 4 ' Roberts
insisted that FLSA's "sole purpose was to increase employment, to re-
quire a fair day's pay for a fair day's work by raising the wages of the
most poorly paid workers and reducing the hours of those most over-
worked, and thus correct inequalities in the cost of producing goods and
prevent unfair competition in commerce." 142 The difference in emphasis
bore significant public policy consequences. For as was to become clear
in this dissent and other dissents in portal pay and overtime cases, one
wing of the Supreme Court, reflecting the views of large capital,1 43 took
the position that FLSA applied at best marginally to unionized workers
137. Id.
138. For this reason Cox's stricture appears misplaced when he states that: "Even in the hands
of the most pragmatic of judges the phrases used to explain one decision are apt to be applied as
formulas in later cases, divorced from their practical background." Cox, supra note 97, at 809.
139. 321 U.S. at 606 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 617.
141. Id. at 602.
142. Id. at 606-07.
143. Thus, for example, one of the petitioners had argued that FLSA was not intended "to
revolutionize conditions in industry which had been established by collective bargaining." Brief for
Petitioner Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. at 35-36, Muscoda.
[Vol. 39
CLASS STR UGGLE,4 T THE DOOR
already protected by collective bargaining agreements.'"
In the specific setting of the case, Roberts sought to reinforce his
insistence that "Congress expected the provisions of the Act to be fitted
into the prevailing practices and understandings as to what constituted
work in various industries" 4 ' by reference to the parallel and related
immunization of union contracts from scrutiny under FLSA. In the less
successful part of his argument, Roberts circularly defined statutorily
compensable work as "the actual service rendered to the employer for
which he pays wages in conformity to custom or agreement." 146 The
trouble with this framework is that where an unscrupulous employer had
secured a vested right to require employees to perform uncompensated
work through long years of acquiescence by its employees in superior
power that then crystallized into custom, "(a) license (for) the kind of
'sweating'... FLSA was intended to halt" would develop.' 47 Even if an
adjudicator were not concerned with the effect of such practices on the
employees, elimination of their untoward competitive impact on non-
sweating employers was indisputably congressional intent in passing
FLSA. In order to avoid this pitfall, the dissent was compelled to argue
that the custom of face-to-face pay, that is, compensation only for work
performed at the face of the mine to the exclusion of travel time, was the
product not of naked power but of the give-and-take of legitimate collec-
tive bargaining. 141
Roberts' first step in proving this contention was to sanction the
drawing of inferences for custom in iron ore mines from the experience in
coal mining based on the similarity of physical conditions. 49 Although
144. Justice Jackson clearly belonged to this wing. See E. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE:
ROBERT H. JACKSON 245 (1958). Murphy sought to refute this claim by reference to specific provi-
sions in FLSA giving effect to two kinds of collective agreements. 321 U.S. at 602 n.18.
145. Id. at 608.
146. Id.
147. Cox, supra note 97, at 804.
148. A Wall Street lawyer, a partner in the law firm of the former Secretary of War, Henry
Stimson, who played an important part in giving shape to the Portal-to-Portal Act, later used pre-
cisely such language of "friendly and ungrudging relations" in arguing that even where an employee
was not paid for nineteen minutes of what was indisputably preliminary or postliminary work, there
was no injustice because:
in most cases, nothing more is involved than the normal give and take which is required
of normal life. Legislation should not be designed to bring out and develop the worst
features in mankind. Mere picayuneness is not to be affirmatively developed by the hold-
ing out of a governmental shield to encourage and protect a demand for the "last mea-
sure of justice" to which one may be entitled.
Portal to Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 658 (testimony of Arthur Pettit).
149. 321 U.S. at 609.
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the next portal case to reach the Supreme Court would discredit Roberts'
claim of better conditions in iron ore mines,150 the important point omit-
ted by the dissent' was the vast difference in union strength between
coal miners on the East Coast and ore miners in Alabama. Thus whereas
some inference as to bargaining trade-offs and power might plausibly be
drawn from the UMW's pre-FLSA acceptance of face-to-face compensa-
tion in coal mining,'52 the lack of pre-FLSA "bona fide collective bar-
gaining" with recognized independent unions 153 by the powerful iron ore
mine owners' 54 rendered any comparison between the two unpersuasive.
The connection to the coal miners' claims for portal pay appeared
particularly pernicious and unjust to the dissenters, who noted that the
UMW had not raised a demand for portal pay until three days after the
appeals court issued its decision in Muscoda. Glossing the UMW's an-
nouncement that it desired "'to take advantage of the law which, under
the Alabama decision, grants them the right to be paid for the time they
are in the mines,' "'"" Roberts saw it as proof that the union understood
portal pay as a judicial declaration rather than a fact of industrial custom
or agreement. 156 The dissent's approach reveals that a segment of the
judiciary, like a segment of the employing class, was still unreconciled to
the sharp interventionist incursion into private agreements between those
of unequal bargaining power that FLSA represented. They did not un-
derstand nor accept that "FLSA is designed to defeat rather than imple-
ment contractual arrangements"' 157 and to impose instead by societal fiat
another standard, which the current structure of the labor market in that
industry would not have produced.158 In that sense, Roberts and Stone,
the only pre-New Deal holdovers on the Supreme Court, confused judi-
cial fiat with legislative directive.
150. See infra § III.B.
151. 321 U.S. at 609-10.
152. See infra § III.B. on how Murphy finessed this issue in granting portal pay to coal miners
in Jewell Ridge.
153. 321 U.S. at 601.
154. Roberts obscured this fact with various euphemisms for so-called agreements with com-
pany unions. See 321 U.S. at 611-12.
155. Id. at 617 (citing no source for the quotation).
156. Id. at 618.
157. Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1545 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
158. See Linder, The Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J. LEGIs. 151
(1990).
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B. Jewell Ridge: John L. Lewis and the Coal Miners
In every democratic country engaged in World War II, the coal mining
industry was the center of bitter and prolonged labor dispute. The United
States was no exception."59
A large portion of the World War II coal mining dispute involved
the politically explosive conflict over portal-to-portal pay. That this bat-
tle erupted in wartime was no coincidence. For "[d]uring World War II
the insatiable demand for coal forced the reopening of older mines whose
tunnels stretched well back into the hills. Entrance-to-face time length-
ened, lengthening in turn the work day of the miner by as much as two
hours."" By 1944, the President's Committee on Portal-to-Portal
Travel Time in Bituminous-Coal Mining reported that nationally coal
miners averaged almost one hour of portal travel daily.16 ' At the same
time and to some extent relatedly, the UMW had launched an attack on
the Roosevelt administration's imposition of a wage stabilization pro-
gram.' 62 Although the mine owners viewed the UMW's demand for por-
tal pay in 1943 as "a subterfuge which would compel the operators to
give 50 hours of pay for 35 hours of work-with time-and-a-half rates
applicable to the extra fifteen,"' 63 it was a subterfuge with a difference:
The figure of two dollars a day that Lewis initially demanded at the begin-
ning of negotiations was set by the January wildcatters, not by the union's
economists after scrutiny of cost-of-living indexes. Indeed, Lewis called
upon W. Jett Lauck, K.C. Adams and Percy Tetlow to develop a statistical
justification for this sum. Likewise, when Lewis, following the advice of
Lauck, decided to achieve the wage advance through the subterfuge of por-
tal-to-portal pay, he stumbled on to a genuine rank-and-file grievance.
64
Ironically, because the importance of portal pay in coal mining had virtu-
ally no counterpart elsewhere in the economy, 65 Lewis saw his portal
159. Suffern, The National War Labor Board and Coal, in I THE TERMINATION REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD: INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND WAGE STABILIZATION IN WAR-
TIME 1079 (n.d.).
160. R. ZIEGER, JOHN L. LEWIS: LABOR LEADER 139 (1988).
161. MONTHLY LAB. REv., July 1944, at 81.
162. See Warne, Coal-The First Major Test of the Little Steel Formula, in 1 YEARBOOK OF
AMERICAN LABOR: WAR LABOR POLICIES 278 (C. Warne ed. 1945); Daugherty & Derber, Wage
Stabilization, in I YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN LABOR: WAR LABOR POLICIES 162 (C. Warne ed.
1945); SEIDMAN, supra note 10, at 109-30.
163. See Warne, supra note 162, at 284.
164. M. DUBOFSKY & W. VAN TINE, JOHN L. LEWIS: A BIOGRAPHY 421 (1977).
165. A possible exception was logging. See Proposed Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1945) (statement of
Reuben Haslam, assoc. counsel, NAM, that travel time issue was pressing into lumber industry).
1991]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
pay campaign as helping his membership secure better wages without
triggering the wave of inflationary wage demands that the Roosevelt ad-
ministration feared.' 66
The portal-to-portal dispute in the coal mining industry arose when
the UMW presented its demand for an across-the-board increase of two
dollars per day at the wage conference with the mine operators in March
1943. When the dispute was certified to the National War Labor Board
("NWLB" or the "Board"), the NWLB agreed in principle "that any
payment for travel time should be so designated and paid for as an item
separate and apart from hourly or tonnage wage rates, in order that there
may be no doubt that travel time has been included in the mine workers'
compensation."'6 7 The NWLB, without issuing a decision, directed the
union to resume work under the terms of the old contract and negotia-
tions. With such a decision the union struck, the federal government
seized the mines, and work and negotiations were resumed-a cycle that
repeated itself several times in 1943. In its next ruling, the NWLB con-
ceded the UMW the right to demand portal pay, but rejected the specific
demand for equal pay for unequal travel times as "plainly and unmistak-
ably a demand for an 'indirect wage increase in violation of the wage
stabilization policies'....,168
Thwarted in its efforts with one group of operators, the UMW then
negotiated a portal agreement for a flat $1.25 per day with another
group. When the two sides submitted their agreement to the NWLB for
approval, the Board once again disapproved the portal pay provision on
the same grounds.' 69 The Board finally approved a second agreement
between the same parties that provided for an eight and one-half hour
day inclusive of travel time; all these hours were to be compensated at
straight-time rates with time-and-one-half for overtime. Although the
NWLB characterized the provision as a "true" portal pay method, it
seemed to have suspended disbelief, ultimately granting its approval "be-
cause we are convinced that when travel time is paid for the economic
inducement imposed on the operators will lead them to reduce the travel
time ... 17
166. See ZIEGER, supra note 160, at 140.
167. Coal Operators' Negotiating Committee of the Appalachian Joint Wage Conference v.
UMW, 8 War Lab. Rep. 502, 509 (1943).
168. Coal Operators' Negotiating Committee of the Appalachian Joint Wage Conference v.
13MW, 9 War Lab. Rep. 112, 118 (1943).
169. Illinois Coal Operators Assoc. v. UMW, 10 War Lab. Rep. 684, 684-86 (1943); id. at 686,
770 (CIO and AFL members, dissenting).
170. Illinois Coal Operators Assoc. v. UMW, 11 War Lab. Rep. 687, 688 (1943). The AFL
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In the welter of these events, the second in the trilogy of portal pay
cases to reach the Supreme Court, Jewell Ridge, like the iron-ore Mus-
coda case, also originated as a declaratory judgment action-filed by an
employer in July 1943 to test the legitimacy of the portal demand under
FLSA. The 1000 employees at the Virginia mines traveled as much as
eighty-eight minutes daily as far as five miles from portal to face.171
Transportation of the miners by the mine owner not only within but also
to the mine played a major part in the overall mobilization of the labor
force. As described by management, this activity bore strong resem-
blance to the transportation of machinery or raw materials. Thus plain-
tiff-employer's superintendent testified at trial that "[w]e have busses that
haul our employees from the surrounding country." 172 Absent an obli-
gation to pay for the time spent in such travel, the company conceded in
trial testimony that it had not exhausted the possibilities for reducing the
amount of travel time.1 73 The underground travel, or "man trips"-as
distinguished from coal hauling-were, the mine superintendent testified,
for the convenience of the company; otherwise, he said, the miners would
work where coal was more easily mined. 74 The company was even more
to the point when it stated, "If a man has to walk there, he isn't worth
anything when he gets there. The idea is to get him there able to work
... [I]t wouldn't be practical to try to operate the mine ... having to
walk from the driftmouth in.",
75
As to the level of exertion required of the miners during travel, a
former miner who had risen to the presidency of the United Eastern Coal
Sales Corp. 176 testified: "I don't think traveling is work. Because I elect
members of the Board dissented on the grounds that although the majority indicated that travel time
was work time, the majority approved only half-time pay for the travel. Id. at 693-94. After another
round of government seizure, the agreement concluded between Lewis and Secretary of Interior
Ickes was adopted in December 1943 by operators accounting for two-thirds of coal output; the
collective bargaining agreement provided for eight hours of productive work and forty-five minutes
of travel time daily, with the latter compensated at two-thirds the rate of the former. The owners
also agreed to pay each employee forty dollars in settlement of all portal claims that had accrued
after April 1, 1943 in return for dropping all prior claims. See Warne, supra note 162, at 299 n. 17.
171. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, UMW, 53 F. Supp. 935, 937 (W.D. Va. 1943);
Record at 6 (Complaint), Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 161 (1945)
(No. 721).
172. Record at 242, Jewell Ridge (emphasis added). Although the issue was not pursued on
appeal, the district court inquired whether the 400 miners were entitled to portal pay for the time
spent on the buses and trucks to the mine. 53 F. Supp. at 949-50.
173. Record at 245, Jewell Ridge.
174. Record at 256.
175. Record at 257-59.
176. Since it was obvious that Jewell Ridge was a test case, other entities sought to intervene as
plaintiffs in the proceedings. In ruling on the Southern Coal Producers' Association's motion, the
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to live in Scarsdale, New York, and take the 8:22 every morning.., isn't
any reason why my salary should be raised above the fellow who lives in
the apartment house right across the street from the Graybar build-
ing." '17 7 When challenged as to the differences between his mode of
transportation and that of his erstwhile colleagues, he replied:
There isn't any more difference relatively than to try to stand up in a coach
train from New York to Washington and you sitting in your comfortable
seat in a Pullman.... You can't run Pullman trains in a coal mine, but
there isn't any more discomfort in a ride in a trip of mine cars at the rate of
six miles an hour than there is sitting in that chair.
178
Although the trial judge who ruled on the owners' request for in-
junctive relief recognized that the man trips were necessary for the suc-
cessful operation of the mines and benefited the company by "promoting
safety, orderliness and increased productiveness," he found that they also
benefited the workers themselves "by saving their time and energy, and
thus increase their productiveness." 179 This reasoning cannot, at first
sight, be denied a certain logic. There is virtually no facility that employ-
ers confer on their employees that does not simultaneously benefit both.
But it is precisely that characteristic that points up the inherent untrust-
worthiness of "benefit" as a criterion of compensability. For employers
could argue that the provision of machinery at the workplace also bene-
fits the workers by saving their time and energy and increasing their pro-
ductiveness, thus leading to the conclusion that time spent working on
the machine need not be compensated. Even Justice Murphy's eventual
modification-"[e]xertion pursued necessarily and primarily for the ben-
efit of the employer and his business" 8°0-does not explain how to deter-
mine which party is benefited more.
Although this indeterminacy becomes particularly acute in the case
of transportation furnished by the employer from the employee's perma-
nent residence to the employer's door,1 81 it is dissipated considerably
district court conceded that as a matter of abstract fairness the employer's bargaining representative
should be permitted to intervene because its counterpart, the UMW, was a defendant. But doubting
its power to make the employees of intervenor's members in other jurisdictions parties defendant
without their consent, the court denied the motion but permitted entry as amicus. Jewell Ridge Coal
Corp. v. Local No. 6167, UMW, 3 F.R.D. 251, 253-55 (W.D. Va. 1943).
177. Record at 164, Jewell Ridge.
178. Id.
179. 53 F.Supp. at 939.
180. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 161, 165 (1945).
181. It was precisely this slippery slope to "pillow-to-pillow" wage claims that opponents con-
jured up in order to discredit the narrower portal-pay demands. 93 CONG. REC. 1493 (1947) (Rep.
Hobbs). See also Topics of the Times, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1947, at 20, col. 4 (extended ad absurdum
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once the travel is confined to the employer's premises, as it is in the tril-
ogy of portal cases decided by the Supreme Court. This consideration is
not legalistic, but rather reflects the employer's power to structure the
arrangements and hence to reduce the time involved.182 Thus it is not so
much that during the trip the employer controls the employee but rather
the transportation itself that is relevant.18 3 Although in terms of cost
analysis the employee might have an incentive to reduce such idle-albeit
unpleasantly spent-time, he is foreclosed from reducing the distance
traveled or the speed of the means of transport. 84 Only if the employer
joke). Directly after the War a district court furnished the following socio-economic answer to the
question of home-to-worksite travel:
The defendant then, if it did not furnish transportation, would have available to it as
employees only those who had automobiles and thus [sic] able to furnish their own trans-
portation. Necessarily then, in obtaining employees, the defendant, in place of having
access to a restricted and unlimited labor market, would have access only to a restricted
and limited labor market.... It cannot be said that ... the facility was not provided
primarily for the benefit of the defendant in carrying on its business, and without which
it probably could not be carried on at all.... [A]ny choice the employees had was a
"Hobson's" choice.
Walling v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 66 F. Supp. 913, 918 (D. Mont. 1946). In other words,
the workers could either accept the facilities or not work for the company at all. Unfortunately, with
the same logic "employee" and "employer" would be interchangeable. Thus workers without access
to automobiles would have been participants in a restricted labor market, while the company was
faced with a Hobson's choice of offering transportation or not operating a mine at all. This problem
appears largely confined to infrastructurally underdeveloped areas that are further characterized by
many low-income residents whose numbers exceed the opportunities for local employment. When a
firm then seeks to exploit some natural resource, the workers' penury would in the normal case
presumably permit the employer to dictate whether travel time was paid. In the alternative, if the
anticipated duration of the exploitation warranted it, the state, in an effort at community develop-
ment, could either require such firms to build housing closer to the employment site or to establish
public transportation or subsidize either or both.
182. The time appeared long past in which mine owners contended that they could not control
face workers, who set their own starting and stopping times and saw their "boss less often than once
a day." C. GOODRICH, THE MINER'S FREEDOM: A STUDY OF THE WORKING LIFE IN A CHANG-
ING INDUsTRY 41, 43(1925) (emphasis in original). Although mine operators do not appear to have
challenged coverage under FLSA on the grounds that miners were independent contractors, other
employers were seeking to raise this claim in the 1940s. See Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-
Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 236 (statement of Irving Richter, UAW); 4 Minimum Wage Standards
and Other Parts of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2846-48 (1947) (statement by group of
Cleveland, Ohio firms). The Wage and Hour Administrator energetically opposed this effort. Id. at
2621.
183. To the extent, however, that management already places workers under its command even
before the travel begins, this rationale supersedes the considerations discussed in the text. Thus it
was held that the FLSA clock started running at the portal of a silver mine because that was "where
the workmen are to appear at a specified time... under the control and direction of" the employer.
Sunshine Mining Co. v. Carver, 41 F. Supp. 60, 66 (N.D. Idaho 1941).
184. Even in the absurd and unrealistic situation in which the miners were "permitted" to walk
for hours from portal to face and back, although miners might be able to choose the speed at which
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were obligated, to pay for the travel time would it have an incentive to
restructure the worksite in such a way as to reduce the time and hence
the wage outlay. Indeed, the NWLB ultimately approved a portal pay
settlement in the coal industry precisely on these grounds. 18 5
Finding that the transportation benefited the employees and the em-
ployer, that the supervision during the trip was limited to enforcement of
safety rules, and that the travel was less hazardous than other coal min-
ing operations, the trial judge concluded that none of the travel time met
the criteria of compensability. 186 Of far greater consequence for the fu-
ture course of portal pay, however, was the court's discussion of the role
of custom and agreement, which had played a subordinate part in Mus-
coda. For not only had face-to-face been the universal mode of payment
in the bituminous coal industry for a half-century, but defendants, plain-
tiff's employees, had been organized and represented since 1933 by the
UMW, all of whose post-FLSA collective bargaining agreements had
been premised on face-to-face arrangements. 1 7 Weighty too in the
judge's mind was the ore miners' concession in Muscoda that the UMW
was a strong union with the power to paralyze production by strikes.'
In addition, the judge found significant a 1940 letter written jointly
by the UMW and the mine owners to the Wage and Hour Administrator
disavowing portal pay:
The uniform high rates of pay that have always been included in the
wage agreement of the mining industry contemplate the employee's work-
ing day beginning when he arrives at his usual working place. Hence travel
time was never considered as a part of the agreement or obligation of the
employer to pay for... since the eight-hour day was established in the
industry-April 1, 1898 ....
[A]ny ruling requiring such a change in the custom, tradition and con-
tract provision so as to change the work day from "seven hours' work... at
the usual working places" to any new standard... and to the adjustment of
wage rates made necessary thereby, would create so much confusion.., as
to result in complete chaos, and would probably result in a complete stop-
page of work at practically all of the coal mines in the United States. Such
a ruling, moreover, would establish such diversity of time actually spent at
productive work as between different bituminous coal mines and within
each mine that there would be no basis on which any general wage scales
they walked, they would not and could not determine where the portal and where the face were
located. The same would be true of large factories.
185. Illinois Coal Operators Assoc. v. MW, 11 War Lab. Rep. 687, 688 (1943).
186. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, UMW, 53 F. Supp. 935, 939 (W.D. Va. 1943).
187. Id. at 939-40.
188. Id. at 948-49.
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would be predicated, collective bargaining would therefore be rendered im-
possible,. . . and the very purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act would be
defeated... [which] was passed... to aid workers in industries that had
unreasonably long hours and unreasonably low rates of pay, as contrasted
with the short hours and the high rates of pay in the bituminous coal
mines. 1
89
In concluding the letter, the union and the operators urged the Wage and
Hour Administrator to issue a supplement to his Interpretative Bulletin
No. 13 stating that the definition of working time set forth in the Appa-
lachian Agreement, which embodied the custom and traditions of the
industry, complied with FLSA and Bulletin No. 13 on the grounds that
"'reasonable standards agreed upon between the employer and the em-
ployee will be accepted for the purposes of the Act.' "190 The Adminis-
trator replied to Houck on July 18, 1940 that face-to-face compensation
"would not be unreasonable," repeating this position in a public state-
ment a few days later.191
The judge also found significant that in first presenting its demand
for portal pay at a wage conference in March 1943, the UMW "only
contended for it then as an additional basis for its demand for a general
wage increase to all mine workers" of two dollars per day. 192 Lewis's
189. Id. at 940-41. The history behind this letter may be recounted briefly. Early in its exist-
ence, the Wage and Hour Division had upheld portal-to-portal pay in the Cornucopia Gold Mine on
the grounds that it had been a long-standing custom and tradition. Record at 683, 685, Jewell Ridge.
In 1940, a Wage and Hour investigation of a coal mine in Pennsylvania concluded that face-to-face
compensation was proper, but added that if the Cornucopia rule were applicable, the coal mine
would owe $70,000 in back wages. After the mine owner brought this information to President
Lewis's attention, both the UMW and the mine operators told the Wage and Hour Division from
time to time that they opposed any construction of FLSA requiring travel pay. Then on July 7,
1940, the Appalachian Joint Conference Negotiating Committee and the director of the legal depart-
ment of the UMW, Earl Houck, sent Wage and Hour Administrator Fleming a letter memorializing
their joint position. Houck's letter was approved by UMW vice-president Philip Murray while
Lewis was sick. When the operators released this letter to embarrass Lewis in connection with the
Jewell Ridge litigation, "Lewis repudiated the letter, saying that neither Houck nor any other em-
ployee of the United Mine Workers was authorized to speak for the policy, principles, or purposes of
the organization." S. ALINSKY, JOHN L. LEwIs: AN UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 352-53 (1949).
190. 53 F. Supp. at 940-41.
191. Id. at 941. Fleming later characterized his decision, which had been reached with consid-
erable difficulty, as having been dictated by the unique length and uniformity of face-to-face compen-
sation. Record at 692-96 (reproducing Fleming, Collar-to-Collar vs. Face-to-Face, 142
ENGINEERING & MINING J. (April 1941)). In the memorandum submitted to the Supreme Court as
amicus in Jewell Ridge, Fleming stated that his earlier distinction between metal and coal mining,
which had not been guided by legal principles but by his reluctance to disturb collective bargaining
practices, had become untenable in the light of Muscoda. His failure to intervene in the coal case
resulted solely from his desire not to influence the litigation. Memorandum for the Administrator of
the Wage and Hours Division as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, 5, Jewell Ridge.
192. 53 F. Supp. at 941.
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biographers have explained his supra-individual approach to portal pay
as rooted in the assumption "that travel time would have to be calculated
on an individual basis for each miner. The union naturally wanted to
avoid the divisiveness this would foster among the rank and file. The
union also feared that in establishing travel time in line with the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which also provided for the forty-hour week, the
mine workers would weaken their claim to a seven-hour day." '193 What
remains puzzling about this explanation is that the Houck letter had in-
dicated that the man trips,
are scheduled to leave the... opening of the mine at a certain hour, so that
all the employees will reach their working places by the hour at which work
regularly begins at the working places throughout the mine, and these trips
are also scheduled to leave the inside of the mine ... at the conclusion of
the seven-hour period of work at the working places.1
94
In other words, all miners worked seven hours at the face, but some were
required to travel longer than others. It is not clear why this differential
in individual unpaid travel time should be less divisive than the differen-
tial in individual paid travel time.195
Both the union's demands at the wage conference and the Houck
letter not only influenced the trial judge's decision in Jewell Ridge but
also allowed employers to convince the press and a majority of Congress
that they were the aggrieved party in the portal-to-portal pay contro-
versy. Wresting that role away from workers who alleged that they were
being robbed of compensation for precious minutes of work, capital suc-
cessfully projected an image of well-paid workers who were trying to
snooker their employers into paying triple back wages for time that they
had solemnly covenanted to be noncompensable. Assuming that much
of the non-mining population presumably regarded any sort of venturing
into a coal mine as a harrowing prospect to be avoided at most if not all
costs, management cannot be gainsaid a significant propaganda victory in
convincing some segment of the public that miners ought not be paid for
one hour a day they spent deep in the bowels of the earth.
The trial judge also made much of the UMW's alleged untrustwor-
thiness in citing Lewis's testimony at the FLSA hearings in 1937, when
he opposed governmental interference with collective bargaining out-
193. DUBOFSKY & VAN TINE, supra note 164, at 421-22.
194. 53 F. Supp. at 952 n. 1.
195. Presumably miners did not rotate with regard to closer and more remote working places,
for in that case there would have been no individuation problems in calculating portal pay.
[Vol. 39
CLASS STR UGGLE A T THE DOOR
comes in excess of statutory standards.196 Cast as apostates, the UMW
defendants failed, finally, to impress the court with their amended an-
swer, which contended that when their collective bargaining agreement
expired at the end of March 1943, FLSA (and portal-to-portal principles)
began to control. Rejecting as irrelevant the union's disclaimer of any
overtime that had accrued before April 1, 1943, the district judge pointed
out the inconsistency: "If the Fair Labor Standards Act... required the
inclusion of travel time as work time, it did so irrespective of contract,
and if there was a contract to the contrary, the contract would be ineffec-
tive as against the Act."19 7
The union appealed the trial judge's decision, and the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed what it otherwise found a convincing decision on the basis
of the supervening Muscoda decision by the Supreme Court, which it
found indistinguishable. 9 ' Neither of the possible exceptions to the
principle that travel time is compensable work time mentioned by Justice
Murphy in Muscoda-the impossibility of precise computation of time or
borderline cases-applied to the coal miners' situation. Moreover, the
appeals court appeared reassured that "[tihe disturbing effect of the deci-
sion here will not be so great as it otherwise would, in view of the fact
that, by agreement between the miners and operators, the portal to portal
system.., has now been adopted in the industry." '199 Consequently, the
overtime claims for the period between April 1, 1943 and June 20, 1943,
which amounted to a mere $40 per miner, constituted what had been
awarded other miners as a result of settlement of portal claims.2"
Having achieved only two-thirds pay for travel time in 1943, Lewis
196. 53 F. Supp. at 943 (citing The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937 Joint Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Education and Labor and the House Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 281
(1937)). To be sure, Lewis was testifying about the powers of a labor standards board to set wages in
various industries, a provision that was ultimately not enacted.
197. Id. at 950.
198. Local No. 6167, UMW v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 145 F.2d 10, 11 (4th Cir. 1945). The
district court decision had been handed down in January 1944, the Supreme Court decision in Mus-
coda in March 1944.
199. 145 F.2d at 13.
200. 145 F.2d at 13, 15. The dissenter was considerably less persuaded by the voluntary nature
of such settlements, pointing out that strikes had led to an agreement between Lewis and the Secre-
tary of the Interior including portal-pay provisions to which the greater part of the industry yielded.
Id. at 15. Jewell Ridge remained in litigation because the Southern Coal Producers' Association, of
which Jewell Ridge was a member, refused to participate in the Ickes-Lewis agreement of November
3, 1943, which coal operators accounting for two-thirds of national output had accepted. The South-
ern Coal Producers Association adhered to the position that travel time was not work time. Because
the Association refused to join the agreement, the United States Government continued to operate
the member mines. See Warne, supra note 162, at 297 n.15, 299 n.18.
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demanded the full rate for all travel time (including time and one-half
after seven hours in the mine) when negotiations over renewal of the
contract began on March 2, 1945. A week later the Supreme Court
heard oral argument in Jewell Ridge. As the familiar scenario of walk-
outs by the miners and government seizure of the mines was replayed,
0 1
pressure, Justice Jackson later alleged,2 "2 was exerted on Justice Murphy
to hand down an opinion quickly in order to influence the outcome of the
negotiations in favor of the UMW.20 3 Writing for the majority, Murphy
framed the sole issue on appeal as whether Muscoda was controlling.
20 4
Making short shrift of the petitioner's and the district court's reasoning,
he summarily found that underground travel in bituminous coal mines
satisfied the three elements of compensable work set forth in Muscoda: 1.
physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not); 2. exertion
controlled or required by the employer; and 3. exertion pursued necessar-
ily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.20 5
Thus, for example, conditions in the coal mines, though less burdensome
than those under which iron ore miners traveled, caused the workers to
watch out for low and falling ceilings.2 "6
The lack of subtlety characteristic of the opinion, large parts of
which consisted merely of quotations from Muscoda,2°7 was most promi-
nent in the resolution of the issue regarding for whose benefit the work
was performed. Asserting that the answer was "too obvious to require
extended discussion," Murphy noted that the workers "do not engage in
this travel for their own pleasure or convenience" but only as "a neces-
sary prerequisite to the extraction of coal... which is the prime purpose
of petitioner's business."20 8 In his hurried zeal to vindicate the rights of
the workingman, Murphy failed to think through this approach, which
in its open-endedness might have been applicable to employees driving
201. Warne, Industrial Relations in Coal, in LABOR IN POSTWAR AMERICA 367, 368-69 (C.
Warne ed. 1945).
202. See infra § VI.
203. See E. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 247-51 (1958). The Chief
Justice originally assigned the opinion to Jackson, but when Reed switched his vote, Black assigned
it to Murphy. FINE, supra note 3, at 325. Although Murphy apparently did not expedite issuance of
the decision, which was handed down May 7, 1945, the UMW achieved all its bargaining objectives
later that month.
204. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 161, 162 (1945).
205. Id. at 164-66.
206. Id. at 164.
207. The mechanical quality of the opinion raises the question as to why the Court did not
merely deny the petition for certiorari or issue a summary affirmance.
208. 325 U.S. at 161, 165, 166.
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their own automobiles to work in heavy traffic on dangerous roads.
What the opinion lacked in logic, it made up for in empathetic language.
With this language Murphy effectively subverted the plausibility of any
argument that such extraordinary travel on the employer's premises
might nevertheless be noncompensable:
Those who are forced to travel in underground mines in order to earn their
livelihood are unlike the ordinary traveler or ordinary workman on his way
to work. They must journey beneath the crust of the earth, far removed
from the fresh and open air and from the beneficial rays of the sun....
From the moment they enter the portal until they leave they are subjected
to constant hazards and dangers; they are left begrimed and exhausted by
their continuous physical and mental exertion.
To conclude that such subterraneous travel is not work is to ignore
reality completely.209
As in Muscoda, Murphy once again rejected the argument that the
mining industry's custom dictated that workers receive no pay for travel
time.210 In Jewell Ridge, however, he emphatically added that not even
the best employers were immune from FLSA's injunction to pay for all
time worked: "Conversely, employees are not to be deprived of the bene-
fits of the Act simply because they are well paid or ... represented by
strong bargaining agents."2"' Presumably because Lewis's wage de-
mands never envisioned individualized portal pay, Murphy stated in dic-
tum that the Court was not foreclosing "the validity of agreements
209. Id. at 166.
210. In his dissent, Jackson criticized the majority for its neglect of a recent unanimous opinion
by Jackson in which the Court had held that a determination of whether waiting time was compen-
sable working time involved "'scrutiny and construction of the agreements between the particular
parties' ": "'The law does not impose an arrangement upon the parties. It imposes upon the courts
the task of finding what the arrangement was.'" Id. at 192-93 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 137 (944)). Absolutized out of context, this principle is clearly a misstatement of the
law. In a number of important respects FLSA certainly does "impose an arrangement upon the
parties." The parties cannot, for example, agree that the hourly wage will be less than the statutory
minimum. It may, nevertheless, be reasonable, where employees are "on call" for such extended
periods of time that they are permitted to sleep and to eat and otherwise to engage in "pursuits of a
purely private nature which would presumably occupy the employees' time whether they were on
duty or not," Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139, to permit agreements to provide "compen-
sation for a reasonable portion of time in addition to" the actual physical work insofar as the "em-
ployee gives more to his employer than actual physical labor. He gives his time-for he is not free to
sell it elsewhere." U.S. DEP'T. oF LABOR, FIRsT ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE WAGE & HOUR DIVISION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1939, at 13 (1940). Ironically, however, that
principle was mere dictum in Skidmore because the agreement called for no compensation for pure
on-call waiting time. Had that arrangement been controlling, Jackson would not have reversed and
remanded the case. In any event, the majority in Jewell Ridge impliedly resisted Jackson's bid to
extend the principle beyond the very narrow and unusual sphere of 24-hour on-call work.
211. 325 U.S. at 167.
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whereby, in a bona fide attempt to avoid complex difficulties of computa-
tion, travel time is averaged or fixed at an arbitrary figure and under-
ground miners are paid on that basis rather than according to their
individual travel time." '212 Returning to the principle of the case before
him, however, Murphy concluded that "each of petitioner's miners re-
ceive his own reward according to his own labor.1
21 3
The dissenters (and scholarly commentary) pounced on Murphy's
contradiction between individualized portal-pay and collective bargain-
ing agreements. Jackson, joined by Chief Justice Stone, Roberts and
Frankfurter, wrote a dissent three times as long as the majority opinion,
detailing the history of the portal pay controversy in coal mining. Point-
ing out that the industry now operated under a portal pay scheme (as
part of the Ickes-Lewis agreement), worked out as a result of the federal
government's seizure of the mines in 1943, which in effect prospectively
credited each miner with forty-five minutes of travel time regardless of
his actual time so spent, Jackson noted that the collective bargaining
agreements based on this scheme did not even purport to comply with
FLSA.21 4 Consequently, the Court had brought "into question the valid-
ity of all existing mine agreements":
215
If it is illegal for the operators and the miners by collective bargaining to
agree that there shall be no travel time, it is obviously equally illegal to
agree that travel time shall be fixed at an arbitrary figure which does not
conform to the facts.... Moreover, the averaging means that a part of the
travel time earned by one miner is taken away from him and given to an-
other who has earned less than the average, a procedure utterly unwar-
ranted in the statute .... 216
Thus by unnecessarily suggesting that the Court might approve a
212. Id. at 170.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 188-91.
215. Id at 188.
216. Id. at 191. Even a sympathetic labor law scholar could not discern "any intellectually
satisfying basis" for the corner Murphy had argued himself into:
mhe union and the operators have for some years mutually agreed that in this industry
underground travel shall not be treated as work. These agreements have, since the effec-
tive date of the Act, been either valid or invalid. To say that they were invalid is to say
that the Court would have been obliged to strike them down at the insistence of an
individual employee even though both the union and the operators had been urging the
Court to sustain them.... It is difficult to believe that a majority of the members of the
Court would have held the agreements invalid if the case had come before them prior to
the date of the union's change of front.
Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 321, 354, 355
(1946).
CLASS STRUGGLE AT THE DOOR
pseudo-portal pay arrangement that clearly contradicted the principle of
individuation set forth in his opinion, Murphy unwittingly confirmed
that there might after all be practical reasons for deviating from FLSA in
the coal industry.2" 7 He thereby made it easier for opponents of portal
pay to attack its underpinnings.21 8
Jackson also devoted considerable attention to showing that both
the legislative history of FLSA and the contemporaneously enacted Bitu-
minous Coal Act evinced an intent to stabilize the industry by collective
bargaining.2 19 While the dissenters conceded that Congress intended to
invalidate collective bargaining agreements that failed to secure employ-
ees minimum wages or overtime in compliance with the standards set by
FLSA,220 they did not join issue on the central claim raised by portal pay
demands. This was the allegation that the face-to-face method did not
compensate the miners for all the hours they worked. To be sure, the
dissent sought to undercut this argument by pointing out that counsel for
the union had noted that "the wage scale was fixed at a level intended
indirectly to compensate travel time." '221 But this response was irrele-
vant because its cogency was confined to minimum wage claims, whereas
the portal pay cases were all based on overtime.2 2
IV. MT. CLEMENS POTrERY COMPANY: THE CIO KNOCKS AT
INDusTRY's DOOR
After learning that the CIO would demand portal-to-portal pay in all
American industries, the justice wrote his brother approvingly, "This case
217. See Dodd, supra, at 355.
218. This outcome is puzzling in light of the fact that Murphy removed his initial statement that
the Court was not adjudicating the validity of agreements to average rather than to individuate
travel time "after Rutledge pointed out to him that this assertion seemingly contradicted his 'basic
premise that contract cannot make work not work.'" FINE, supra note 3, at 326.
219. 325 U.S. at 175-82. For a sophisticated analysis of the peculiarities of competition among
coal producers, which unfortunately ends shortly before the period under discussion, see J. Bow-
MAN, CAPITALIST COLLECTIVE ACTION: COMPETITION, COOPERATION, AND CONFLICT IN THE
COAL INDUSTRY (1989).
220. 325 U.S. at 177.
221. 325 U.S. at 172.
222. The reason that this issue was never joined may lie in the relatively abstract plane on which
the Supreme Court disposed of the case, which did not require it to delve into the mundane empirical
intricacies of the prevailing wage system at the Jewell Ridge mines. Some confusion may have en-
veloped the overtime issue as a result of the fact that although the 1940 Houck letter indicated that
miners were paid eighty cents per hour for a thirty-five hour week, the miners at Jewell Ridge were
paid according to piece (tonnage) rates. These rates were apparently designed to secure parity with
the hourly guarantee, which may have operated as a floor. See 325 U.S. at 183, 184 n.9; Record at
63-64, 612-13, 624-26, 630, Jewell Ridge.
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may be the turning point in the economy of the country.... I did not write
it to unstabilize conditions in this country, but I did write it to make secure
the rights of man. History... will record that it has made a step forward
for those who toil by the sweat of their brow for their bread." 22?
A. Background of the Last of the Portal-to-Portal Trilogy
As indicated in § I and § II, portal litigation up to this point dealt
with underground (mining) or outdoor (forestry) places of production,
which created unusual problems of access and uncommonly extended
and hazardous travel. Unable to discern a more encompassing principle
at stake, industrial employers and their counsel paid relatively little at-
tention to these earlier portal decisions.224 The final case in the Supreme
Court portal-to-portal trilogy, however, involved a medium-size factory
like thousands of others in the United States. Precisely because of the
factory's ordinariness and the near-universality of its compensation prac-
tices, a ruling that FLSA had been violated "would mean that nearly
every plant in the country would be in violation of the law and that bil-
lions of dollars in retroactive payments and liquidated damages could
now be assessed against thousands of companies .... .221 The workers'
223. FINE, supra note 3, at 332.
224. A significant exception was a memorandum from NAM's law department of Nov. 3,
1944-that is, after the Supreme Court's Muscoda decision but before it reversed the Fourth Circuit
in Jewell Ridge-predicting that the Wage and Hour Administrator would use the miner cases "'to
regard as work-time the time spent by employees traveling anywhere on company property.' " "Por-
tal-To-Portal" Wage-Hour Liabilities, 9 N.A.M. L. DiG. 3 (Supp. 11946) (quoting memorandum).
With hindsight, a leftist lawyer saw a meaning to employers' general blindness:
Since the adoption of this Act industry not only has demonstrated concerted opposition
to it, but has maintained a strikingly consistent record for guessing wrong on almost
every legal issue the cases have presented. Perhaps this is understandable when one
recalls the multitude of prior decisions of the federal courts effecting the invalidation or
emasculation of practically every labor enactment which had come out of Congress.
Sugar, The Truth About "Portal to Portal", 7 LAW. GUILD REV. 23, 23 (1947) (footnote omitted).
By way of contrast, Arthur Krock, a leading political columnist for the New York Times, found an
excuse for lack of journalistic foresight in a similar judicial failing. Krock, Even the Dissenters
Didn't See It Coming, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1946, at 24, col. 5. To be sure, counsel for TCIR had
argued to the trial court:
Doesn't everyone know that for all times in all plants, almost without exception, men go
to the gates of plants, and even punch the clock, but their time at work does not begin
until they get to their work benches.., no matter how far the gate is from the place of
work?
Record at 3492, Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590
(1944).
225. Brief for Respondent at 98, Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946)
(No. 342). It is in the nature of tactical posturing that in opposing the workers' petition for writ of
certiorari, the respondent-employer had argued that "The Decision Is Not of Importance in the
Administration of the Act." Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 15.
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counsel was therefore hardly exaggerating when he asserted that it was
"the most important case... pending under the Wage and Hour law in
the United States today."226 Indeed, when the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the district court, the trial in the winter of 1947 was and has
remained the most intensively and extensively reported in the entire half-
century history of FLSA.22 7
The Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., located a few miles north of Detroit,
was "the largest manufacturer of dinner ware pottery in the United
States."22 Acquired by S.S. Kresge in 1920, it was at the time of the
litigation a wholly owned subsidiary of Kresge, whose chain stores it sup-
plied.2 29 While the average pottery establishment employed 131 wage
earners,2 31 1,250 worked at Mt. Clemens.231 Significantly for the over-
time issue, ninety-five per cent of production workers were paid on a
piece-work basis.232 Pottery as a whole, though "a small and relatively
unimportant industry.., has considerable importance in the union-man-
agement relations field because nation-wide collective bargaining has
been notably successful since 1905 in its major division, general ware.
'233
Mt. Clemens fell outside that framework as nonunion in the late 1930s,
but in the summer of 1940 the CIO Federation of Glass, Ceramic and
Silica Sand Workers announced plans to organize unorganized sections
of pottery manufacture; by the next year, Mt. Clemens was the most
important local CIO industrial union in pottery.23 4
226. Record at 1497, ML Clemens.
227. "The legal attention of the country ... will be centered on Judge Picard's court ......
Ruch, Picard to Decide Portal Time Issue, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1947, at 2, col. 4. On remand, the
New York Times published the text of the full opinion (including footnotes). N.Y. Times, Feb. 9,
1947, at 26. Business Week featured a picture of the trial judge, Frank Picard, on its cover the week
he handed down his decision. Bus. Wx., Feb. 8, 1947.
228. Brief of Appellants at 6, Mt. Clemens.
229. STANDARD AND POOR'S CORPORATION, POOR'S FINANCIAL RECORDS, 1941 INDUSTRIAL
MANUAL 2594 (1941); P. Taft, Appendix B, in How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS: A SURVEY
OF EXPERIENCE IN LEADING AMERICAN INDUSTRIES 910 (H. Millis ed. 1942). Kresge did not sell
Mt. Clemens Pottery, which had been established in 1914, until 1965. MOODY'S INVESTORS SER-
VICE, INC., MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1971, at 1332. The original complaint named Kresge
as a defendant, but for reasons that are not clear from the record, plaintiffs voluntarily discontinued
as to Kresge. Record at 7, Mt. Clemens; Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 60 F. Supp. 146,
148 (E.D. Mich. 1943).
230. In 1937, 251 establishments employed 33,000 wage earners. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, BIENNIAL CENSUS OF THE MANUFACTURES, pt. 1 at 847 (1939).
231. Record at 8, Mt. Clemens.
232. Record at 166.
233. Taft, supra note 229, at 908 (footnote omitted). The standard study of that system is D.
MCCABE, NATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE POTTERY INDUSTRY (Johns Hopkins U.
Stud. in Hist. & Pol. Sci., New Series No. 16, 1932).
234. Taft, supra note 229, at 910-11.
1991]
98 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
On April 16, 1941, a few days after an organizational strike began..
in the midst of efforts by Mt. Clemens to form a company union,2 36 suit
was filed in federal district court in Detroit by seven employees on behalf
of themselves and "in behalf of others similarly situated" and by Local
1083, United Pottery Workers of America, which was designated a rep-
resentative by various of its members.237 The case came before Judge
Frank Picard, who had been Justice Murphy's former campaign manager
when Murphy was candidate for governor of Michigan and who owed
his appointment to the federal bench in 1939 to Murphy.23 The grava-
men of the complaint was,
that the defendant compels its employees to punch a time clock and in such
a procedure deliberately falsifies the records of the time worked by its em-
ployees. That the said employees work 14 minutes in advance of the time
shown on the clocks in the morning of each working day.239
The workers further alleged that the company clocked them out
before they actually finished working before lunch and repeated the same
procedure after lunch and at the end of the workday. Consequently, the
plaintiffs pleaded, they were owed back wages and liquidated damages
totalling $100,000 for overtime for forty minutes per day or three and
one-quarter hours per week since the forty-hour provision of FLSA went
into effect on October 24, 1940.24 0 The plaintiffs' lead counsel241 stated
235. See Pottery Strike in ML Clemens, Detroit Free Press, Apr. 15, 1941, at 14, col. 4; Record
at 26; Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. v. Anderson, 149 F.2d 461, 461 (6th Cir. 1945).
236. See Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 46 NLRB 714 (1943); NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,
147 F.2d 262, 263-65 (6th Cir. 1945).
237. Record at 7. Steve Anderson, the eponymous plaintiff of the case, was the president of the
local. Id. at 119. The class allegations in the complaint do not track the statutory language pre-
cisely. The collective action prong of § 16(b) authorizes employees to sue on behalf of themselves
and "other employees similarly situated," while the representative action prong authorizes employ-
ees to "designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employ-
ees similarly situated." Why representatives are called upon to represent "all" similarly situated is
unclear. See Poole, Pivate Litigation Under the Wage and Hour Act, 14 Miss. L.J. 157, 164 n.43
(1942). The trial judge denied a motion to dismiss the class action on the grounds that if a narrow
interpretation were given to such suits, few could be brought under FLSA. He therefore permitted
all those claiming back wages for overtime in one classification. Record at 29-30. Approximately
300 employees were permitted to file designations. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. v. Anderson, 149 F.2d
at 461.
238. J.W. HOWARD, JR., supra note 129, at 403; FINE, supra note 3, at 28; Bus. WK., Feb. 8,
1947, at 8.
239. Record at 10.
240. Id. at 10-12. The plaintiffs also made overtime allegations for the period from Oct. 24,
1938 to Oct. 24, 1939, when the overtime provision of FLSA was triggered after forty-four hours,
and from Oct. 24, 1939 to Oct. 24, 1940, when it kicked in after forty-two hours. Id. at 8-9. Their
allegation that they had worked forty-five hours weekly for the defendant contradicted their other
claim that they had worked three and one-quarter hours beyond forty. Finally, allegations were also
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that "this company gyps each employee out of approximately 56 minutes
of pay a day.... Almost $1,000 a day they are taking out of the payroll
of these employees. ' 242
B. The Master's Report
The court appointed a special master, Donald Quaife, who heard
extensive testimony in 1942 and issued a report in March 1943.243 His
unsympathetic attitude toward the workers' action was clearly expressed
in his skepticism as to why no worker had ever complained about the
"cheating" before suit was ffled. 2 4 The master concluded that
"[p]erhaps the true explanation" was that it had "never occurred to" the
plaintiffs before suit was filed that Mt. Clemens was deliberately un-
derpaying them.24  The implication here-that the union manufactured
hypertechnical claims about which the workers had never articulated a
felt need but which they cynically supported as a "'gravy train' ",2___
was then largely adopted by employers and the press in the course of the
portal and anti-portal movements. Because this employers' position im-
plicitly underlay the master's report, it gained enhanced legitimacy as the
debate proceeded.
In the alternative the plaintiffs argued that "at least the full time the
employees were in the plant as shown by entries punched on the time
made for some employees for minimum wages. Id. at 9-11. The following calculation underscores
how even minimal individual claims can over time cumulate to a considerable liability-just as they
once constituted a considerable source of savings-for a large employer. If the sum requested,
$100,000, included liquidated damages, then the underlying back wages amounted to $50,000, or $40
for each of 1,250 employees. For the entire two and one-half years (from the day FLSA went into
effect until the day the suit was filed), this sum equalled thirty-one cents per week per employee. At
the initial minimum wage of twenty-five cents per hour, this amount represented 2.5 hours weekly; at
the later minimum wage of forty cents per hour, 1.5 hours. If the workers' regular rate of pay was
higher, then even fewer hours of back wages would have been at issue.
241. Edward Lamb stated during the litigation that he practiced law for the fun of it in "'the
largest non-paying practice" in the United States. Back-Pay Lawyer Advises Caution, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 29, 1946, § 1, at 3, col. 1. J. Panell Thomas, the chairman of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities, alleged in one of the few outbursts of red-baiting during the portal debates that
Lamb "has followed the Communist party line and has associated himself with numerous Commu-
nist fronts.. . ." 93 CONG. REc. 539 (1947).
242. Record at 382. Discrepancies crop up in the record as to the exact number of minutes
involved. The complaint specifies fourteen, ten, fourteen, and fifteen minutes at the four clock-ins
and clock-outs, which add up to fifty-three minutes, although the complaint then speaks of forty
minutes. Record at 10-11.
243. Record at 143-217.
244. Id. at 190.
245. Id. at 191.
246. Exit Mount Clemens, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1947, at 22, col. 3.
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clock cards should have been ... credited to them, since they were re-
quired to go directly from the time clocks to their respective departments
and immediately thereafter to work.""24 In the company's version, by
way of contrast,
the employees were given a fourteen minute period to check in and out....
It is claimed, however, that while they were permitted to come in fourteen
minutes early, they were under no compulsion to do so, the only require-
ment being that they be at their place of work, ready to work, at the estab-
lished starting time, and their time being their own until then.24 8
Mt. Clemens argued in the alternative that even if the master found in
favor of the plaintiffs, they could have no judgment because the amount
of working time not credited to the employees could not be computed.249
On this issue of travel time, the master found that after entering the
production part of the plant, which encompassed more than eight
acres,250 the workers punched in at the rate of twenty-five per minute,
after which they walked to their work place for distances ranging from
130 to 890 feet. Although the company did not permit the workers to
punch in more than fourteen minutes before what it called the starting
time,"' in computing the hours worked on the basis of the time-clock
cards, Mt. Clemens figured the time,
from the succeeding even quarter hour after employees ring in to the quar-
ter hour immediately preceding the time they punch out. Thus, for exam-
ple, an employee whose card is punched in at 6:46 A.M., out at 12:03 P.M.,
in at 12:50 P.M., and out again at 4:07 P.M. is credited with eight hours
working time.252
In this example the employee was not credited for a total of thirty-four
minutes in which she was actually clocked in and on the premises. The
parties agreed that the employer did not consider the time spent walking
from the time clocks to the work place working time and that such walk-
ing took place before the regular starting time. The parties also agreed
that the time spent walking to the closer departments was one or two
minutes; the employees estimated the time spent walking to the more
distant departments ranged from one-half to three minutes, while the em-
247. Record at 163.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. This area is the equivalent of a square with sides of 200 yards, although the plant was
actually nearly a quarter-mile long. Brief for Respondent at 34.
251. Record at 167.
252. Id. at 168.
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ployer's estimate varied between six and eight.25 3
This difference in estimates is crucial for two reasons. First, it
shows how minimal the walking time was by any calculation. Second, it
underscores the perverse underlying structure of the dispute before the
trial court---one that would later be inverted and cause considerable con-
fusion as to what the case was all about. Because the workers' central
claim went to the issue of the compensability of pre-7:00 A.M. work at
their individual work place and because the parties agreed that the dis-
pute involved a maximum of fourteen minutes, it was in the employees'
interest to understate the amount of walking time in order to maximize
the amount of time they could have devoted to such work. Conversely, it
was in the employer's interest to exaggerate the amount of walking time
in order to minimize the amount of potentially compensable time spent
in pre-7:00 A.M. work.
The master touched on but never dispositively resolved this issue of
walking time. The plaintiffs contended that the proper standard was that
"all time spent by the employee on the employer's premises at the request
of the latter" was compensable.25 4 This formula tracked the guide ar-
ticulated by the Wage and Hour Administrator. 255 The master rejected
this formula solely because he believed that he had found an example
that refuted its literalness-namely, that lunch time, even where it had to
be eaten on the employer's premises, was not compensable.25 6 The
master, though, offered no principled resolution of the issue of walking
time, merely stating that in view of the workers' knowledge of the custom
and practice not to credit them for that time, "it would seem that defend-
ant's practice ... was not improper under the Act.
257
253. Id. at 173-74.
254. Id. at 197.
255. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, WAGE AND HoUR MANUAL, Interpretative Bulletin
No. 13, at 172-73 (1944-45) ("all time during which an employee is required ... to be on the
employer's premises"). More pertinently, a Wage and Hour official testified that he had told Mt.
Clemens in 1939 "that time spent on the premises by any employees who were required to be there
by the company was to be considered as hours worked, regardless of whether they worked or not."
Record at 1324.
256. Record at 197. Yet this case makes little if any sense. For other than in the instance of
those who live on the employer's premises, there would be a presumption that any order not to leave
the premises for lunch was based on the employer's desire to keep the employee within hailing
distance. Subject to such a restriction, the employee would have a valid claim to compensation for
lunch time. See Lofton v. Seneca Coal & Coke Co., 2 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 669, 675 (N.D.
Okla. 1942) (half-hour lunch period compensable where employee required to remain at his place of
work "so that defendant received the benefit of his presence"), aff'd, 136 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 772 (1943).
257. Record at 199.
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As to the preliminary work (that performed prior to 7:00 A.M.), the
master found that:
Practically all of the workmen in the plant had certain duties to per-
form after arriving at their departments previous to the commencement of
actual production.... Two kinds of activity are embraced under this head-
ing: (1) personal preparations, such as putting on aprons or overalls, remov-
ing shirts, taping or greasing arms, putting on finger cots; (2) activity of a
non-personal nature, involving the preparation of equipment for com-
mencement of production work, such as turning on switches for lights and
machinery, opening windows and assembling and sharpening tools.
2 58
The plaintiffs testified that they performed two to three minutes of pre-
liminary work each day "immediately upon arrival in the department."
The company conceded that so-called personal preliminary activities did
take place before the established starting time although it denied that the
so-called non-personal preparations were done at all before starting
time.
259
The master found resolution of the issue of the compensability of
preliminary activity difficult. For without benefit of pertinent case law,
he was confronted with a conflict between a Wage and Hour Inspection
Field Letter that "ma[de] it clear that the Administrator considers such
work [non-personal preliminary duties] as part of the employment time"
and differing industry customs.26 Ultimately the master found it unnec-
essary to reach the issue "in view of another principle of law which is
applicable here... which requires that in order for the Court to render a
judgment for damages in favor of a plaintiff, evidence as to the amount of
damages suffered must be reasonably definite and not based upon mere
conjecture. '261 If the claim of fifty-six minutes per day or the contention
that all the punched time on the cards constituted work time had been
credible, then there would have been no impediment. Computing over-
time, however, on the basis of a finding that the employees worked more
time than credited to them but less than that shown on the time cards
would be speculative and unreliable because the plaintiffs kept no time
records and could not recollect-independently of the time cards-when
they arrived at their departments or began preliminary work on any
given day. The master therefore felt compelled to deny recovery on this
claim. But even if the plaintiffs had been able to overcome this hurdle, he
added, they would still have had to deal with "counterbalancing time not
258. Id. at 169.
259. Id. at 174.
260. Id. at 200.
261. Id. (citing several appellate and district court FLSA cases).
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worked by employees when they quit and cleaned up in advance of the
established quitting time."262 Finally, the master cautioned that even if
the plaintiffs had been able to avoid all these problems, the amount
recovered,
would be very small, inasmuch as such time under the most liberal esti-
mates could not have aggregated over one-half hour per week, and in most
instances there was a greater margin than that between the weekly working
time credited to the employees and the statutory period for payment of
straight time.
2 63
In other words, the master in dictum developed the de minimis issue on
which the case would ultimately hinge.
In order to reach his decision, the master tried to gain some perspec-
tive on standard industrial practice by devoting some attention to the
testimony elicited by the parties' expert witnesses. He concluded that all
expert witnesses had agreed that it was a "practically universall]" custom
in manufacturing plants with time clocks2' 6 that:
If an employee arrives early in his department, his time is his own until the
regular starting time. The punched entries on the time cards show the time
the employees enter and leave the production part of the plant, but do not
show the time they commenced and stopped work; and the time worked is
not computed directly according to these entries, since it is obvious that
they will practically always show more time than is actually worked. In-
stead, if the punch-in time is prior to the beginning of the shift it is assumed
that the employee started at the regular starting time....
65
In point of fact, however, one of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses, the direc-
tor of research of the UAW, had responded directly to a question by the
master that in some plants workers punched time clocks directly in their
departments to record the beginning of their work.266 Therefore, it
would have been administratively possible for Mt. Clemens to record the
actual starting times for workers who went directly to work rather than
have them punch-in at the portal.267
262. Id. at 201.
263. Id. at 202.
264. Id. at 170.
265. Id. at 171.
266. Id. at 1460-61.
267. To be sure, this arrangement would have eliminated the problem of non-payment for pre-
liminary work, but would not have dealt with walking time from the gate. Since that distance would
presumably have been fixed, however, it would not have been difficult to ascertain a reasonable
amount of time to walk it and to factor that into the computation of working time. In that case,
then, it would not have mattered how early workers had.arrived at the outside gate-they would
have been paid only for the walking time to their work bench. This consideration is important
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After hearing this testimony, and in addition to his ruling that pre-
liminary activity was not compensable working time, the master made
four pertinent summary findings of fact. First, the workers had never
objected to but had acquiesced in the practices over which they eventu-
ally sued. Second, the workers neither were required to work nor did
they in fact work fifty-six uncredited minutes daily. Third, the workers
were instructed to be in their departments "ready to work and with per-
sonal preliminary duties performed, by the established starting time."
And fourth, the workers failed to prove that they were required to report
in advance of the starting time, that they performed other than prelimi-
nary work before that time, "or that they worked continuously from the
time they punched their cards in to the time they punched out.
'268
The master also made three pertinent summary conclusions of law.
First, the plaintiffs had the burden of proof to show that the company
failed to compensate them for some of their work. Second, plaintiffs
failed to carry that burden "with the possible exception of preliminary
work." And third, a computation of the time spent in such preliminary
work "cannot be made except upon a speculative basis, and accordingly
forms no basis for recovery of overtime pay.
'269
C. In the Lower Courts
When the master's ruling was appealed by the employees of Mt.
Clemens, the question before District Judge Picard was whether to ap-
prove the master's report.270 If the workers' account was correct, then,
Picard wrote, the court would be "face to face with a method of em-
ployer domination and unfairness that, to say the least, would be most
reprehensible," whereas upholding the employer's version-that since
the work was done by crews on a piece rate, it was important that the
whole crew be at work on time-would lead to a conclusion that its pro-
cedures had been reasonable. Although Picard generally agreed with
the master, certain details merited closer scrutiny,' especially the finding
that the time cards and calculations showed that,
[b]y eight minutes to seven but a few stragglers were left.... [T]he prepara-
tion even after punching the clock wouldn't take more than one or one and
inasmuch as Mt. Clemens conceded that workers had to punch in early in order to be in their
departments by starting time. Id. at 173.
268. Id. at 214-15.
269. Id. at 217.
270. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 60 F. Supp. 146, 148 (E.D. Mich. 1943).
271. Id. at 148-49.
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a half minutes and to the farthest point in the plant from the time clock
wouldn't take more than 2 minutes. It is apparent, therefore, that practi-
cally every member of the entire shift was ready to work at from 5 to 7
minutes before the hour and it does not seem probable that with compensa-
tion set by piece work, and the crew ready... these employees didn't start
to work immediately. In fact, it appears that this was encouraged by the
company as being mutually beneficial.
272
Or as Picard phrased it somewhat more informally at a hearing several
months later:
Now, I know what went on out there. I do think that if they got down
there, the bunch of them, being on piece work, that they jumped the gun,
and I do think that the people were as much a party to it as the manage-
ment. The management encouraged it; and I would like to penalize the
management for doing it. But I have got to go on your proof.
273
The crucial point here is that Picard, who clearly maintained strong
sympathies for the workers, viewed their whole overtime claim as based
on the practice, which presumably antedated FLSA, of beginning piece
work before the official starting hour. Before FLSA went into effect,
such practices mattered less. Perhaps in the welter of disputed issues
surrounding the union's organizing campaign, the workers had more
pressing issues to pursue. But since the employees' claims to overtime
pay were unwaivable under FLSA, they were free to "sav[e] up these
claims like Octagon soap wrappers."2 74 Clearly, though, Picard was of
the opinion that neither walking from the clock nor preliminary work
was the real abuse in this case. Rather,
when a crew was ready to work they might jump the gun. In the experience
of this court that's just exactly what would happen 99 times out of 100 on
piece work and it was one of the practices that the Wages and Hours Act
sought to discourage both on the part of the employer and employee. To us
it is obvious that.., an attempt was made either by the company itself or
by certain foremen in currying favor with the employer, to circumvent the
spirit of the Wages and Hours Act.27 5
Picard ruled that the court would not "lend its aid to a practice that
deprives any working man of... the only thing he has to sell-his hours
or minutes of labor. ' 276 He therefore held to be compensable all the time
shown by time cards over and above five minutes for punching in and
two minutes for walking to the work place. A total of seven minutes was
272. Id. at 149.
273. Record at 1506, Mt. Clemens.
274. 92 CONG. REc. 1559 (1946) (Rep. Hobbs).
275. Mt Clemens, 60 F. Supp. at 149.
276. Id. at 149-50.
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credited to the employer. Thus Picard expressly denied the walking
time.277 In addition, Picard awarded the approximately 300 named plain-
tiffs and intervenors a de minimis recovery of $1,207.87 in overtime and
an equal amount in liquidated damages in addition to $2,000 in attorney
fees.
278
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and dismissed.279 The narrow
ground of decision was the district court's requirement to accept the
master's findings unless clearly erroneous. According to the Sixth Cir-
cuit, Judge Picard "applied an arbitrary formula" which "produced a
judgment based upon surmise and conjecture" since the employees based
their claims "on a mere estimated average of overtime worked. 280
D. Before the Supreme Court
In their petition to the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, the
employees argued that all the time they spent after clocking in bore all
the indicia of work as articulated in the Muscoda decision-that is, exer-
tion on the employer's premises controlled or required by the employer
necessarily and primarily for the employer's benefit.281 The question
presented to the Supreme Court was, the plaintiffs implied, complicated
by the district court since the trial judge:
did not base (his) judgment for the plaintiffs upon a ruling that the time
spent by the employees in checking through the time clocks or in going to
their work places was strictly working time. Instead the District Court in-
dicated that time spent in these activities should be credited to the employer
and deducted from the time shown on the time cards. The Circuit Court...,
however, in treating this case as an ordinary travel time case, misconstrued
the District Court's decision....
The plaintiffs' formulation was, to say the least, disingenuous. First, Pie-
ard had expressly ruled that punching in and walking were not compen-
sable. Second, given the procedural grounds on which the Sixth Circuit
reversed the trial court, it was immaterial whether it viewed travel time
as crucial or not. And finally, if this was not an "ordinary travel time
case," then why had plaintiffs been arguing "throughout these proceed-
ings.., that because of the impossibility of calculating travel time to the
277. Id. at 150. Picard also allowed the employer five minutes for punching in after lunch, but
denied recovery for punching out.
278. Record at 289, 297-305. One worker received as little as one cent in back wages.
279. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. v. Anderson, 149 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1945).
280. Id. at 464-65.
281. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Mt Clemens.
282. Id. at 7-8.
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exact second the reviewing court should compel a modification of the
trial court's decision [and give the employees] full recovery from the em-
ployer for the amounts shown on the time cards"? 83
The answer to this rhetorical question appears to be that the work-
ers had never argued that this was a travel time case. Instead, they had
pleaded the case as involving actual production work before the clock
started ("jumping-the-gun").284 When the Sixth Circuit, however, re-
versed Picard on the not-clearly-erroneous standard, plaintiffs' counsel
may have believed that the easiest way to persuade the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari was to assert that Mt. Clemens presented the question
that the Court had left open in Jewell Ridge concerning" 'the validity of
agreements whereby, in a bona fide attempt to avoid complex difficulties
of computation, travel time is averaged or fixed at an arbitrary fig-
ure .... ,"28 Although this argument appears misguided since the "arbi-
trary" element had allegedly been introduced by Judge Picard-and not
by the parties, as in Jewell Ridge-the Court did grant certiorari.286
In their brief, the workers offered a rather different view of the daily
work routine than the decisions below had disclosed. Now they asserted
that all their personal preliminary activities (including clothes changing)
took place even before they clocked in.287 After clocking in, it took only
thirty to ninety seconds "to get into productive activities." '288 In under-
stating the travel time, the workers sought to convince the Court that it
was not being called upon to work a revolution in industrial practices, for
the "case reveal[ed] a curious and an unusual situation in employer-em-
ployee relations in the United States" in that the company required the
employees to clock in "as much as fourteen minutes before the regular
starting time" but paid them only from the succeeding quarter hour. 89
The company, of course, took the opposite tack, emphasizing that,
because its practice was "universal," any ruling that it was in violation of
FLSA would have equally broad consequences for all industry.290 Mt.
Clemens sought to buttress this argument by suggesting that the clock-in
283. Id. at 8.
284. Indeed, the plaintiffs argued to the Supreme Court that because the Sixth Circuit had mis-
interpreted the decision below, it had left "the law as to working time in our industrial plants in a
state of uncertainty." Id. at 9.
285. Id. at 8.
286. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 326 U.S. 706 (1945) (cert granted).
287. Brief for Appellants at 8, 23, ML Clemens.
288. Id. at 8.
289. Id. at 9.
290. Brief for Respondent at 27, Mt. Clemens.
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and payment arrangement was universal precisely because it was emi-
nently reasonable:
One of the practical realities of operating a factory is that it is impossible
for a group of one thousand or more individuals to arrive at their places of
work simultaneously.... It is in recognition of this plain fact that all
plants have developed a custom of opening their doors and permitting em-
ployees to enter fifteen or thirty minutes before starting time.
The objective is to have everyone in the plant ready to go to work at
starting time. To do this the individuals who lead the parade must enter the
plant earlier than others.291
Misrepresenting the nature of the employees' claim, the company then
charged that:
Any requirement that an employee must be paid for the time spent
getting into the plant would be directly at odds with the practice that has
prevailed in plants all over the country for many years.... It would mean
that nearly every plant in the country would be in violation of the law and
that billions of dollars in retroactive payments and liquidated damages
could now be assessed against thousands of companies.
292
Finally, the employer developed an argument designed to put unions on
notice that if they pushed this game too far, industry could respond in
ways that might make the recovery of portal wages very unpleasant and
expensive for employees:
Bickering over such minutiae293 was not contemplated when the Fair La-
bor Standards Act was adopted .... If employees were given a right to
insist upon such a demand, employers would doubtless counter with re-
quirements that employees must start work and become subject to strict
control of management from the very moment they enter the company's
premises.... Any such requirement would retard the development of the
beneficent practices of allowing rest periods, and time off for a "snack" on
the job, and the privilege of quitting work a few minutes before quitting
time when convenient.... 294
291. Id. at 96-97.
292. Id. at 97, 98.
293. The "minutiae" over which the CIO was "bickering," according to NAM, included
(1) changing clothes, (2) checking equipment, (3) taking medical examinations, (4) figur-
ing earnings from piece rate tickets, (5) preparing reports, (6) walking.. .to and from
work on company premises, (7) waiting for work, (8) waiting to get paid, (9) eating
meals "on duty," and (10) resting for periods not exceeding 20 minutes.
"Portal-to-Portal" Wage-Hour Liabilities, supra note 224, at 3, 4.
294. Brief for Respondent at 98. Remarkably, on remand before Judge Picard a year later, the
Department of Justice expressly adopted this argument. In seeking to save labor from the conse-
quences of its own imprudence, the Assistant Attorney General told Picard that "'[o]n the facts of
this case the play is not worth the candle.'" Measurement of Trifles, TIME, Feb. 10, 1947 at 82
(quoting John Sonnett). See also Ruch, Picard Reopens Basic Portal Suit; U.S. Protests Pay, N.Y.
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In his opinion for the Supreme Court,2 9 Justice Murphy reversed
the Sixth Circuit by referring to the appeals court's approval of the
master's imposition on the workers of "an improper standard of proof
... that has the practical effect of impairing many of the benefits of"
FLSA.2 96 Although an employee had the burden of proving that he had
performed the work for which he alleged underpayment: "[t]he remedial
nature of this statute and the great public policy which it embodies...
militate against making that burden an impossible hurdle... ."297 This
equitable readjustment of the evidentiary burdens was buttressed by the
employer's obligation under § 11(c) of FLSA to keep time records. The
Court thus disapproved of the Sixth Circuit's solution of penalizing the
employee for the employer's violation of the recordkeeping provision.298
In the future, where an employer failed to keep adequate and accu-
rate time records reflecting when the employee began his preliminary ac-
tivities, all the employee would be required to produce was "sufficient
evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just
and reasonable inference. '299 Such a showing-and the Court held that
Picard's "arbitrary formula" did not meet that standard-sufficed to
shift the burden to the employer either to produce counter-evidence of
the real amount of work performed or "to negative the reasonableness of
Times, Jan. 31, 1947, at 1, col. 5. The aforementioned retaliatory countermove by employers was
perhaps the only one still available to Mt. Clemens once it had conceded both that performance of
non-personal preliminary activities was compensable working time and that the cost to it of comput-
ing how long an employee was in the plant would exceed the benefit to the workers. The Wage and
Hour Administrator appeared as amicus in order to underscore its position "that both the 'personal'
and 'non-personal' duties constitute employment compensable under the Act," a view as to which it
had consistently "advised numerous employer associations and labor unions in various industries."
Brief for L. Metcalfe Walling, Adm'r of the Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep't. of Labor, as Amicus
Curiae at 3, 7. The Administrator also noted that he had not yet taken a position on the compen-
sability of walking time from fences to working places in normal peacetime operations. Id. at 8 n.6.
295. Viewed against the strongly empathetic descriptions of the conditions under which the
miners travelled from portal to face in Justice Murphy's opinions in Muscoda and Jewell Ridge, the
sharply contrasting language near the beginning of Mt. Clemens immediately creates the expectation
of a different approach and outcome:
The employees ...walk to iheir working places along clean, painted floors of the
brightly illuminated and well ventilated building. They are free to take whatever course
through the plant they desire and may stop off at any portion of the journey to converse
with other employees and to do whatever else they may desire.
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 683 (1946).
296. Id. at 686.
297. Id.
298. To be sure, this violation did not give rise to a private right of action, but the Administra-
tor could seek criminal sanctions under § 215(a)(5) and § 216(a). Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. 215(a)(5), 216(a) (1965).
299. 328 U.S. at 687.
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the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence. ' ' 3c ° Failure to
do so would justify recovery "even though the result be only approxi-
mate.' 301 This procedural innovation is the only pro-employee proposi-
tion of Mt. Clemens that survived the subsequent congressional
backlash.
302
Having set forth this principle by way of prologue, the Court then
proceeded to eliminate most of the workers' claims. First, Murphy up-
held the circuit court's ruling that Picard had erred in failing to accept
the master's fact finding that the workers did not perform unpaid "actual
productive work" before scheduled hours.30 3 This ruling was crucial in-
sofar as the only sympathy Picard had expressed for the workers was
that the company made pieceworkers "jump the gun." With the guts of
the case now ripped out, Picard's decision on remand was virtually pre-
ordained. Second, Murphy implicitly upheld the Sixth Circuit's charac-
terization of Picard's judgment as based on an "arbitrary formula" by
ruling that the workers had not proved "that they were engaged in work
from the moment they punched in... to the moment when they punched
out.' '3 4 By this formulation the Court presumably meant, more specifi-
cally, that they had not proved how much of the maximum of fourteen
minutes allotted to them to get from the time clock to the scheduled
beginning of work was actually devoted to compensable activity.30 5
Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that mere presence on the
employer's premises, as reflected on time clock records, should start the
FLSA clock absent any requirement by the employer that the employee
actually be there.30 6 By the same token, Murphy implicitly declined the
plaintiffs' invitation to avail himself of the opportunity to implement the
dictum in Jewell Ridge concerning the possibility of permitting an arbi-
300. Id. at 687-88.
301. Id. at 688.
302. On the unsuccessful efforts to overturn this holding as well, see infra § VII. Remarkably,
the only authority the Supreme Court cited for this point was a student note. The student, in turn,
had bottomed the proposed law reform on courts' "inherent equitable powers to draw from the
refusal to keep records, consequences similar to those explicitly drawn, by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, from the refusal to produce them." Note, Determination of Wages under Fair Labor
Standards Act, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 355, 358 (1943).
303. 328 U.S. at 689.
304. Id.
305. This conclusion flows from the Court's rejection of the assumption that it would be "un-
fair" to credit the first person past the clock with more compensable time than the last person. Id. at
690. Had the Court accepted the workers' claim that they went to work immediately, such a calcu-
lation would not have been unfair.
306. Id.
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trary aggregate average fixing of travel time rather than requiring indi-
vidualized accounts.'
The Court, though, did favor the plaintiffs on one point:
that it was necessary for them to be on the premises for some time prior and
subsequent to the scheduled working hours. The employer required them
to punch in, walk to their work benches and perform preliminary duties
during the 14-minute periods preceding productive work; the same activi-
ties in reverse occurred in the 14-minute periods subsequent to the comple-
tion of productive work. Since the statutory workweek includes all time
during which an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer's
premises.., the time spent in these activities must be accorded appropriate
compensation.
30 7
Ignoring the time spent in waiting to clock in as not having been
pleaded,30 8 the Court certified the time spent walking on Mt. Clemens's
premises after clocking in as working time, estimated at "2 to 12 minutes
daily, if not more," because it,
was under the complete control of the employer, being dependent solely
upon the physical arrangements which the employer made in the fac-
tory.... Without such walking... the productive aims of the employer
could not have been achieved. The employees' convenience and necessity
... bore no relation whatever to this walking time; they walked on the
employer's premises only because they were compelled to do so by the ne-
cessities of the employer's business.
309
According to the Court, however, the employees, while walking
from the clocks to their work benches, did attend to their own "conven-
ience." The time consumed by such purely personal detours and frolics
was to be deducted to arrive at the compensable time, which "was lim-
307. Id. at 690-91.
308. Id. at 691. In two cases, one decided before and the other after M4 Clemens, recovery for
clock-waiting time was denied on de minimis grounds. Cameron v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 65 F.
Supp. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1946); McIntyre v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 366 (w.D. Ky.
1947). It is unclear why the workers did not assert a claim for this time since the Administrator had
ruled "that if the employer requires the employees to punch a time clock and the employee is re-
quired to be present for a considerable period of time before doing so, such time will be considered
hours worked." Interpretative Bulletin No. 13 at 1 3 in WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL 173 (cumul.
ed. 1944-1945 [originally issued July 1939]). Even the master had interpreted this provision to mean
that "the employer would seem to be obligated to have sufficient clocks so the employees would not
be required to wait an unreasonable time to punch in or out." Record at 197, Mt. Clemens. Since
the Supreme Court found that a minimum of eight minutes was needed for the workers to get by the
clock, 328 U.S. at 683, and since all the indicia of work and control by and benefit for the employer
spelled out by the court with regard to walking also applied fully to waiting to clock in, the employ-
ees would presumably have been entitled to recover. In the ensuing wave of litigation, the CIO did
follow up this cue.
309. 328 U.S. at 691.
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ited to the minimum time necessarily spent in walking at an ordinary rate
along the most direct route" and should normally be easily calculable.31
The Court, in other words, was not only instructing Picard to make such
calculations on remand, but also issuing a guideline to all employers for
establishing such standards for their employees. With regard to prelimi-
nary activities, the Court invalidated the master's distinction between
compensable non-personal and non-compensable personal ones. They
were all compensable work because the employees undertook them "nec-
essarily and primarily for the employer's benefit" rather than solely for
their own convenience.31
While acknowledging that time spent walking from the clock to the
work station was working time, Murphy also held that time spent both
walking and in preliminary activities was subject to a de minimis rule so
that "negligible" or "insubstantial and insignificant" periods of time need
not be compensated:
312
The workweek contemplated by § 7(a) must be computed in light of the
realities of the industrial world. When the matter in issue concerns only a
few seconds or minutes beyond the scheduled working hours, such trifles
may be disregarded. Split-second absurdities are not justified by the actual-
ities of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. It is only when an employee is required to give up a substantial mea-
sure of his time and effort that compensable working time is involved. 13
Murphy was certain that this de minimis rule could "doubtless be ap-
plied to much of the walking time" involved in Mt. Clemens, leaving to
Judge Picard to determine just how much. 14
The dissent by Justice Burton, with whom Justice Frankfurter con-
curred,3 15 sought to re-focus the analysis on custom, contract, and collec-
tive bargaining, as had the dissent in Jewell Ridge. Instead of requiring
employers to engage in the futility of recording small amounts of time
spent in non-productive activities, "the obvious, long established and
simple way to compensate an employee for such activities is to recognize
those activities in the rate of pay for the particular job. These items are
appropriate for consideration in collective bargaining. ' 31 6 Moreover,
310. Id. at 692.
311. Id. at 693.
312. Id. at 692, 693.
313. Id. at 692.
314. Id.
315. Jackson, who was chief U.S. prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials at the time, did not take
part. He attacked Justice Black publicly the day after Mt. Clemens was handed down. See infra
§ vi.
316. 328 U.S. at 697.
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there was "no evidence that Congress meant... to set aside long estab-
lished contracts or customs which had absorbed in the rate of pay of the
respective jobs recognition of whatever preliminary activities might be
required of the worker by that particular job."
317
Workers could, it is true, try to secure portal pay or any other terms
and conditions of employment through collective bargaining. FLSA, as
the dissent failed to realize, was a recognition of the political and eco-
nomic reality that certain workers were not able to obtain certain levels
of compensation by such methods. Consequently, Congress compelled all
concerned parties to comply with standards set by society at large. To
remit employers to their own devices in defining a statutory term such as
compensable work would have marked a return to the pre-statutory pe-
riod. Moreover, reliance on custom, contract, and bargaining would
have reproduced precisely the conditions of unfair competition that ena-
bled "chiseling" employers to underprice those employers who could not
or did not wish to "sweat" their employees.318 If what Burton really
meant was that FLSA was not designed to promote the marginal im-
provements in working conditions that strong unions had theretofore ap-
parently preferred to trade off for other terms,319 he failed to explain how
that result could be achieved without harming the unorganized workers
(and more responsible employers) whom Congress indisputably wanted
to help.
The outcry that the Court's decision to grant the Mt. Clemens
workers wages for certain walking time eventually unleashed320 appears
317. Id. at 697-98.
318. "I think the opportunity for evasion in the Fair Labor Standards Act comes... in determin-
ing the amount of time that shall be put in, in order to secure the minimum wage. The opportunity
for chiseling there, is an opportunity to chisel upon the hours worked .... 93 CONG. REc. 2251
(1947) (Sen. McGrath). For the use and meaning of these terms in the various FLSA congressional
debates, see Linder, supra note 158, at 160-62. Even what may appear to the individual worker to be
negligible unlawful deductions from compensable time can, when spread out over thousands of
workers for long periods of time, aggregate to significant cost advantages. See supra § I.
319. Since the work-spreading goal of premium pay for overtime was macroeconomic, it was
designed to apply to all workers, including members of the strongest unions.
320. Thus, for example, Representative Vorys (Rep. Ohio) called it "the most outrageous and
unconscionable instance of judicial usurpation of the law-making power that I have ever seen." 93
CONG. Rnc. 1514 (1947). Senator Wherry (Rep. Neb.) stated that the effect of Mt. Clemens had
been "to pervert the act from an instrument of righteous correction into an instrument to destroy
those very employers who have attempted conscientiously to obey the mandates of the act." Id. at
2195. One of Murphy's biographers echoed these sentiments twenty years later in calling the portal-
pay trilogy "Frank Murphy's closest brush with abuse." J.W. HOWARD, JR., supra note 129, at 405.
In his capacity as director of the National Conference of Judicial Councils, Roscoe Pound, who had
turned to the Right in the 1930s, charged that decisions such as Mt. Clemens threatened to trans-
form the United States into an "autocracy":" 'The Supreme Court's handling of the portal-to-portal
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strangely inappropriate. After all, the de minimis condition321 imposed
such narrow limits on recoveries that it would be difficult to sustain polit-
ically relevant sympathy for employers sued for any surviving claims for
substantial periods of time. Given the individual nature of the rights cre-
ated by FLSA, the de minimis exception contained a very favorable twist
for employers: "The walking time of some employees conceivably could
be as little as two minutes a day and this might be disregarded under the
de minimis rule. The fact that this would aggregate forty hours a day or
more for all the employees would not enter into consideration. 3 22 Even
the evidentiary adjustment that the Court made in favor of employees
was arguably nothing more than a negative incentive to employers to
comply with their recordkeeping obligations under § 1 l(c).123
Indeed, had the Court framed its ruling purely prospectively, it
might have deprived employers and their congressional advocates of any
moral basis for overturning Mt. Clemens. 24 By the same token, had the
CIO restricted its litigation campaign to enforcing the new ruling only
prospectively, the financially fueled fervor that triggered impressive lob-
case was an example of spurious interpretation in which judicial statesmanship was conspicuously
exhibited.'" Pound Hits High Court for Its Interpretation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1947, at 20, col. 2.
321. According to Eugene Gressman, who was Murphy's clerk from 1943 to 1948, the de
minimis doctrine was injected into the opinion precisely because Murphy believed that there was a
difference between conditions in mines and factories. Telephone interview with E. Gressman (Apr.
9, 1990). Gressman, who is the longest-serving Supreme Court clerk in modem times, was so closely
involved in writing Murphy's opinions that he was jocularly called "Mr. Justice Gressman."
322. Clark Asks a Hand in Key Portal Suit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1947, at 1, col. 6.
323. In this sense, it may have been an exaggeration to speculate that the decision "would have
caused radical changes in the payroll practices of American industry." Cox, supra note 97, at 807.
Similarly, Frances Perkins, the Secretary of Labor under President Roosevelt, called the Supreme
Court's decision a "'doctrinaire'.. .one that could not have been made by any one with practical
knowledge of working conditions." Miss Perkins Urges Labor Pacts Providing Ways to End Disputes,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1947, at 4, col. 4. Arthur Krock immediately seized upon this remark. Krock,
Miss Perkins Goes to the Root of the Decision, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1947, at 22, col. 5. By way of
contrast, Elmer Andrews, the first Wage and Hour Administrator, while surprised that his own
portal interpretation for mining had been extended to less hazardous employment, nevertheless con-
cluded that "[t]here can be no moral disagreement with" the Supreme Court's decision because Mt.
Clemens obliged its employees to work almost fifteen minutes "getting ready to do more work."
Many Portal Suits Held Unwarranted, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1947, § 3, col. 2.
324. In commenting on NAM's petition for amicus status on remand, its counsel stated that:
"Application of the principle of prospective rather than retroactive effect to this case
and to all portal-to-portal cases would go a long way toward clearing up the great uncer-
tainty and public concern created by the litigation.
"Our remedy is one which would reduce the portal-to-portal controversy, however it
is finally decided, to dimensions which could be handled without danger of disrupting
the whole national economy."
NAM Gives Basis for Entering Portal Case; Says Back-Pay Plan Could Wreck Economy, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 11, 1947, at 7, col. 5.
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bying efforts on behalf of a portal amendment to FLSA would have been
seriously undercut. As it was, however, employers were disposed "to
fight every portal pay suit... in the firm belief that the Supreme Court
will change its mind." '325 In the meantime, critics of Mt. Clemens tried
to rework the salient points of the dissent into the language of amenda-
tory bills.326
E. The Remand
Events unfolded on two tracks after the Supreme Court denied a
rehearing to Mt. Clemens on October 10, 1946.327 First, attention soon
focused on the proceedings on remand before Judge Picard. Second, em-
ployers and their associations awaited the outcome of the congressional
elections in November to determine whether legislative overruling of Mt.
Clemens might be feasible. Once the magnitude of the Republican vic-
tory became clear, employers were less inclined to work out settlements
with unions and more inclined to wait for the new Congress to take care
of the matter.3 21 Conversely, the pace of litigation accelerated as unions
began to fear that if they did not file promptly, their claims would be cut
off.329 All of this strategic behavior must, moreover, be seen against the
backdrop of the contemporaneous second round of postwar wage negoti-
325. Bill to Wipe Out Portal Pay Suits Ready in Capital, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1947, at 1, col. 4.
Employers hoped that the Court would change its mind in part through a change of Court person-
nel. Id.
326. The notions of contract and custom found their way into virtually all of the bills. Several
incorporated Burton's phrase concerning the absorption of preliminary activities in the rate of pay.
See, eg., H.R. 1041, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 384 (1947) (Rep. Fernandez).
327. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 329 U.S. 822 (1946). In January 1947 Arthur
Krock wrote in the New York Times that lawyers suggested that before Congress acted, it would be
best for the Supreme Court to rehear ML Clemens. Krock, The Long Trail to the Portal-to-Portal
Suits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1947, at 20, col. 5. Krock did not explain on what grounds a second
petition for rehearing might have a greater chance of success. Krock, of course, also failed to state
that by (unnamed) "lawyers" he in fact was referring to Justice Jackson, with whom he had a private
conference on January 7, 1947. The contents of the memorandum Krock made of Jackson's remarks
at that conference are virtually identical with that of his article. See GERHART, supra note 203, at
274.
328. Thus a Wall Street lawyer urged that: "[lit is not recommended that actions be brought by
the employer for declaratory judgments to determine its liability .... I[The new Congress may well
rectify the inequities which presently exist. The employer might do well just prayerfully to sit
tight.... ." Cotter, Portal to Portal Pay, 33 VIRG. L. REv. 44, 67 (1947). The president of Packard
Motor Co. appears to have adopted this fatalistic-reverential pose: "There is nothing we in industry
can do or say. The issue is now a legal fact and the answer to it all is in the hands of Congress. We
can only wait to see what they will do." Portal Pay Demands, If Awarded, Would Wipe Out Auto
Industry, Warns Christopher of Packard, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1947, at 2, col. 1.
329. Lee Pressman, CIO general counsel and one of the architects of the portal-pay legal cam-
paign, testified before Congress that filings mounted "when some Congressmen started making state-
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ations. For it was clear to all concerned that if the employees ultimately
prevailed in the litigation, unions could use the pressure of out-of-court
settlements to bargain for larger wage increases. 330 By the same token,
however, Edward Lamb, counsel for the employees in Mt. Clemens,
warned unions that they risked restrictive congressional action if they
filed suits for "'fabulous and reckless'" amounts.
331
Not until January 1947 did the proceedings on remand resume in
Judge Picard's court. Out of court, however, the general and business
press as well as the law reviews joined in the campaign to educate and to
mobilize their various audiences for capitalist law reform. Throughout
December 1946, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal kept
readers informed of the latest portal suits, highlighting the maximum
but, in the reality of litigation, infeasible332 recoveries,333 and furnished a
running account of employers' associations' initiatives to overturn Mt.
Clemens.334
More important in manufacturing public opinion and the "hyste-
ria ' 335 that might galvanize Congress into action, however, was the
newspapers' constant and unswerving editorial promotion of manage-
ment's position. Thus, for example, the New York Times, ignoring
FLSA's purpose to negate contract in favor of uniform standards, edito-
ments that 'As soon as we get into Washington, there is going to be a law wiping out past claims.''
Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 174.
330. See Portal Pay Claims Reaching Billions; A Boon to Unions, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1946, at
1, col. 8; UA Wto Ask Pay Rises Plus Portal Demands, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1946, at 10, col. 4; Portal
Pay, Wages Separate, Says CIC, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1946, at 1, col. 3; Portal Pay Asked By Electric
Union, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1946, at 12, col. 3. But see Rubber Union, Seeking Pay Raise, Tells
Local "Go Slow" on Law Suits, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1947, at 1, 61. 1; Portal-to-Portal, Wall St. J., Jan.
22, 1947, at 4, col. 2 (editorial, in which it is mentioned that Inland Steel proposes that base wage
rates be reduced to finance nonproductive time Inland may be obligated to pay for under FLSA).
331. Back-Pay Lawyer Advises Caution, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1946, at 3, col. I; Picard Hits
Hysteria, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1946, at 10, col. 3.
332. See, eg., Industry Payment on Portal Suits Seen Fraction of Vast Union Claims, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 30, 1946, at 2, col. 2.
333. See, eg., Portal Pay Suits Exceed a Billion, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1946, at 1, col. 8; Bethle-
hem Sued for $200,000,000, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1946, at 3, col. 4; Portal Pay Suits Pass
$900,000,000, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1946, at 2, col. 4; 6 Billion Possible in Portal Claims, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 22, 1946, at 3, col. 4 (suit by UAW members against Ford for $270,000,000); Asks
$120,000,000 in Portal Pay Suit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1946, at 24, col. 5 (suit by USW members
against U.S. Steel).
334. See, e.g., GOP Drive Grows to Curb Pay Suits, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1946, at 2, col. 2;
Republicans Back Quick Bill to Curb Suits for Portal Pay, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1946, at 1, col. 2;
Business Starts Campaign to Limit Portal Suit Costs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1946, at 1, col. 5 (U.S.
Chamber of Commerce drafts four amendments); Business Confused by Wage Decision, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 18, 1946, at 47, col. 3.
335. Picard Hits Hysteria, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1946, at 10, col. 3.
[Vol. 39
CLASS STRUGGLE AT THE DOOR
rialized that the portal pay suits, which were "apparently to be used as a
lever for one of the largest mass wage demands in the nation's history,"
were "a peculiarly disturbing and harassing type of wage demand" be-
cause they retroactively inserted provisions into agreements never in-
tended by the parties and were "capricious" because they were related
not to intent but to the nature of the industry and its geographic loca-
tion.336 The Times's chief editorial page columnist, Arthur Krock,
secretly echoing the sentiments of Justice Jackson, warned that "the larg-
est sum of money ever transferred from one pocket to another in this
country will have changed hands without a word or a line of authoriza-
tion by Congress in the statute thus interpreted." '337 The Wall Street
Journal tended to glide off into its wonted histrionic tone:
If anyone were to assert that the motive behind these numerous suits to
collect from employers some billions of retroactive pay was the overthrow
of private ownership and its replacement by communism, the charge would
be indignantly-though perhaps not unanimously--denied by organized la-
bor's spokesmen. Few unionists, we take it, have that purpose in mind.
But the fact is that, whatever their aim, the general success of these suits
could help mightily to bring about that result.
338
Even before Picard reopened the proceedings he had already become
something of a press celebrity, granting frequent interviews, presumably
to absolve himself of any responsibility for the "hysteria" caused by Mt.
Clemens.339 His primary message was that he was amazed at what had
become of his original ruling, which did not deal with portal issues at all,
but with a claim for overtime for actual productive work.34  Before the
trial resumed, Picard dealt with a number of motions, all of which were
336. The Portal-to-Portal Issue, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1946, at 16, col. 1 (editorial). See also
Retroactive Relie/7 N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1946, at 14, col. 2 (editorial on reopening government
contracts).
337. Krock, The Long Trail to the Portal-to-Portal Suits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1947, at 20, col.
5. For evidence that these remarks were actually Jackson's, see E. Gerhart, supra note 203, at 274.
The generally conservative positions that underlay Krock's indefatigable editorializing against portal
pay may be gleaned from A. KROCK, MEMOIRS (1968).
338. Portal Pay, Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1946, at 4, col. 1 (editorial). The Wall Street Journal
reasoned that because the smaller firms would not be able to pay, "a real concentration of 'economic
power'" would result leading to greater governmental control and even nationalization. The Wall
Street Journal, however, also published several more sober editorials on the possible economic conse-
quences of portal pay. See Portal-to-Portal, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1946, at 6, col. 1; "Walking Time"
Pay, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1946, at 6, col. 2.
339. Picard Hits Hysteria, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1946, at 10, col. 3.
340. Overtime Is Basis of Portal Claims, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1946, at 11, col. 1. The president
of the Michigan CIO Council agreed. Id. J.W. HOWARD, JR., supra note 129, at 403, incorrectly




dutifully reported by the Times. Thus he granted the motion of the
United States to enter an appearance as an amicus, which Attorney Gen-
eral Clark had ified in order to represent the government in its capacity
as administrator of FLSA and as an affected party where cost-plus war
contractors might seek reimbursement for additional wages awarded
through portal pay litigation.341 Picard also prompted objections from
the defendant by appearing sua sponte at the Mt. Clemens plant with a
stop-watch to compute travel time.342 NAM was also permitted to enter
as an amicus, its chief position being that the court should deny retroac-
tive force to any ruling.343
In the days before Picard reopened the hearing, the United States
began adopting a harder line as amicus, urging dismissal of the claims
unless the workers could show that they were really substantial and "not
against the public interest."' 3 " The Government reinforced its role by
successfully petitioning the court for status as an intervenor, which
would then permit it to appeal any ruling.
345
Picard, well aware of the attention being focused on him, prefaced
his opinion of February 8, 1947 with an apology. The case, he noted, did
not originate as a claim for walking time or preliminary activities, but
solely for unpaid overtime for actual production labor, which Picard be-
lieved the workers had been required to perform before and after their
scheduled hours. When the Supreme Court sustained the Sixth Circuit's
ruling that he was bound by the master's conclusion to the contrary,
"[o]rdinarily this would have ended the case then and there. '346 But the
341. Portal-Pay Judge Allows US. Brief, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1947, at 17, col. 8; Clark Asks A
Hand in Key Portal Suit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1947, at 1, col. 6. Arthur Krock characterized the
Attorney General's intervention as "a precedent in the legal history of the United States." Portal-
To-Portal Case Brings Rare Reaction, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1947, § 4, at 3, col. 1.
342. Portal-Pay Judge Allows U.S. Brief, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1947, at 17, col. 8; $400,000,000
Asked of Auto "Big Three," N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1947, at 5, col. 1.
343. NAM Gives Basis for Entering Portal Case; Says Back-Pay Plan Could Wreck Economy,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1947, at 7, col. 4; Portal Pay Suits Entered by NAM, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1947,
at 14, col. 3.
344. Government Asks Portal Case Ban: Origin "Trifling", N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1947, at I, col.
8. Lamb, the workers' attorney, charged that the Department of Justice's "'vendetta against organ-
ized labor'" had put it in conflict with the Wage and Hour Administrator. Although Walling de-
nied the charge, he did state that he had long taken the position that employees should be paid for
make-ready time required by the employer. US. Row Charged Over Portal Case, N.Y. Times, Feb.
1, 1947, at 7, col. 5.
345. See Picard Lets U.S. Enter Portal Suit, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1947, at 13, col. 1; Government
Seeks Portal Case Role, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1947, at 16, col. 1. Indeed, Picard even asked the
government attorney whether the latter could expedite review by the Supreme Court. Truman Sup-
ports U.S. In Portal Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1947, at 15, col. 1.
346. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 69 F. Supp. 710, 712 (E.D. Mich. 1947).
[Vol. 39
CLASS STR UGGLE AT THE DOOR
parties had inserted into the record evidence about walking and prelimi-
nary activities in order to bolster their contrary positions on the issue of
productive overtime. That is, the company overstated walking and pre-
liminary activity time in order to undermine the workers' claim to wages
for actual work, whereas the workers understandably minimized that
time. But it was not the Supreme Court that raised the portal issue.
Rather:
It's here because defendant company oversold its defense before the
master four years ago in explaining why its employees reported 14 minutes
before starting hours. This was quickly taken advantage of by plaintiffs in
the interim between the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court...
[W]hen the Supreme Court held that this Court was wrong in granting
overtime for what we believed was real production labor, it found itself in
the position where it must in all fairness at least inquire into the extent of
walking time and preliminary activities to which defendant company was
apparently admittedly subjecting its employees .... 347
Because Picard never instructed the master to compute the time em-
ployees spent walking and engaging in preliminary activities, he heard
new testimony on this point, which, as he had anticipated, was not credi-
ble since each side now had an incentive to reverse its position with re-
gard to exaggerating or understating the time consumed. The judge
concluded from this conflicting testimony that walking time was maxi-
mally three minutes.348 Picard found that preliminary activities
amounted to less than three minutes per day. 349 Based on his review of
the meager precedents, Picard concluded that the walking time and pre-
liminary activities, taken together, were de minimis.
3 °
In a largely incoherent analysis, Picard sought to deal with the
Supreme Court's reference to two to twelve minutes of walking time.
But his conclusion that even the maximum individual daily walking time
of 6.2 minutes was de minimis appeared dictated instead by his percep-
tion that precisely because FLSA was "above all aimed to prevent ex-
ploitation of the laborer who under dire requirement of providing
necessities of life... might make any kind of a [sic] bargain in order to
get a job,... how can anybody claim that... [under Muscoda or Jewell
347. Id. at 713.
348. Id. at 714-15.
349. Contrary to the Supreme Court's opinion, Picard did not consider what the master had
called personal activities (such as putting on aprons) as preliminary. Similarly, the nonpersonal
preliminary or make-ready activity was "part of the job and was considered in the rate of pay." Id.
at 715.
350. Id. at 716-19.
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Ridge] walking time of the type and amount involved in this case can be
considered as compensable.. .?,,31 Picard's resolution of the de minimis
issue based on this interpretation of the Supreme Court's portal trilogy
appears misguided in the sense that the Court had been well aware not
only of the vast difference in conditions between the halls at Mt. Clemens
and the mine shafts but also of the minimal dimensions of the portal time
at stake in the case. Had these factors been dispositive, Murphy would
not have bothered to remand the case.
352
In dictum, Picard granted NAM its most.urgently pleaded point: a
rule of non-retroactivity. But this rule was not so generally formulated
as NAM would have wished since Picard premised his decision on the
company's reliance on the results of a compliance inspection by the Wage
and Hour Division.353 Adding dictum to dictum, Picard came much
closer to accommodating NAM's position by insisting that "any indus-
try" in "the general field of manufacture" would have been warranted in
ignoring "such a narrow, picayunish, meager" amount of portal time
before the Supreme Court had spoken in Mt. Clemens.354 In virtual dis-
regard of the clear holding of the portal trilogy that FLSA takes prece-
dence over industry custom, Picard seemed almost overeager to make
amends with the business world that had castigated him: "Custom and
usage should be considered... Otherwise there can be no stability in an
industrial world when tomorrow may see some new interpretation of the
workweek that would disrupt our entire economic structure.
'355 Pic-
ard's belief that an award of retroactive damages under FLSA to employ-
ees would be so harsh that "a holding to the contrary would not be
calamitous, ' 356 seemed even to Picard so harsh that he justified it by
absurdist metaphor: "we should look upon labor and industry as ...
husband and wife where the give and take is not all on one side."' 35 7 In a
final act of self-defense he also expressed "some regrets for the original
plaintiffs," whose version of not having been paid for jumping the gun he
351. Id. at 719.
352. This cavalier attitude was also at odds with a colloquy that Picard had with NAM's coun-
sel at the remand proceedings in which he "wormed from" the attorney "the statement that the
segments of employees' time that he did not want counted as meriting payment might amount to $75
a year. 'Is $75 de minimis to you?' asked Picard. And when Crow replied, 'No, I don't think so,'
Picard added, 'I'd like that in the record.'" Drama of the Stopwatches, Bus. WK., Feb. 8, 1947, at
17, 18.
353. 69 F. Supp. at 720.
354. Id. at 720.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 721.
357. Id. at 722.
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still accepted, although the Supreme Court had precluded him from
awarding them a recovery.35 8 And while these plaintiffs might not have
been worthy of portal pay, Picard held out the prospect that sometime a
portal suit might prevail.359
F. The Reaction to the Remand
Reactions to Picard's ruling were predictable. The plaintiffs' coun-
sel, Lamb, announced immediately that they planned to appeal, adding,
however, that in several respects Mt. Clemens was not a true portal case.
Consequently, the facts did "'not justify compensation comparable to
that which'" existed in heavy industry.3" Shortly before Picard handed
down his decision, Representative Hartley was of the opinion that the
Supreme Court decision "threatens the structure of our free-enterprise
system; 361 as soon as Picard's ruling became public, Senator Taft and
others supported by employers announced the Republicans' intention of
legislating an end to the suits.362 Undeterred, the CIO, viewing Picard's
decision as inconsistent with the Supreme Court ruling, filed new suits.
363
The New York Times, which made the dismissal the lead article3' 6 and
published the entire opinion (including footnotes), 365 exulted in three edi-
torials. Expressing great relief, it hoped that organized labor had learned
its lesson "that wages ought to be adjusted by collective bargaining, not
by fantastic proceedings at law.... 366 The next day it offered further
reflection on the matter:
As a legal exercise this case will probably fascinate students of juris-
prudence for years to come.... But as a symbol it will serve its purpose. It
should lead to a legislative clarification of the Fair Labor Standards Act
and to a decision by the unions to fix wages by fair negotiation and not by
gymnastics in the courts.
3 67
358. Id.
359. Id. at 722. If so, it would not be in Picard's court. See Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 76 F.
Supp. 178 (E.D. Mich. 1948) (per Picard, J.).
360. Appeal is Planned on Portal Deciiion, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1947, at 16, col. 4.
361. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 7, 1947, at 34.
362. GOP Sets Priority on Pay-Suits Curb, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1947, at 1, col. 3. See also
Leviero, Backers of Portal Pay Curb Will Push Bills in Congress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1947, at 1, col.
6.
363. UAW Sues Again Despite Portal Ban, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1947, at 20, col. 5.
364. Ruch, Picard Dismisses Portal Pay Case, Hits 5 Billion Suits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1947, at
1, col. 8.
365. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1947, at 26-27.
366. Judge Picard Reconsiders, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1947, § 4, at 8, col. I (editorial).
367. Mt. Clemens as a Symbol, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1947, at 28, col. 2 (editorial).
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Several days later it praised Picard for "having done much to abate the
portal-to-portal hysteria and to restrict that principle to its fair and
proper sphere. ' 368 Business Week captured the mood best in the wake of
Picard's failure to convince any Qf the parties to abandon the fight: "[I]n
the portal-to-portal cause celebre, how and what the formerly obscure
Detroit judge reasoned was itself de minimis. The stock market's reac-
tion to his decision seemed appropriate. It sold off. There was a wide-
spread recognition that the portal-to-portal issue was still far from
settled.
369
The appeal of Picard's remand decision was fied by the union with
the Sixth Circuit in March, but two weeks later, when the CIO realized
that further prosecution of the case was becoming counterproductive,370
the plaintiffs moved to dismiss.37 1 In the meantime Attorney General
Clark announced that he would seek expedited review by the Supreme
Court before the appeals court acted.372 As grounds for his action he
alleged that the district court portal cases "threaten[ed] to embarrass
court procedure, and to interrupt industrial relations while the nation is
passing from war to peace manufacture., 373 The Sixth Circuit quickly
dismissed the appeal per curiam, 37 4 and a week later the Supreme Court
dismissed the government's petition on Clark's motion.375 If the unions
believed that voluntary dismissal would appease the anti-portal pay
forces, or if the Truman administration believed that strong government
intervention before the Supreme Court would make possible a new deci-
sion accommodating employers' concerns about "'the expense, difficulty
and possible disruption of industrial peace incident to the keeping of
records of short intervals of time,' ",376 Representative Gwynne promptly
declared that it would have no effect on the legislative process.377
368. Mount Clemens in Retrospect, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1947, at 20, col. 2 (editorial).
369. ML Clemens Decision Leaves Portal Still Open, Bus. WY.., Feb. 15, 1947, at 86.
370. The plaintiffs' attorney, Lamb, stated that the Attorney General was "'seeking to scuttle
the entire Wage and Hour Act by a savage attack'" on the case. Exit Mount Clemens, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 4, 1947, at 22, col. 3 (editorial).
371. Workers Abandon Mt. Clemens Suit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1947, at 21, col. 1.
372. This review could take place pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 347(a) (1946). Government Seeks
Portal Case Speed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1947, at 17, col. 3.
373. Wood, High Court Action on Portal Asked, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1947, at 8, col. 5.
374. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 162 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1947) (United States,
Intervenor).
375. United States v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 331 U.S. 784 (1947).
376. Wood, High Court Action on PortalAsked, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1947, at 8, col. 6 (quoting
Clark's petition).
377. Workers Abandon ML Clemens Suit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1947, at 21, col. 1.
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V. "(W)AIT FOR THAT NICE NEW REPUBLICAN CONGRESS TO COME
RIDING TO THE RESCUE"
3 7 8
A. Precursors of the Portal-to-Portal Act
As Representative Gwynne declared, Congress was ready to put an
end to the portal suits. In order to understand this congressional reac-
tion, however, a look at some of the actions taken prior to the passage of
the Portal-to-Portal Act are necessary.
1. State Statutes of Limitations. Because Congress failed to pro-
vide for a specific statute of limitations in which workers could file claims
for back wages under FLSA, courts had to apply what they considered
the most analogous state statute of limitations. Thus in the absence of a
uniform national standard, a patchwork of limitations-and hence of
rights and liability-arose not only among the states but even within a
state as courts disagreed over the applicable state statute. As of the date
of enactment of FLSA in 1938, these periods of limitation varied from
one year to twelve years.379
The legislative genesis of the core of the Portal-to-Portal Act can be
traced back to a movement to shorten the limitations period. Several
states during World War II enacted statutes of limitation that discrimi-
nated against wage claims in general and FLSA overtime and liquidated
damages in particular.38 ° Overtime was a particular animus of employ-
ers simply because the vast majority of all FLSA violations involved pre-
mium pay rather than minimum wages or child labor.38' As early as
1943, the Wage and Hour Administrator warned of the adverse enforce-
ment impact of such laws, which he characterized as "State Efforts at
Nullification" aimed at FLSA's "defeat in practice. '382 And shortly
378. Cort, The Labor Movement: Boxed in a Portal-to-Portal Suit, COMMONWEAL, Feb. 14,
1947, at 447.
379. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT, WAGE & HOUR & PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIvi-
SIONS, FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1946, Table H at 86 (1947).
380. Weiss, Minimum Labor Standards, in 1 YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN LABOR: WAR LABOR
POLICIES 198, 209 (C. Warne ed. 1945), conjectured that "[i]ncreased liability of employers under
the Act may have been responsible for" the wave of state legislation.
381. See, eg., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS IN WARTIME: ANNUAL RE-
PORT, WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISION, FISCAL YEAR 1942, at Table III
(1943); U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE WAGE & HOUR & PUBLIC CONTRACTS
DIVISIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1946, Table 3 at 20, Table D at 74-76 (1947).
382. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS IN WARTIME: ANNUAL REPORT,
WAGE & HOUR & PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISIONS, FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1943, at 4 (1944). See
also FAIR LABOR STANDARDS IN WARTIME, 3RD YEAR: ANNUAL REPORT, WAGE & HOUR &
PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISIONS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1944, at 7 (1945); U.S.
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before the war ended in Europe, the press reported that "[a] successful
and little-known behind-the-scenes campaign is well under way in many
states to hamstring time-and-a-half payment for overtime work....
These efforts had been made possible by Congress's omission of a limita-
tions period in FLSA itself.384
A review of the most prominent state laws highlights the shortest
limitations periods imposed by the states. In Oregon the legislature, cit-
ing an "emergency," acted in March 1943 to limit "[r]ecovery for over-
time or premium pay... required or authorized by any statute.., to...
work performed within six months" before the suit for future claims and
only ninety days for past claims.385 By way of contrast, actions to re-
cover regular wages, which could be brought for six years after ac-
crual,3 86 remained unaffected. Employees promptly challenged the
statute in state and federal court. The Oregon Supreme Court struck
down the statute in 1945 on the grounds that "legislation manifestly hos-
tile to the exercise of rights granted by a federal statute cannot stand. 387
In reliance on this decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of a
federal district court that the law "unreasonably interferes with the nor-
mal operation" of FLSA and hence with Congress's commerce power.3 88
In 1947 the legislature amended the statute to extend the limitations pe-
riod to one year for future and past claims.389 Enactment of the Portal-
to-Portal Act with its own limitations period several weeks later made
moot the state law's constitutionality as to future claims.
The Iowa legislature, which acted a week after Oregon's legislature
DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT WAGE & HOUR & PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISIONS FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1946, at 62-65, 86 (1947).
383. Riesel, Labor News and Comment: Time-and-a-Half Payment for Overtime Threatened,
N.Y. Post, Mar. 21, 1945, at 39, col. 1. Riesel noted similarities between this campaign and a con-
temporaneous one for state "right-to-work" laws organized by the Christian America Association
and Fight For Free Enterprise, Inc., both of which were designed to circumvent a federal legislature
deemed impervious to anti-labor initiatives.
384. Apparently the first bill to establish a limitations period was introduced only a few months
after FLSA went into effect. In the first session of the Seventy-Sixth Congress (March 13, 1939),
Senator Wiley offered S. 1765, which would have provided for a four-year period within which to
recover double liability (that is, liquidated damages) for minimum wage or overtime. Some irony
attaches to this sponsorship inasmuch as Wiley was the chief Senate supporter of the portal bill with
its much shorter limitations period in 1947.
385. 1943 Or. Laws 265.
386. OR. [Limitations of Actions] § 1-204 (Consol. 1939).
387. Fullerton v. Lamm, 163 P.2d 941, 945 (Or. 1945), reh'g denied, 165 P.2d 63 (1946), rev'g
Fullerton v. Lamm, 9 Lab. Cas. 62,495 (Or. Cir. Ct. 1944).
388. Kurth v. E.H. Clarke Lumber Co., 9 Lab. Cas. 1 62,494 at 67,261 (D. Or. 1944), aff'd,
E.H. Clarke Lumber Co. v. Kurth, 152 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1945).
389. 1947 Or. Laws 492.
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in 1943, took a different tack. It imposed the six-month limitations pe-
riod on "all cases wherein a claim... has arisen or may arise pursuant to
the provisions of any Federal statute wherein no period of limitation is
prescribed... ."39o The law was held invalid as to FLSA and discrimina-
tory against federally granted rights.391 In the midst of these judicial
proceedings the Iowa legislature, too, repealed its earlier statute, enacting
a new one with a two-year period for future claims for wages without
reference to federal statutes. 392 After a federal district court upheld the
statute,393 it was preempted by the new Portal-to-Portal Act.394
Although a number of states continued to enact short statutes of
limitations395 even while Congress was debating and after it passed the
Portal-to-Portal Act,3 96 the rude judicial reception accorded them 397 in-
duced NAM to curtail these efforts during 1946 in favor of a congres-
sional campaign. 398  Now that labor, capital, and the executive and
legislative branches of the federal government agreed that a uniform na-
tional limitations period was a desideratum since conflicting court inter-
pretations led to confusion,39 9 the primary stumbling block, as the failure
390. 1943 Iowa Acts 267, § 1.
391. Kappler v. Republic Pictures Corp., 59 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Iowa 1945), aff'd, Republic
Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1945), aff'd per curiam, 327 U.S. 757 (1946).
392. 1945 Iowa Acts 222. Already existing claims had to be brought within six months of
enactment. Id.
393. Reid v. Solar Corp., 69 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
394. This preemption dealt with future claims. Under § 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, which
provided for the possible applicability of state statutes of limitations for already existing claims, the
Iowa statute was upheld in Kendall v. Keith Furnace Co., 162 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1947).
395. For an overview see, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT, WAGE & HOUR & PUB-
LIC CONTRACTS DIVISIONS, FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1946, Table H at 86 (1947).
See also Note, Limitations of Actions Under Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1945).
396. Perhaps the most remarkable such statute was a Massachusetts act that provided that re-
covery of back wages "based upon any judicial interpretation of a state or federal statute differing
from or overruling a previous interpretation of the same" had to be brought within one year after
that interpretation or, if it was an already existing interpretation, within one year after enactment.
1947 Mass. Acts 333. The Idaho Hours Worked Act, though not applicable to FLSA, declared it
"contrary to the public policy of the State of Idaho for persons now to sue for attorneys' fees,
liquidated damages, and alleged overtime for non-productive work performed during the war .. "
1947 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 267, § 1. The act then set forth a checklist of noncompensable activities
to be excluded from the definition of "hours worked." 1947 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 267, § 2.
397. For example, a South Carolina statute imposing a one-year limitation on federal wage
claims was held invalid. Rockton & Rion Ry. v. Davis, 159 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. i946), afftg, 65 F.
Supp. 67 (W.D. S.Car. 1946).
398. See Retroactive Penalties Under Federal Law: The "Gwynne" Bill-HR 2788, 9 N.A.M. L.
DIG., Sept. 1946, at 1, 3; Back- Wage Limit Contested, Bus. WK., Dec. 7, 1946, at 76, 78.
399. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1945, at 10-11 (1945).
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to enact any of the legislative initiatives in the Seventy-Ninth Congress
demonstrated,' was disagreement over the appropriate length of that
period.
2. A Federal Statute of Limitations. The drive for a uniform but
quick federal cutoff for FLSA claims started in earnest in 1945. The
chief advocate of such an abbreviated period of limitations in the Sev-
enty-Ninth Congress was Representative Gwynne, a Republican from
Iowa, who feared that the United States was "becoming a socialistic na-
tion.""°  On March 28 he introduced H.R. 2788, which would simply
have amended the Judicial Code so that, absent a specific limitations pro-
vision, an action to recover damages would need to be brought within
one year "unless a shorter time be fixed in any applicable State
statute.''1402
H.R. 2788 was interesting for two reasons. First, it was not limited
to FLSA, but would have applied to numerous federal commercial stat-
utes.4"3 Second, brevity, not uniformity, was its goal. Gwynne himself
underscored this point by reference to the need to protect employers
against double damages "for events which were lawful when they oc-
curred but unlawful in retrospect" by virtue of "the concepts of work
time, over-all coverage, and [that] the Administrator's authority are con-
stantly being enlarged by new interpretation."'  Since "a legal right is a
law-suit won, and a legal duty, a law suit lost," 5 Gwynne's animus is
difficult to locate systemically. He sought to motivate his legislation by
way of a case, "beg[ging] for correction," from Iowa, in which an em-
400. Earlier Representative Costello (Dem. Cal.) repeatedly undertook unsuccessful efforts to
insert a short period of limitations into FLSA. H.R. 10466, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 86 CONG. REC.
11607 (1940) (six months); H.R. 2660, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 CONG. REc. 303 (1941) (six
months); H.R. 6791, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 CONG. REc. 2535 (1942) (one year); H.R. 835, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REc. 50 (1943) (one year).
401. Gwynne, Shall Victory's Fruits Be Lost, or Representative Government Be Saved?, WATER-
LOO DAILY COURIER, July 10, 1944, at 4, col. 1 (guest editorial). Gwynne served in the House from
1935 to 1948, when he lost the Republican primary. In 1953 President Eisenhower appointed him to
the Federal Trade Commission, of which he served as chairman from 1955 to 1959, when he retired.
See Ex-Congressman John Gwynne, 82, WATERLOO DAILY COURIER, July 5, 1972, at 5, col. I.
402. 91 CONG. REC. 2927 (1945). Two other bills were offered with a six-month period of
limitation. S. 760, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REC. 2386 (1945) (Johnson); H.R. 3079, 79th
Cong., Ist Sess., 91 CONG. REC. 4006 (1945) (Chenoweth). Both sponsors represented Colorado,
one of the states that had enacted a short statute of limitations designed to apply solely to federal
statutes.
403. See 91 CONG. REC. 2927-29 (1945) (setting forth applicable laws). The bill provided for a
two-year period in public actions.
404. Id. at 2927.
405. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 9 (1973).
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ployer was sued under FLSA for overtime wages and liquidated damages
three years after the employment had been terminated and six years after
the cause of action had accrued. Characterizing Iowa's six-month statute
of limitations-without revealing its length-as "reasonable," Gwynne
was disturbed that, despite the employee's laches, the court instead ap-
plied Iowa's five or ten-year statute of limitations for contracts." 6
Gwynne did not explain why wage contracts should be treated differently
than other contracts. Moreover, although it may be uncommon for em-
ployees to wait three years after the termination of the employment rela-
tionship before filing, the purpose and effect of the bill was to shorten the
period for current employees who were intimidated by the possibility of
retaliation. 4 7
In June and July 1945, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee held hearings on H.R. 2788.10 The first witness was counsel for
NAM, Raymond Smethurst, whose statement was not confined to com-
plaints about the limitations period or even portal pay issues under
FLSA.4  He expressed employers' concerns about the expansion of cov-
erage resulting from judicial interpretations of the statutory term "com-
merce," as well as about the Supreme Court's recent ruling that
employees' waivers of their damages claims pursuant to an agreement
with an employer were void.410 NAM took the position that during the
coming "difficult period of reconversion . . ., [e]nactment of a limiting
statute could provide an important and needed stimulant to postwar
business venture and risk taking. 4 1 1 NAM was therefore grateful for
406. 91 CONG. REc. 2926 (1945).
407. The case Gwynne was referring to was Keen v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 58 F.
Supp. 915, 63 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Iowa 1945). Since the employer was a Delaware corporation
operating a refinery in Oklahoma and merely distributing oil products in Iowa (and represented by
Oklahoma counsel), it seems improbable that Gwynne was merely engaged in energetic constituent
service.
408. Limiting the Time for Bringing Certain Actions Under the Laws of the United States: Hear-
ing Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)[here-
inafter Limiting the Time for Bringing Certain Actions Under the Laws of the United States]. The
chairman of the subcommittee, Representative Hobbs of Alabama, was arguably the most vociferous
opponent of FLSA at the time of the portal-pay hearings in 1947. According to a union newspaper:
"The bill was drafted in such broad terms in order to have it referred to the ultra-reactionary Judici-
ary Committee, which is notoriously hostile to labor." House Bill Gives Business Crooks License To
Steal, LABOR, Nov. 24, 1945.
409. Business Week later commented that NAM's testimony "did take on a significant propa-
ganda aspect." Shorter Weeks, Bus. WK., June 16, 1945, at 98, 102.
410. Limiting the Time for Bringing Certain Actions Under the Laws of the United States, supra
note 408, at 21-22.
411. Id. at 32.
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the "partial corrective" that Gwynne's bill provided as to future claims.
But NAM further argued that:
The Bill does not meet the equally serious need for reducing liabilities
which may already have accrued under recent administrative rulings and
judicial decisions.
4. It is recommended, therefore, that the bill be amended (a) to include
actions for penalties or wage adjustment not now clearly covered; (b) to
reduce the period within which such ... actions must be brought; (c) to
provide the same treatment for actions which have already accrued.., as is
provided for future claims....
5. If the committee decides... that a reasonable time should be al-
lowed for filing of accrued actions, we urge that such period should not
exceed 90 days, and as to such actions, that a maximum period of recovery
be provided not to exceed a period of 1 year prior to the effective date of the
limiting statute.41
In light of the recent portal-to-portal decisions by the Supreme Court in
favor of miners, it came as no surprise that the representative of the Na-
tional Coal Association supported NAM's proposals.413
Considerable interest attaches to the testimony of the Wage and
Hour Administrator, Metcalfe Walling, who sharply criticized the bill's
permissive provisions with regard to state statutes of limitations as un-
dermining nationally uniform standards.414 Walling himself suggested a
three-year limitations period.415 He also used the opportunity to re-urge
Congress to confer authority on him to define FLSA's terms and to issue
interpretations with the force of substantive law subject to judicial re-
view. The Administrator shrewdly couched this plea in such a manner
as to address employers' concerns about retroactive liability. As an en-
forcement agency, the Wage and Hour Division had been peculiarly
handicapped by Congress:
The year 1938-that in which the Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted-
was a year in which the tide of hostility to so-called "administrative absolu-
tism". . . was already rising. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the Fair
Labor Standards Act Congress confined the powers of the Administrator of
the Wage and Hour Division within very narrow limits. He has no rule-
making power except with respect to minor matters, no power to hear and




413. Id. at 38-40 (statement of James Haley).
414. Id. at 149.
415. Id. at 155.
416. Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 321,
370 (1946).
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Since Walling conceded that even with such powers he might be
overruled by a court, in which case an employer might be liable despite
an initially favorable ruling by the Administrator, his "cure [wa]s to per-
mit the Administrator to protect those employers who follow his inter-
pretation in good faith." '417 If, in addition, Congress amended FLSA to
provide for "simple restitution of wages owed without liquidated dam-
ages where the violation is not willful," or the employer had followed the
Administrator's interpretation, "justice would be served." '418 Walling's
initiative turned out to be doubly ironic. First, this strongly pro-em-
ployer measure-it was after all the penal aspect of the retroactivity that
incensed employers-was not even offered by employers, but rather by
the Administrator himself. Second, Congress ultimately adopted Wall-
ing's proposal as to good faith and willfulness without conferring any
additional powers on the Administrator.
In October, the House Judiciary Committee, through Representa-
tive Hobbs, reported favorably on H.R. 2788, amending it to incorporate
NAM's proposal on already existing claims. Indeed, much of the re-
port's explanatory section was taken almost literally from Smethurst's
testimony. The Judiciary Committee also inserted a more radical version
of the Administrator's suggested provision on eliminating liability for
good faith reliance on administrative rulings. 19 Specifically, the com-
mittee's bill read:
That causes of action which had accrued prior to the passage of this Act,
and which had not become barred by any applicable statute of limitation
may be maintained if commenced within six months after the date of enact-
ment: Provided further, That no liability shall be predicated in any case on
any act done or omitted in good faith in accord with any regulation, order,
or administrative interpretation or practice, notwithstanding that such reg-
ulation, order, interpretation, or practice may, after such act or omission,
be amended, rescinded, or be determined by judicial authority to be invalid
or of no legal effect.42°
Whereas Walling had merely proposed excusing employers from liability
for liquidated damages where they had followed the Administrator's rul-
ing, the committee bill would apparently have abolished liability even for
the underlying back wages. The Attorney General and the Secretary of
417. Limiting the Time for Bringing Certain Actions Under the Laws of the United States, supra
note 408, at 146.
418. Id. at 154.
419. LIMITING THE TIME FOR BRINGING CERTAIN ACTIONS UNDER THE LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 1141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1945).
420. Id. at 1.
1991]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
Labor both expressed strong opposition to the committee's bill42 as did
several Democratic members of the committee. 22
Although H.R. 2788 was to be given two hours of debate, the House
leadership did not call it up.423 In November 1945, however, Gwynne
did have the opportunity to speak on the bill, at which time he assured
his colleagues that there was "[n]ot the slightest" reason to consider the
bill "antilabor."42 On a more candid note, he kept his bill's chances
alive by stating that he was "not quarreling with anyone who thinks the
statute of limitations should be a little longer." '425 And the following
March, the Senate Judiciary Committee, too, reported H.R. 2788 favora-
bly, this time with a two-year limitations period.426 Truman's new At-
torney General, Tom Clark, found this period "somewhat brief," instead
suggesting five years.427
At the same time that Gwynne's statute of limitations bill was wend-
ing its way through the judiciary committees, the labor committees in
both chambers were also considering amendments to FLSA. Indeed, a
struggle was emerging over which committee should have jurisdiction
over the bill.42 The major FLSA bills in 1945, which were largely
designed to raise the minimum wage,429 both contained provisions stat-
ing that an action by an employee to recover liability for unpaid mini-
mum wages or unpaid overtime compensation may be brought within
421. Id. at 7-9.
422. Id. at pts. 2 and 3.
423. 91 CONG. Rac. 10946 (1945) (statement of Rep. Gwynne).
424. Id. at 10947 (exchange between Representatives Gwynne and Horan). Two years later
Gwynne protested to the Methodist Federation for Social Service that the purpose of the portal bill
was not to weaken FLSA but "to remove the inequities and injustices which are jeapordizing [sic]
the very existence of the Act itself." Letter to Jack McMichael (Mar. 1, 1947) (copy in author's
possession).
425. Id.
426. S. REP. No. 1395, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1946).
427. Id. at 6. Clark also proposed an extended period for causes of action that had already
accrued. Id.
428. Two Democratic members of the House Judiciary Committee expressed minority views to
the effect that it would be more appropriate for the House Labor Committee to consider the question
"than to legislate in the blunderbuss manner proposed in this bill." H.R. REP. No. 1141, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, pt. 2 (1945).
429. In cautioning against "[a] too rapid increase" in the minimum wage, Senator Taft made the
important point that "[the difficulty is that the less efficient producers and the small industries are
driven out of business and the industry is likely to be concentrated in the large mass production units
and the monopolistic companies in the industry." 92 CONG. Rac. 2493 (1946). This argument
echoed the largely forgotten criticism which the leading marginalist in the United States had di-
rected at populist advocates of state minimum wage laws decades earlier. J.B. Clark, The Minimum
Wage, 112 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 289, 296 (1913).
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five years after accrual of liability.430 The Senate debated and in April
passed S. 1349, the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1946, which
included a two-year limitations period and conferred on the courts dis-
cretion to reduce or to eliminate liquidated damages where the employer
showed that his violation had not been willful and that he had acted in
good faith.431 In July the Senate, at the request of a bipartisan group of
Senators, briefly returned to H.R. 2788, amending it to provide for a
three-year period.432 In the meantime, in May, the House, after extended
debate over the length of the limitations period,433 passed H.R. 2788 with
a two-year period.434 When Representative Hobbs the next day sought
unanimous consent by the House to concur in the Senate amendments,
objections by three prolabor Congressmen effectively killed the bill and
any chance for passage of a federal statute of limitations.435
Since these early Congressional bills were exclusively statutes of lim-
itations with no reference to portal issues,436 it was with some justifica-
tion that NAM could later assert that the Portal-to-Portal Act would
430. Proposed Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Labor, H.R. 3914, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1945); Amendments of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, S. 1349, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1945).
431. 92 CONG. REC. 2245, 3205 (1946). For the debate over whether the period should be one,
two, three, or five years, see id. at 3187-89. Senator Cordon of Oregon sponsored a short period on
behalf of lumber employers who had apparently been sued for unpaid travel time by employees
whom they had transported to the forests during the war. The debate in the House brought out the
fact that such workers had not been driven from home, but rather had first driven to company
property before they were transported further. Id. at 5296 (colloquy between Representatives
Gwynne and Savage).
432. Id. at 10,372-73. Causes that had accrued eighteen months or more before enactment were
required to be filed within six months after enactment. The bill also eliminated liability for violations
committed in good faith reliance on administrative rulings.
433. Id. at 5290-5305. The supporters of a short period competed with one another in telling
war stories about "outrageous suits... which shock our sense of justice." Id. at 5293 (Representa-
tive Hancock). Among the new arguments offered, the most interesting stemmed from Representa-
tive Feighan, who pointed out that if the short limitations period made it impossible for employees to
bring suit (because "the poorly paid, unorganized workers.., who would not get their 40 cents an
hour and overtime if it were not for this law" would not normally file suit until they had been laid off
or found a new job), they could not act as private attorneys general, thus imposing on the taxpayer
additional expenditures for enforcement of FLSA. Id. at 5297-98.
434. Id. at 5305-06.
435. Id. at 10,487.
436. Conversely, in 1941 bills were introduced in both houses providing that FLSA shall not be
interpreted to require employers to pay employees amounts greater than those agreed on, but these
bills contained no limitations period. S. 1015, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 CONG. REc. 1581 (1941)
(Sheppard); H.R. 5268, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 CONG. Rnc. 5916 (1941) (Patton).
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have been unnecessary had an earlier bill been enacted.437 By the same
token, since even in the latter part of 1946 unions' demand for retroactiv-
ity was more important to "a large segment of management" than for
portal pay as such,438 it was not a foregone conclusion that congressional
action would necessarily go beyond achieving a compromise on a limita-
tions period.
B. The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947
Of course, Mr. Speaker, I am sorry that this remarkable law [FLSA]
may be utilized against those unfortunate companies.., which made mil-
lions during the war, and barely succeeded in accumulating profits, surplus,
and reserves amounting to 26 billions of dollars; and I know it would cost
them something if that law ... were to remain in force.
439
1. Preliminary Skirmishes. Even before the Eightieth Congress
convened on January 3, 1947, Republican Congressmen, reacting to em-
ployers' complaints that "'invisible bankruptcy'" hovered over indus-
try,"0 began floating specific proposals to amend FLSA. Thus already
on December 27, Representative Hoffman of Michigan was reported to
have drafted two amendments designed to make only "productive" work
compensable. Tracking the language of Mt. Clemens, Hoffman would
also have excluded from the workweek any time spent walking from the
time clock." 1 Hoffman portrayed his bill as a means of dealing with a
situation which was "'an invitation to unscrupulous lawyers and racke-
teering labor leaders'" and "'unscrupulous blackmailers.' "442 The New
York Times, for which no anti-portal pay legislation was too radical,
437. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 419 (statement by Ray-
mond Smethurst, NAM counsel).
438. Door-to-Door Pay, Bus. WK., Sept. 21, 1946, at 94.
439. 93 CONG. REc. 1002 (1947) (Rep. Adolph Sabath, Dem. Ill., Dean of the House).
440. Wolman Predicts One More Pay Rise, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1946, at 3, col. 5 (statement by
Raymond Smethurst, counsel to NAM). Monsanto Chemical Co., for example, which was a defend-
ant in a portal suit, wrote a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee stating that portal legislation
was the first problem the new Congress should attack. Portal-to-Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 801
(1947).
441. GOPDrive Grows to Curb Pay Suits, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1946, at 2, col. 2. Hoffman then
introduced the first portal bill in the House on January 3, 1947 as H.R. 89.
442. Leviero, Bill to Wipe Out Portal Pay Suits Ready in Capital, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1947, at 1,
col. 4. Even before the formal House debates on the portal bill began, Representative Hoffman
expressed strong animus against "Judge" Murphy, recalling his role as Governor of Michigan at the
time of the sit-down strikes at General Motors, when he "left the sit-down strikers in possession of
private property .... 93 CONG. Rac. 298 (1947). During the debates he called Murphy the "CIO's
Santa Claus." Id. at 1562.
[Vol. 39
1991] CLASS STR UGGLE A T THE DOOR
placed its imprimatur on Hoffman's proposal as "the most forthright,"
while warning unions that the further filing of suits would "play into the
hands of the reactionary element."" 3
Beginning on the opening day of the first session of the Eightieth
Congress, a flood of anti-portal bills was introduced. Most embodied
provisions similar to what eventually became the principal House and
Senate bills. 4 Perhaps the most extraordinary piece of legislation was
proposed by Senator O'Daniel in the form of an amendment to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. O'Daniel's proposal would have imposed a 100 per
cent income tax on all portal suit recoveries and entitled payors to deduct
such amounts from their income taxes.' 5 By January 15, the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee 6 was already holding hearings-the first, boasted
chairman Wiley, "held under the auspices of the Republican Party since
1933 on a matter of national importance."" 7
The accelerated pace of congressional action went hand in hand
with the stepped-up portal litigation. Workers had fied 727 portal suits
in federal courts during the last six months of 1946, but in January 1947
alone an additional 1,186 were recorded." 8 The closer Congress ap-
443. The Portal-to-Portal Issue, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1947, at 14, col. 2 (editorial).
444. See S. 307, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 43 (1947) (Wilson); S. 557, 80th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 910 (1947) (Wilson); H.R. 89, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 43
(1947) (Hoffman); H.R. 233, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 46 (1947) (Dondero) (providing
for thirty-day limitations period in actions for overtime and liquidated damages and no liability for
violations of FLSA pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement); H.R. 477, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
93 CONG. REc. 148 (1947) (Smith, Va.); H.R. 613, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 157 (1947)
(Price, Fla.); H.R. 776, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 262 (1947) (Buck); H.R. 957, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 329 (1947) (Jennings); H.R. 1041, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG.
REC. 384 (1947) (Fernandez); H.R. 1046, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 384 (1947) (Hoff-
man); H.R. 1194, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. Rnc. 496 (1947) (Hoffman); H.R. 1277, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 552 (1947) (Hartley); H.R. 1440, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG.
REc. 694 (1947) (Fernandez).
445. 93 CONG. REC. 414 (1947). A bill in the Massachusetts legislature likewise proposed to
impose a 100 per cent tax on portal pay. Bills Would Bar Portal Suits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1947, at
10, col. 8.
446. The bills were apparently referred to the Judiciary rather than to the Labor Committee
because such action involved the limitation of courts' jurisdiction. See Ray, The Portal to PortalAct
of 1947, 20 TENN. L. REV. 151, 153 (1948) (Associate Solicitor, U.S. Dep't. of Labor). Some bills
were referred to the labor committees, but never advanced. See, e.g., H.R. 1041, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947). Sen. Taft, the chairman of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, stated that the Senate
bill was initially referred to his committee, but that he had not objected to its having been placed
under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee since it seemed to involve constitutional issues
rather than questions directly related to FLSA. 93 CONG. REc. 2369 (1947).
447. Portal-to-Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 8.
448. EXEMPTING EMPLOYERS FROM LIABILITY FOR PORTAL-TO-PORTAL WAGES IN CERTAIN
CASES, S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947). During the remaining five months of the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1947, only 326 more portal suits were filed, producing a total of 2,239.
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peared to be moving to closing the portal permanently, the more actions
were filed. 4 9 And as reports circulated that the defendants' total liability
was approaching $6 billion,450 Congress, in turn, felt that much more
obliged to act quickly to stave off the purportedly looming mass bank-
ruptcies that would halt the postwar reconversion process. Thus Senator
Capehart, who filed the first Senate portal bill on January 6,451 declared
at the outset of the Senate hearings that:
This problem might not be so urgent if it were merely a question of an
economic struggle between two parties, one of which wants the money and
the other of which has the money. But these so-called portal-to-portal suits
... threaten the very existence of thousands of business[es]... 452
The Truman administration in December 1946 and January 1947
undertook to exert some influence over the eventual shape of the Repub-
licans' amendatory legislation in two ways. First, as already noted, it
entered the Mt. Clemens proceedings on remand in order to persuade
Picard to dismiss the suit on de minimis grounds.453 Second, reports be-
gan appearing that the Treasury would provide partial financial relief to
affected employers. In late December the New York Times editorialized
about "[t]wo possible avenues" of such relief. One involved re-opening
back corporate income tax statements for the years of high wartime taxa-
tion so that refunds could be made to recapture the retroactive wage pay-
ments compelled by portal litigation. The other was the renegotiation of
Enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act in May radically reduced filings; in the following four years
44, 13, 5, and 13 portal suits were filed respectively. These data are taken from the corresponding
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, Table C 2. The Administrative Office, which until then had not published more detailed
data on FLSA cases, calculated these figures by asking the district clerks
to include cases brought under Sections 7 and 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act seek-
ing compensation for unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation in
which the question is raised as to whether the employee's compensation has included pay
for all the time during which he was necessarily required to be on the employer's prem-
ises or at his prescribed work place.
S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947).
449. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 174-75 (testimony of Lee
Pressman, General Counsel, CIO).
450. S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947). This sum was presumably calculated from
the amounts alleged under the rubric "amount demanded" on the civil cover sheets. Interestingly,
more than a month earlier the New York Times quoted "[i]ndustry leaders" as citing the same figure,
6 Billion Possible in Portal Claims, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1946, at 3, col. 4.
451. S. 49 was referred to the Labor Committee, but when it was later decided that the Judiciary
Committee would have jurisdiction over all portal bills, Capehart was compelled to offer it as a
substitute amendment to Senator Wiley's bill, S. 70. Portal-to-Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 11-12,
452. Portal-to-Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 17.
453. See supra § IV.
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government war contracts to take into account the new state of facts.454
The next day the Times reserved the lead-article column of its Sunday
business section for "an authority on taxation," who explained how the
carry-back provisions of the wartime excess profits tax might work.455
Then, as if by coincidence, two weeks later the Treasury Department
issued a ruling in reply to an inquiry by the "M. Company," which had
agreed to pay its employees back portal wages, that it could recalculate
its tax liability in effect by writing off both back portal wages and liqui-
dated damages against the war years of high profits and taxes in which
the labor was performed.456
Corporations, to be sure, were "greatly pleased" by this Treasury
ruling,45 7 but the Times warned that the resulting decline in federal reve-
nues by two to three billion dollars "would make it virtually impossible
to reduce income tax rates, as the Republicans have proposed.
458
Although these steps by the Truman administration have been inter-
preted as part of its effort to forestall portal legislation,459 the contempo-
rary view appears much more plausible that the Treasury ruling was
"likely to... [s]pur Congressional action to block further portal-to-por-
tal pay suits ... in order to save the Government from raids on the
Treasury .... "4'0 As the Attorney General's intervention in Mt. Clem-
ens had already suggested to large capital, which was the primary object
of the suits,461 the Administration's sympathies lay with capital in regard
454. Retroactive Relief?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1946, at 14, col. 2 (editorial).
455. Nelson, Portal Pay Raises Tax Implications, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1946, § 3, at 1, col. 8.
The same author estimated that employers might ultimately shift almost three-fifths of the financial
burden to the Treasury. Nelson, Treasury to Lose in Portal-Pay Suits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1947, § 3,
at 1, col. 4.
456. I.T. 3836, 1947-1 C.B. 33; Hurd, Grants Tax Refund in Portal Actions, N.Y. Times, Jan.
23, 1947, at 1, col. 7.
457. Treasury Rules Industry Can Charge Funds Paid in Portal Suits Against Federal Taxes,
Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1947, at 3, col. 1.
458. The Budget and Portal Pay, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1947, at 20, col. 2 (editorial). Nelson,
Treasury Sharing Portal Pay Suits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1947, § 3, at 1, col. 5, provided further
estimates of the Treasury losses.
459. See S. HARTMANN, TRUMAN AND THE 80TH CONGRESS 41 (1971).
460. Treasury Rules Industry Can Charge Funds Paid in Portal Siits Against Federal Taxes,
Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1947, at 3, col. 1. Still more puzzling for its indirectness was that the govern-
ment was, according to a Senate investigation, forcing war contractors to settle for full payment of
all portal claims, with the resulting liability passed on to the government under cost plus fee con-
tracts. White, Federal Policy Under Fire in War-Job Portal Pay Suits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1947, at 1,
col. 6.
461. The defendants in the largest suits included U.S. Steel, General Motors, Bethlehem Steel,
Ford, International Harvester, Chrysler, A.T.& T., and Standard Oil of New Jersey. See Treasury
Rules Industry Can Charge Funds Paid in Portal Suits Against Federal Taxes, Wall St. J., Jan. 23,
1947, at 3, col. 2; S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-25 (1947).
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to the future of portal claims. Management, however, presumably under-
stood that Truman could not afford to jeopardize the electoral support of
organized labor by additionally associating his administration with retro-
active antilabor legislation.
2. House Bill: De Facto Repeal of Fair Labor Standards.
Although the House began holding hearings on the portal issue on Feb-
ruary 3, several days after the Senate had already concluded its hearings,
it had issued its committee report, debated, and voted on its bill before
the Senate opened debate. The bill on which the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, of which Gwynne was chairman, held hearings was Gwynne's
H.R. 584, entitled "[A] Bill To define the jurisdiction of the courts, to
regulate actions arising under the laws of the United States, and for other
purposes." '462 The findings and purposes section of H.R. 584, which ap-
plied to FLSA, the Walsh-Healey Act, and the Davis-Bacon Act,463 em-
phasized that because the administration and interpretation of these
statutes had disregarded custom, practice, and agreement between em-
ployees and employers, they interfered with collective bargaining and
created "windfalls of unearned compensation to employees. ' '4 64 To elim-
inate such "inequities and hardships," H.R. 584 limited actions by:
1. creating a one-year statute of limitations;
465
2. prohibiting actions based on any act done or omitted "in good faith con-
sistent with or in reliance on any administrative regulation, order, ruling,
interpretation, enforcement policy, or practice, notwithstanding that after
such act or omission" any of the foregoing "is modified, rescinded, or de-
clared by judicial authority to be invalid";
466
3. prohibiting actions based on an employer's failure to pay an employee for
activities other than those "which at the time of such failure were specifi-
cally required to be paid for either by custom or practice of such employer
at the plant.., or by express agreement";
467
462. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 1. For Gwynne's explan-
atory remarks when he introduced the bill on January 7, 1947, see 93 CONG. REC. 153-54 (1947).
Also subject of the hearings was H.R.J. Res. 91, "To prohibit suits for recovery of portal-to-portal
pay." Introduced by Representative Knutson, it would have applied retroactively and prospectively,
defining "portal-to-portal pay" as "pay for the time during which an employee is required to be on
the employer's premises ... and is not engaged in productive work" unless contract or industry
custom provided otherwise. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 4.
463. H.R. 584, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1947).
464. Id. § 1.
465. Id. § 2(a). Claims that had already accrued had to be filed within ninety days of the Act's
effective date unless the action would have been barred by any other applicable (presumably state)
statute of limitations. Id. § 2(b).
466. Id. § 2(e)(1).
467. Id. § 2(e)(2).
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4. permitting all claims to be "waived, compromised, adjusted, settled, or
released";
46 8
5. limiting attorneys' fees, which were made permissive rather than
mandatory, to five per cent of the amount recovered, subject to a maximum
of $5,000 "to be paid out of but not in addition to the amount of the
judgment";
469
6. placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff, whereby "the failure of the
defendant to produce records not required, at the time the transactions...
occurred, by published regulations authorized by statute shall give rise to
no prejudicial inference affecting liability or the measure . . . of
damages" ;470
7. withdrawing from the courts jurisdiction to "entertain, proceed with, im-
pose liability in or enter judgment" on any actions already filed "except in
accord with the conditions and limitations therein prescribed" and except
with regard to "actions upon which final judgment" had been entered prior
to the Act's effective date "and from which no appeal had been or could be
taken";4 71 and
8. making the award of penalties or actual, liquidated, or compensatory
damages contingent on an express judicial finding that the underlying viola-
tion "was in bad faith and without reasonable grounds," in which case the
court was granted discretion to award penalties or damages.
472
This comprehensive catalogue of amendments,"7 though packaged
as merely undoing the effects of the Supreme Court's portal trilogy, not
only transcended the portal issue, but effectively eliminated the
mandatory and uniform character of FLSA's standards. The bill's linch-
pin in this respect was § 3, which both retroactively and prospectively
relieved employers of all liability for any wages for which they did not
agree or were not accustomed to pay. Thus to take an extreme example
that would fit comfortably within the words and intent of Gwynne's bill:
468. Id. § 2(f).
469. Id. § 2(f). Attorneys who charged or received fees beyond these limits were guilty of a
misdemeanor and subject to fine and imprisonment.
470. Id. § 2(h).
471. Id. § 3(a).
472. Id. § 3(c).
473. Included in the House hearings is a document entitled, APPENDIX TO STATEMENT
BEFORE SUBCOMMITrEE OF THE HOUSE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY [Committee Print], dated
February 1947, which is labelled H.R. 584 as introduced by Gwynne on January 7, 1947, but in-
cludes a number of specifically marked omissions and insertions. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-
to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 334. The status of this version and the role it may have played in the
legislative process are unclear. It did make a number of siguificant changes the language of which is
puzzling. In a separate definitions section it defined "'work,' 'employment' or 'hours of labor'" to
mean only activities for which custom, practice, or express agreement required payment. Id. at 335.
Yet a new section entitled, "Additional Provisions With Respect to Actions Based upon Activities or
Time Not Constituting Work," which imposed very severe evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs, seems
supererogatory since such claims would by definition not have been actionable. Id. at 337.
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if an employer's practice was not to pay his employees for their first
hour's work and he had never expressly agreed to do so, that flagrant
violation of FLSA would no longer be actionable. In a feat of legislative
overkill, the bill's other provisions served to wipe out any claims that for
any reason whatsoever might have slipped through the principal barrier.
NAM's designation of Gwynne's bill as the most favorable to employ-
ers474 was therefore scarcely surprising.
Testimony at the hearings was predictable, with employers' repre-
sentatives offering strong support475 and unions' representatives offering
vehement opposition. Of interest were the nuances separating the posi-
tions of the AFL and CIO. Earlier in January, both the president of the
AFL, William Green,476 and the president of its Metal Trades Depart-
ment, John Frey, denounced portal suits as dishonoring collective bar-
gaining agreements:
To inject now the question of back pay for portal-to-portal time would
be an admission that when wage agreements were signed by trade union
representatives, they had been insincere during negotiations and had held
mental reservations....
Our trade union movement has no assets more valuable than its agree-
ments with employers and the integrity which is involved.477
This position, which echoed the moral indignation expressed by employ-
ers, had secured the AFL editorial praise.47 8 Yet at the hearings, the
AFL representative, largely avoiding the claim that portal suits had
"struck 'below the belts' of employers,"479 stressed the inequity stem-
ming from the physical expansion of plants, which required workers to
walk up to a half-mile for fifteen or twenty minutes. That the AFL op-
posed not only H.R. 584 but any portal legislation,480 derived in part
474. See Pending Labor Legislation: "Portal-To-Portal" and Other Retroactive Liabilities, 9
N.A.M. L. DIG., Jan. 1947, at 3, 4.
475. Interestingly, NAM denied its support to the "effective though drastic course" of totally
repealing FLSA in order to avoid any constitutional defects retroactively nullifying portal claims.
Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 419 (statement of Raymond Smet-
hurst, counsel, NAM.
476. Id. at 74 (testimony of Walter Mason, national legislative representative, AFL, citing
Green's statement of Jan. 14).
477. Frey, No Fairl Portal-to-Portal Suits Violate a Basic Principle of Collective Bargaining, AM.
FEDERATIONIST, Feb. 1947, at 17. The dispute between the AFL and CIO escalated to the level of
physical violence in Alabama. See AFL Members Raid CIO 'Portal' Office, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1947, at 16, col. 2.
478. See, eg., Portal-to-Portal Pay, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1947, at 14, col. 3 (editorial).
479. Two AFL Groups Criticize Portal Suits, CoM. & FIN. CHRONICLE, Jan. 23, 1947, at 494
(quoting Earl Jimerson, president, Amalgamated Meat Cutters).
480. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 78, 83 (testimony of
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from its fear that such innovations would grandfather in customs and
practices in violation of FLSA that unorganized workers would be pow-
erless to overcome. 48 1 The radically abbreviated limitations period,
which obviously affected all FLSA claims adversely, also troubled the
AFL.482
The star witness for the CIO was its general counsel, Lee Press-
man.483 His responses were as aggressive as the committee members'
questions were belligerent. In order to deflate the bathos surrounding
employers' complaints, Pressman opened by remarking that "[t]he profits
of not a single American corporation have been diminished by any judg-
ment so far rendered in any [portal] lawsuit. '4 4 If the committee was
really interested in dealing with portal problems, Pressman suggested, it
would investigate "the hardships which are imposed upon working peo-
ple" in large industrial plants such as steel mills. It would, moreover,
discover that where portal pay obligations are imposed on employers, as
in iron ore mining, it had proved possible for them to reorganize their
operations more efficiently to increase employees' leisure as well as to
reduce their own liabilities.48 5 Pressman also provoked Gwynne by
pointing out to him that his bill was so capacious that logically it would
absolve an employer from liability who customarily turned back the
clock so that his employees were never recorded as or paid for working
overtime.48 6
By the same token, Pressman displayed a willingness to accommo-
date employers and congressmen on a number of portal issues. This
more conciliatory attitude may have been dictated by the recognition
that since portal litigation had insured that some version of an antilabor
portal bill would pass both houses,4 87 the CIO was "seeking a way out of
Walter Mason, national legislative representative, AFL). See also Report of the Proceedings of the
Sixty-Sixth Convention of the American Federation of Labor 220-22 (1947).
481. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 79 (testimony of Walter
Mason, national legislative representative, AFL).
482. Id. at 81.
483. See generally, CURRENT BIOGRAPHYr 1947, at 528-30 (1948). According to N. LICHTEN-
STEIN, LABOR'S WAR AT HOME: THE CIO IN WORLD WAR 11143 (1982), during World War II the
legitimacy of the Communist Party among the highest echelons of the CIO was such that Pressman
was an open fellow traveler. Pressman himself stated in 1950 that he had joined a Communist group
for one year in 1934. Lee Pressman, Labor Lawyer, and Ex-CL O. Counsel, Dies, N.Y. Times, Nov.
21, 1969, at 47, col. 1.
484. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 115.
485. Id. at 131.
486. Id. at 141.
487. TIME quoted Pressman as saying: "'They are fantastic. Local lawyers have gone hogwild.
Suits for these incredible sums have fanned the flames of antiunionism.' "TIME, Jan. 27, 1947, at 83.
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this muddle without losing face." '4 88 Thus, for example, he thought wor-
thy of consideration Gwynne's offhand suggestion to permit settlements
of FLSA claims subject to approval by the Wage and Hour Administra-
tor.489 That non-hazardous walking time similar to that in Mt. Clemens
was not the CIO's highest priority emerged from another colloquy be-
tween Pressman and Gwynne in which the congressman pressed the for-
mer to concede that there was "quite a jump" from not paying blast
furnace workers for time spent changing clothes to the practice at Mt.
Clemens. Pressman retorted that he would "be glad to draft an amend-
ment to take care of that situation, if you will agree with me that these
things are times worked. Your bill does not do that."'4 90
Following the House hearings, the subcommittee prepared another
draft, H.R. 2157, which it reported to the House.491 The principal
changes vis-a-vis H.R. 584 were as follows: 1. the grace period during
which already accrued portal claims could be brought was extended from
ninetk days to six months (§ 2(b)); 2. the statute of limitations was not
tolled as to any individual claimant (in a class or representative action)492
until he was named as a party (§ 2(c)); 3. the good-faith reliance provi-
sion was clarified as an employer's affirmative defense (§ 2(e)); 4. the lim-
itation on the employer's liability for the employee's attorneys' fees was
eliminated; and 5. the imposition of the burden of proof on the employee
was eliminated.
Although H.R. 2157 was somewhat less radical than the previous
bill, H.R. 584, they were both prominent in their undifferentiated appli-
cability retroactively and prospectively. This feature, taken together
with the sharp restrictions of numerous enforcement and recovery provi-
sions having nothing to do with portal issues, led the minority members
of the committee to accuse the majority of "emasculat[ing]" FLSA:
"Why do not the proponents of the bill honestly say they want to kill the
488. Steel Wage-Price Pattern of World-Wide Significance, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1947, § 3, at 1,
col. 4. See also Scheibla, CIO Portal Pay Strategy Backfires; Union Abandons Out.of-Court Settle-
ment Hopes, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1947, at 3, col. 2.
489. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 160. The 1949 FLSA
amendments included such a provision. See infra § VI. At the Senate hearings, Pressman testified
that it would be proper for Congress to amend FLSA to permit compromises of all portal-to-portal
back wages through collective bargaining. Portal to Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 218 (1947). Dur-
.ing the debates, Senator Pepper echoed this position. See 93 CONG. REc. 2301 (1947).
490. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 170.
491. 93 CONG. REc. 1489 (1947) (statement of Rep. Michener, chairman of Judiciary Comm.).
The bill that the committee reported on February 25 as H.R. 2157 was identical with the H.R. 2157
that Gwynne had introduced the previous day.
492. Id. at 1489 (statement of Rep. Gwynne).
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Fair Labor Standards Act?"4 9 In particular, the minority saw the use of
"custom or practice" as a guide to compensability as enabling the new
employer "to write the law for himself" and thus undermining uniform-
ity of standards among already existing employers.494 An especially
poignant example of this generous legislatiVe conferral of self-help power
upon employers emerged inadvertently in the course of the House de-
bates. Representative Walter, a Democratic supporter of a portal bill, in
responding to a question as to whether "custom or practice" that was
"bad or in error ... would be a defense,""49 granted that the issue had
"caused the committee a great deal of trouble":
[C]ustom and practice ... means a custom and practice not in violation of
the law. Certainly no employer could, for example, compel an employee to
get to this place of his business an hour before he punches the clock and
because he had done that for a while relieve himself of his responsibility to
comply with the law by saying, "That is the custom and practice of my
business." No court would uphold-any arrangement of that sort. Certainly
that is work under any of the definitions of the courts and we have to rely
on a common-sense interpretation of that language.
496
In point of fact, as Walter was constrained to concede, the "custom or
practice" language was so capacious that it literally encompassed the
aforementioned sham, thus remitting workers to the courts for an inter-
pretation of the spirit of the bill. Unfortunately for the employees, the
legislative history was so replete with vindictiveness, that the literal inter-
pretation in fact coincided with the spirit of the bills.
The minority members took the position that, because most of the
existing claims would be subject to de minimis dismissals, Congress
should leave their resolution to the courts. Instead of succumbing to the
"great hysteria" over portal suits,4 9 7 the minority members urged, Con-
gress should deal with the issue prospectively either by writing into
FLSA a definition of work498 or by empowering the Wage and Hour
Administrator to issue binding regulations.499
The committee recommended passage of H.R. 2157 on February 25,
493. REGULATING THE RECOVERY OF PORTAL-TO-PORTAL PAY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
H. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 18 (1947).
494. Id. at 16.
495. 93 CONG. REC. 1497 (1947) (Rep. Miller).
496. Id. at 1497.
497. Id. at 9.
498. The minority proposed language tracking that of Murphy's opinions: "in order to be
deemed compensable.. .activities must be conducted under the control, direction, or requirement of
the employer and must be primarily for the benefit of the employer." Id. at 17.
499. Id. at 17, 15.
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and the bill was referred to the Committee of the Whole House for four
hours of debate on February 27 and 28.500 The two extreme positions
were stated at the outset by representatives from Illinois. The Republi-
can Allen denied that the bill was antilabor, °1 while the Democrat
Sabath, who had served since 1907, called it "as vicious as any other
antilabor bill ever brought to this House." 502 While a number of Demo-
crats excoriated the bill as a direct attack on FLSA itself,5 0 3 others would
not have opposed legislation confined to the portal issue-at least if a
longer limitations period had been inserted."° All ten amendments to
H.R. 2157 as well as a motion to recommit were rejected by large majori-
ties.505 Among the more significant amendments, 50 6 two would have ex-
tended the limitations period to two and three years respectively.50 7
Representative Javits' amendment to focus relief from portal claims to
employers on collective bargaining agreements also failed. 8
As indicated by the vote on H.R. 2157, the voting patterns of the
Eightieth Congress were deeply impressed with the party and sectional
results of the 1946 congressional elections, which in effect sealed the de-
mise of the New Deal coalition. 5 9 It was the first (and last) Congress
since the Hoover administration in which the Republican Party con-
trolled both chambers by a significant majority. In addition, the influ-
ence of the South on the Democratic delegation reached a high point as a
consequence of Democratic candidates gaining their largest share of
Southern seats since 1921 while, in the wake of massive Republican vic-
tories in recently Democratic districts in the North, 10 Southern Demo-
crats represented the largest share of Democratic congresspersons since
500. HOUSE J. Feb. 26, 1947, at 159.
501. 93 CONG. REc. 1484 (1947).
502. Id. at 1485.
503. Representatives Norton and Welch, for example, took this position. Id. at 1503, 1513.
504. Representative McCormack, the minority whip, typified this group. Id. at 1558. Repre-
sentative Celler appeared to fall between these two groups of Democrats. Id. at 1495.
505. The motion to recommit with instructions to report the bill back with a two-year limita-
tions period was defeated on a vote of 219 to 42. Id. at 1573.
506. For a description of the less significant ones, see 3 CONG. Q. 44-45 (1947).
507. The first was defeated on a 124 to 73 vote, the second 145 to 40. 93 CONG. Q. at 44.
508. The division vote was 131 to 53. 93 CONG. Rc. 1571 (1947). Although Javits explained
the purpose of his amendment in such language, its text contained the same reference to "custom or
practice" as the principal bill. Id. at 1565.
509. See J. BOYLAN, THE NEW DEAL COALITION AND THE ELECTION OF 1946 151-77 (1981);
R. GARSON, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE POLITICS OF SECTIONALISM, 1941-1948 (1974).
510. See J. Loftus, House Labor Bloc Nearly Destroyed, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1946, at 1, col. 7.
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1921.51 Of the 188 Democrats who faced 245 Republicans in the House,
103 (or fifty-five per cent) represented the South and accounted for all
but two seats in the eleven Southern states.
The roll-call vote on February 28 in the House on H.R. 215712 re-
vealed a rigid party-section pattern. 13 While the Republican majority
may have functioned as the transmission belt for implementing the
agenda articulated by large corporate employers, the entire Southern del-
egation joined them. 1 4. Overall, more than six times as many representa-
tives voted for the bill as against it (345-56). Of the 241 Republicans who
voted, 236 or ninety-eight per cent supported H.R. 2157.515 Although
109 or sixty-eight per cent of the Democrats who voted supported H.R.
2157, ninety of those supporters were Southerners; an additional thirteen
represented Border states. No Southerner opposed the bill while only
three Northern Democrats voted for it. The fifty-one Democrats who
opposed the bill51 6 were geographically concentrated, thirteen represent-
ing New York City alone.517 Five Democrats each from Illinois and Cal-
ifornia voted against the bill, as did three each from Massachusetts,
Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania, and two each from New Jersey and
Rhode Island." 8 Not surprisingly, this Democratic opposition roughly
coincided with the geographic concentration of the portal litigation.519
3. Senate Bill: Let Bygones Be Bygones.
More persons than the employer and the employee are interested in a labor
511. See R. BENSEL, SECTIONALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1880-1980, at
381-85 (1984).
512. 93 CONG. REC. 1573 (1947).
513. In this regard it outdid the votes a few weeks later on Taft-Hartley. See H. MILLIS & E.
CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 363-92 (1950) (chapter written by
Seymour Mann).
514. On Southern Democratic-Republican congressional voting alliances in the 1930s and
1940s, see V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 345-82 (1949).
515. The five who opposed the bill were Javits of New York, Brophy and Hull of Wisconsin,
Meade of Kentucky, and Welch of California. Of these, neither Brophy, who had been a mechanic,
nor Meade was reelected, while Hull had previously been elected as a Progressive. See BIOGRAPHI-
CAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-1989, S. DoC. No. 34, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 678, 1230, 1487 (1989).
516. Vito Marcantonio, the American Labor Party member from New York City, also voted
against the bill.
517. No member of the nine-person delegation from Brooklyn, all of whom were Democrats,
voted for the bill. Seven voted against the bill, one (Delaney) was paired against, and one did not
vote. Similarly, all of the Democratic representatives from Manhattan and the Bronx voted against
the bill.
518. The other ten Democratic votes each represented a different state.
519. See supra § I.
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contract; public interest is also involved.52 °
The Senate hearings, which lasted from January 15 to January 30,
concerned S. 70, which Senator Wiley, the chair of the Judiciary Com-
mittee, had introduced. A relatively short piece of legislation, it chiefly
took the form of an amendment of the overtime provision of FLSA. The
bill defined "work week" to include "only the time during which an em-
ployee is engaged in productive work" unless it is compensable pursuant
to agreement or custom. It then prohibited all future claims for back
wages for time spent in other than productive work. In addition, S. 70
offered an affirmative defense to employers against liability for liquidated
damages if they could show that their failure to pay was "a bona fide
error made in good faith." Wiley's bill, finally, also permitted employees
to release employers from their liability for liquidated damages.521
Although Wiley's bill was marred by a serious drafting defect inasmuch
as it failed to define "productive work," '52 2 it otherwise introduced rela-
tively modest changes into FLSA. Its key provision was purely prospec-
tive while the good faith and waiver provisions were confined to
liquidated damages.
Senator Capehart, a manufacturer, 523 offered an amendment to S. 70
in the form of a substitute.5 24 Capehart's bill was much longer and de-
tailed. It contained a preamble of findings5 25 similar to that which was
ultimately adopted in the Portal-to-Portal Act. It went far beyond Wi-
ley's bill in a number of crucial respects. In particular, Capehart's bill:
1. was retroactive as well as prospective;
2. applied to minimum wages as well as to overtime;
3. excluded from custom or practice any payments made by an employer in
order to conform to any judicial decisions or administrative rulings;
4. made an award of liquidated damages contingent on a finding that the
violation was in bad faith and without reasonable grounds, thus reversing
the burden of proof;
5. offered relief from liability for any act or omission done in good-faith
520. 93 CONG. REc. 2178 (1947) (Sen. Donnell).
521. Portal-to-Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 3.
522. Unlike H.R. 89, which listed very specific activities. Id. at 5.
523. CONG. DIRECrORY, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1st ed. 1947).
524. Capehart had introduced his bill, S. 49, before Wiley, but after it had been rererred to the
Labor Committee, it was decided that the Judiciary Committee would handle all the portal bills; he
was therefore constrained by parliamentary rules to offer his bill as an amendment. Portal-to-Portal
Wages, supra note 9, at 11-12. In the midst of the Senate hearings, on January 18, Capehart intro-
duced a modified version of his amendment. It is this second version that is discussed in the text.
The two versions are at id. at 3-5, 38-40.
525. Id. at 38.
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reliance on any act of the Wage and Hour Administrator even if the latter
were held invalid;
6. extended the waiver or release provision to cover back wages in addition
to liquidated damages; and
7. inserted a one-year limitations period for future claims together with a
three-month grace period for existing claims insofar as the latter were not
barred by any other applicable statute of limitations.5
2 6
Though much broader in scope than Wiley's bill, Capehart's amend-
ment was far less reaching than Representative Gwynne's H.R. 584.
First, whereas Gwynne permitted courts great discretion with regard to
awarding liquidated damages, Capehart's bill required courts to award
full liquidated damages, if they awarded any. Second, Capehart's bill
contained no provision comparable to the heavy burden of proof that
Gwynne imposed on employee plaintiffs. And third, Capehart did not
limit the award of attorneys' fees. For these reasons, NAM, while appre-
ciative of Capehart's efforts, preferred the Gwynne bill. 27
Employers did not present a completely unified or uniform position
at the Senate hearings. In part because of doubts concerning the consti-
tutionality of a retroactive ban on claims, there was "some difference of
opinion between corporation lawyers [a]s to the remedies for the situa-
tion." '528 NAM's counsel emphasized the need for a one-year limitations
period, relief from liquidated damages for non-willful violations, and
generally a rollback of the law to its state before the Supreme Court had
decided Mt. Clemens, including a restoration of the customary rules of
the burden of proof. 29 The Chamber of Commerce went even further,
advocating a prohibition on class suits or the assignment of claims.530
Like the representative of the Chamber of Commerce,531 NAM's
counsel opposed conferring expanded rule-making power on the Wage
and Hour Administrator to define working time.532 In contrast, the
Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce, the mem-
bers of which were largely the high-ranking officers and managers of the
526. Id. at 38-40.
527. 9 N.A.M. L. DIG., Jan. 1947, at 3-4 (Supp. No. 2).
528. Portal-to-Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 616 (Statement by Subcomm. of Business Advisory
Comm. on Attitude of Industry on Portal to Portal).
529. Id. at 111, 114 (testimony of Raymond Smethurst).
530. Id. at 133. It was unclear whether ignorance or disingenuousness underlay the Chamber's
contention that compromising claims was not problematic because employees did not bring suits
alone but through a union lawyer. Id. at 135.
531. Id. at 127 (testimony of Thomas Howard, Manufacture Dep't).
532. Id. at 112.
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largest corporations in the United States,5 3 believed that the Adminis-
trator "should be given power to issue authoritative definitions of the
general terms used in the statute., 534 Although many employers may
have instinctively objected to authorizing New Deal bureaucrats to inter-
pret the intent of an anti-labor Republican Congress,135 it is unclear that
any fundamental principle was at stake in choosing between agency and
judicial enforcement.5 36 For, after all, even such binding regulations
would have been subject to judicial review. Since the entire portal dis-
pute erupted over unfavorable Supreme Court decisions, employers may
have perceived themselves as facing a Hobson's choice. In this sense, the
optimal solution for them may have been the one eventually settled on-
reliance on the relatively detailed catalogue of excluded activities that a
Republican Congress could dictate to agency and courts.
Precisely such a detailed catalogue was suggested by Arthur Pettit,
an attorney in the corporate law firm of Winthrop, Stimson, of which the
former Secretary of War was an eponymous partner. Senator Capehart
deemed his testimony so interesting that he asked him to write down
what he thought the bill should include.537 Pettit offered an unusual
amalgam of modest and radical proposals. Thus on the one hand he
opposed using the individual plant as the standard for judging the exist-
ence of a custom or practice because it would merely favor bad employ-
ers, cause discontent among employees, and undermine FLSA's uniform
standards.538 On the other hand, in order to eliminate existing claims
not based on custom or practice, he proposed repealing the minimum
wage, overtime, and private right of action provisions of FLSA on the
grounds that those claims constituted a burden on commerce. Should
the Supreme Court then hold such a repeal unconstitutional, Pettit advo-
cated as a fallback position a prohibition on collective and representative
actions.539 Although Congress ultimately chose not to adopt these more
533. See id. at 609-14.
534. Id. at 620 (statement of William Foster, Undersecretary of Commerce, speaking on behalf
of the Business Advisory Council).
535. Senator Eastland unsuccessfully tried to elicit from Undersecretary Foster an acknowledg-
ment that agencies invariably exceed their authority. Id. at 620. Significantly, the CIO representa-
tive, Lee Pressman, did not oppose giving the Administrator rule-making power. Id. at 221.
536. But see Mezerik, Time Is Money, NATION, Feb. 1, 1947, at 121, 122 (speculating that
management preferred the courts at least until a Republican administration came to power).
537. 93 CONG. Rac. 2131 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell). Donnell stated at the hearings
that Pettit had also spoken to him personally after one of the hearings and interested him in Pettit's
suggestions. Portal-to-Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 637.
538. Id. at 645.
539. Id. at 645-48.
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radical proposals, it did incorporate his recommendation for dealing with
future claims by inserting specific exclusions into the act such as walking,
riding, traveling, and incidental work activities before and after the
scheduled work period." ° In fact, Congress went even further by omit-
ting Pettit's limitation of such noncompensable portal time to periods
shorter than twenty minutes, which Pettit believed marked off the point
at which employer overreaching began. 4'
While Wiley and Capehart's bills were being debated and amended,
H.R. 2157 was committed and recommitted to the Senate Judiciary
Committee on March 3,542 which issued its report on March 10 offering a
much more detailed overview of the portal litigation and the legal issues
surrounding the proposed legislation than the House report. The Senate
committee report devoted a great deal of space to presenting data on the
volume of litigation, documenting the orchestration of the portal cam-
paign by the CIO, and sketching the worst-case financial impact of the
lawsuits on firms and the federal government.5 4 3 In justifying the need
for intervention, the committee speculated that pending litigation would
adversely affect labor-management relations. The committee argued that
if employers postponed entering into new collective bargaining agree-
ments because of the threat of portal liability, employees would resent
the delay, while employers would develop ill-will toward their employees
on account of the unfounded portal claims. 5" The report also implied
that Judge Picard's dictum to the effect that he was not holding all portal
claims nonactionable had not obviated the need for congressional
action.545
The Senate version of H.R. 2157, as reported by the committee,546
differed fundamentally from the House version in that it gutted FLSA
only retroactively. Like the House bill, it virtually wiped out all existing
claims and not merely those related to portal issues, but left FLSA in-
tact-albeit impaired-for the future, by exempting from the portal ban
future activities taking place during-as opposed to before or after-the
normal workday (§ 6). The committee rewrote the bill in a number of
540. Id. at 655.
541. Id. at 658.
542. SENATE J., Mar. 3, 1947, 120-21.
543. EXEMPTING EMPLOYERS FROM LIABILITY FOR PORTAL-TO-PORTAL WAGES IN CERTAIN
CASES, S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-39 (1947).
544. Id. at 39-40.
545. Id. at 42-43.




other important ways that both favored and disadvantaged employees.5 47
For example, it provided for a two-year limitations period (§ 9),548 but
banned representative actions and required the plaintiffs in collective ac-
tions to file written consents (§ 8). But more importantly, the Senate bill,
unlike the House version, sharply distinguished between existing and fu-
ture claims; specifically, it did not extend the pro-employer provisions
regarding attorneys' fees, liquidated damages, the burden of proof, and
the compromise and settlement of claims to future actions (§§ 2-6).111
In explaining this latter provision, the committee report furnished
what would become very important pieces of legislative history with re-
gard to specifying the types of portal activities for which employers were
to be relieved of liability. Thus with regard to future claims, § 6 of the
bill made the following portal-to-portal activities noncompensable (un-
less compensable on the basis of contract, 550 custom, or practice):
"(a) walking, riding or traveling to and from the actual place of per-
formance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is em-
ployed to perform, and
"(b) activities which were preliminary to or postliminary to said princi-
pal activity or activities which occur either prior to the time on any particu-
lar workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time
on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or
activities:. ."551
The committee report, after noting that the bill did "not attempt to
define what constitutes work," appended this nonexhaustive "list of non-
compensable activities... outside the [employee's] workday":
547. Senator Wiley presented a useful detailed point-by-point tabular comparison of the two
bills during the Senate debates. Unfortunately, it contains a transposition making §§ 4(b) and 4(c) of
the Senate bill appear as provisions of the House bill. See 93 CONG. REc. 2084-86 (1947).
548. It also provided for a 120-day grace period to file accrued claims.
549. Like the House bill, the Senate version contained separability provisions (§ 4) that served
to eliminate any existing claims that for any reason survived their intended destruction by § 3. The
separability section included provisions on attorney's fees and burden of proof that were even more
pro-employer than the corresponding provisions of H.R. 584, which had been eliminated from H.R.
2157. The first would have prohibited courts from awarding any attorney's fee (§ 4(b)), while the
second deprived employees of the benefit of any inferences in proving the extent of their claims
(§ 4(c)). The latter provisions were essentially an effort to overturn the Supreme Court's ruling on
the burden of proof.
550. Although the report expressly stated that § 6 relieved employers of liability for travel time
from the portal to the face of a mine, the committee took notice of the fact that because the then
effective UMW collective bargaining contract provided for such portal pay, the liability of employers
party to that contract would not be affected by § 6. S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1947).
551. 93 CONG. REc. 2376 (1947). The bill used quotation marks to indicate that the provision
was to be inserted as a new § 7A of FLSA.
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(1) Walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of per-
formance of the principal activity or activities within the employer's plant,
mine, building, or other place of employment, irrespective of whether such
walking, riding, or traveling occur on or off the premises of the employer or
before or after the employee has checked in or out. Examples of this are (a)
walking or riding from the plant gate to the employee's lathe, workbench,
or other actual place of performance of his principal activity or activities;
(b) riding on busses from a town to an outlying mine; (c) riding on busses or
trains from an assembly point to a particular site at which a logging opera-
tion is being conducted.
(2) Checking in or out and waiting in line to do so, changing clothes,
washing up or showering, waiting in line to receive pay checks, and the
performance of other activities occurring prior and subsequent to the work-
day, such as the preliminary activities which were involved in the Mt.
552Clemens case....
Since the above-cited provisions of § 6 of the Senate version of H.R.
2157 were adopted intact in the Portal-to-Portal Act,553 these specifica-
tions made clear that the scope of noncompensable portal activities was
meant to be very broad.554 The drafters of the bill insisted on compre-
hensive exclusions because they believed that unions' portal suits had
confronted employers with a slippery slope to bankruptcy:
[U]nless we draw a line and say, "Before this line items shall not be com-
pensable unless by contract or custom," we are in constant danger of an
ever-expanding application of the doctrine of portal-to-portal pay so as to
run not merely from the portal of the employer's premises to the place of
work, but from the portal of the employee's home, or perhaps from his
dining table.
55 5
552. S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1947).
553. Ch. 52, § 4(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (1990)).
554. The Wage and Hour Administrator incorporated them literally into the portal-to-portal
interpretative bulletin that he issued on Nov. 18, 1947. 12 Fed. Reg. 7655 (1947) (codified at 29
C.F.R. § 790.7). For illustrations of the equally broad judicial interpretations holding travel time
noncompensable, see Carter v. Panama Canal Co., 463 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (walk from
check-in point to locomotives along canal); Ralph v. Tidewater Constr. Co., 361 F.2d 806 (4th Cir.
1966) (trip from shore out to work site in bay); Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1308
(D. Colo. 1983) (trip from main camp to construction site). To be sure, the last-cited case appears
wrongly decided even under the Portal-to-Portal Act because the workers were required to check in
at the camp and were not permitted to use their own transportation.
555. 93 CONG. REc. 2121 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell). Donnell was reacting to testi-
mony by mining employers to the effect that potash miners in New Mexico had sued for portal pay
for a twelve-mile trip to the mines during which they read and slept in busses the employer did not
own. Id. Sen. Murray regretted that H.R. 2157 "would make noncompensable many burdensome
activities performed for the employer by employees in the lumbering, smeltering, and petroleum-
refining industries in [Montana];" he mentioned in particular the more than one hour per day that
loggers travelled through "trackless forests" with their saws and axes. Id. at 2238.
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In contrast, the Senate committee indicated that it also intended to
give the term "principal activity," which overlapped with the compensa-
ble "workday," a broad scope:
(1) In connection with the operation of a lathe an employee will fre-
quently at the commencement of his workday oil, grease, or clean his
machine, or install a new cutting tool. Such activities are an integral part of
the principal activity....
(2) In the case of a garment worker in a textile mill, who is required to
report 30 minutes before other employees ... and who during such 30
minutes distributes clothing... at the workbenches of other employees and
gets machines in readiness for operation by other employees, such activities
are among the principal activities of such employee.
556
Of overriding significance in the same context was the committee's
declaration that the existing and unamended provisions of FLSA would
continue to control the compensability of all future claims for activities
occurring within the workday. The report added the very important
statement that "the same will be true as to waiting periods during a pro-
duction break-down and to other waiting periods during the work-
day.' 557 The retention of this protection under FLSA allayed the worst
fears that unions had expressed on behalf of unorganized workers.
558
The minority members of the Senate Judiciary Committee5 59 agreed
"that portal-to-portal relief was necessary," but objected to the major-
ity's approach because it unnecessarily destroyed existing non-portal
claims and lowered FLSA standards for future claims. 6" In particular
the minority emphasized that the majority bill created the danger that
contract would "supersede the statutory standards" for "[a]s between
employer and an unorganized employee at the lower end of the wage
scale, who will influence the custom or practice or contract which will
determine which is compensable and which is not?' 561 And even among
strong unions, such as the UMW, H.R. 2157 would permit owners to
556. S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 48 (1947). In explaining the conference report to the
House, Gwynne incorrectly asserted that even for the future the laying out of garments to work on
would not be compensable. See 93 CONG. RPc. 4389 (1947).
557. S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1947). In explaining the conference report to the
House, Walter incorrectly stated that even as to the future, claims for stand-by time would not be
compensable. See 93 CONG. REc. 4389-90.
558. See id. at 2132 (statement of Sen. Donnell). The unionists were unable to avert the with-
drawal of such protection for existing claims.
559. These included one Republican, Sen. Langer, who eventually voted against the bill. The
two Southern Democrats did not join the minority. Id. at 2375.
560. EXEMPTING EMPLOYERS FROM LIABILITY FOR PORTAL-TO-PORTAL WAGES IN CERTAIN
CASES, S. REP. No. 48, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1947).
561. Id. at 6.
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rebargain the portal wages they had already been compelled to pay
through litigation. 62
With their opposition voiced, the minority members announced a
four-point substitute amendment that would have: 1. barred recovery for
portal claims that had already accrued but for other types of FLSA viola-
tions; 2. permitted compromise of existing portal claims; 3. established a
three-year statute of limitations; and 4. relieved employers of future lia-
bility for acts occasioned by adherence to written regulations or interpre-
tations of the Wage and Hour Administrator. 63 When Senators
McCarran and McGrath introduced this substitute amendment during
the debates, it included several additional elements: 1. the elimination of
representative actions; 2. a requirement that any plaintiff to a class action
file a written consent, at which time the action would have been deemed
to have begun as to that claimant; and 3. a six-month grace period during
which to fie already accrued causes of action unless barred by applicable
shorter periods of limitations. 514 The Senate debates regarding the above
portal bills were much more extensive than those in the House, occupy-
ing six days between March 14 and March 21. Here, too, by large major-
ities all amendments were rejected.
An interesting alignment of forces emerged in the course of debate
over the effect of the majority and minority bills on existing claims. The
minority contended that the majority bill "wiped out" not just existing
portal claims, but all existing claims of violations of FLSA.56 This part
of the debate was not contentious because the Republican floor leader,
Senator Donnell, virtually boasted that in order to wipe out all existing
portal claims, the majority had found it necessary to "wipe out some
rights here and there" that should not have existed in the first place.
566
While the subcommittee was preparing preliminary drafts, it took the
position that no existing claims, unless based on contract or custom,
should be compensable regardless of whether the time at issue took place
before, during, or after the scheduled workday. But then Senator Don-
562. Id. at 8-9.
563. Id. at 9.
564. 93 CONG. REc. 2289 (1947).
565. S. REP. No. 48, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947). In a more alarmist charge, Senator
McCarran asserted that: "For the future... the language of the majority bill means that no em-
ployee has any rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act which his employer is not willing he
should have." 93 CONG. REc. 2245 (1947). Although this may have been true of portal claims (as
well as of the House bill in its entirety), it was not true of other future claims. Senators Cooper and
McGrath made this point at length. See id. at 2297-98.
566. Id. at 2125, 2130. See id. at 2130 (1947).
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nell56 7 invited several AFL and CIO officials to confer with him pri-
vately, at which time they brought to his attention the plight of garment
factory workers who might have to wait two hours without compensa-
tion when the production line was down. 68 If this lack of compensation
was custom in the plant and no contract contradicted it, the proposed bill
would have legalized the employer's policy. In order to deal with such
problems, the subcommittee redrafted the bill to strike only existing por-
tal claims involving periods before and after the normal workday. But
then:
[a] gentleman by the name of Finlay, who is associated with the Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey ... came to Washington and left a memorandum
with us, followed by a letter, taking the position pretty generally that if we
should not legislate with reference to the period ... between whistle and
whistle, we would still leave unattained our objective to wipe out the portal-
to-portal suits.
5 69
Therefore, in order to insure that claims for walking time back and
forth to the cafeteria were wiped out, the subcommittee returned to its
original twenty-four-hour per day conception, thus sacrificing the gar-
ment workers. 70 Senator Donnell then stated that he had recounted this
private legislative history in such detail because it was important to show
that when Congress wiped out non-portal claims, it was "not acting ca-
priciously or arbitrarily, but within its sound discretion in... demolish-
ing the portal-to-portal cases. '5 71 Although no Democrat had charged
that the majority was acting arbitrarily when it did the bidding of any
official of the Standard Oil Co. who happened to drop off a memo, the
monologue left no doubt about the intended effect of the majority bill on
existing claims.
About the corresponding effect of the McCarran-McGrath bill (the
minority bill) much more doubt obtained, especially among Democrats.
The authors asserted that by inserting the phrase "not compensable
567. Senators Donnell, Cooper, and Eastland were in charge of drafting the Senate bill. Id. at
2133-35.
568. At the Senate hearings, a representative of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union
testified that, although there were no portal problems in garment factories where its members were
employed, unorganized workers faced a problem with regard to "enforced unproductivity" or down-
time where they worked on a piece rate. Portal-to-Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 160-61 (testimony
of John Abt, special counsel).
569. 93 CONG. REc. 2132 (1947).
570. Id. at 2132-33. Sen. Donnell stated later, however, that these union representations had
persuaded the subcommittee to insure that "the compensation for the iniquitous practices of an
employer" be preserved. Id. at 2362.
571. Id. at 2132.
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working time," their amendment wiped out all existing claims involving
the issue of compensable working time (including portal claims), but
would not "touch claims which do not in any way involve the question of
whether the nature of the activities engaged in was such as to be consid-
ered work." '572 Thus, for example, whereas the majority bill would elimi-
nate a claim for minimum wage in connection with a piece-rate contract
not specifying any hours, the McCarran-McGrath bill would not.573
Senator Barkley, the Democratic minority leader, offered a hypothetical
situation in which an employer required employees to show up thirty
minutes before starting time to sharpen tools, an activity for which
neither contract nor custom mandated payment. He then asked McCar-
ran whether, if the employer coerced the employees to obey him for fear
that they would lose their job, they could recover under McCarran's bill.
McCarran, agreeing that there were many such cases in the United
States,5 74 was constrained to concede that such workers would be left
unprotected. 57 When Senator Cooper, a leading Republican supporter
of the majority bill, asked McCarran how his bill then really differed
from the majority's, the latter sought refuge, like Representative Walter,
in the spirit of FLSA. 76  At that point, Senators Cooper and McGrath
joined to "make contribution [sic] to the legislative history" by empha-
sizing that the bill was intended not only to preserve all the protections of
FLSA for the future for activities during the workday proper, but also to
create an expansive compensable universe of "principal activities.
577
After this comforting exchange, the Senate rejected the McCarran-
McGrath amendment 53 to 35.578 In quick succession the chamber also
572. Id. at 2290 (statement of Sen. McCarran).
573. Id.
574. Id. at 2291. Senator Pepper, perhaps the most radical opponent of portal legislation in the
Senate, added that in the South, when "workers are required to be present 30 minutes ahead of
time," economic compulsion reinforced the employer's demand-as evidenced by the fact that only
forty per cent of families in the United States "had total liquid savings of as much as $40." Id. at
2303-04. Senator Johnston (Dem. S.C.), who had worked in a cotton mill and represented workers
in wage and hour suits, offered a concrete example. See id. at 2371.
575. Id. at 2291.
576. Id. at 2292. Senators Barkley and McCarran may also have been speaking past each other
since their colloquy seemed to be based on the assumption that the inquiry concerned past and future
claims whereas McCarran's an'-ndment did not apply to future claims.
577. See 93 CONG. REc. 2296-99 (1947).
578. Id. at 2366. Eight Southern Democrats voted with the Republicans against the amend-




defeated several other amendments. 7 9 These included one to raise the
minimum wage to sixty cents per hour.5 80 In an effort to prevent em-
ployers from reorganizing work activities in order "to throw all of the
nonprincipal activities at the beginning or end of the day" so that
"lj]anitorial ... services, normally performed by other workers could be
required of production workers" without compensation, 581 another un-
successful amendment proposed language permitting portal suits cover-
ing preliminary or postliminary activities "normally engaged in during
the working day." '582
Further factional maneuvering emerged over the length of the limi-
tations period. Senator Holland, a Southern Democrat backing portal
legislation, proposed an amendment permitting applicable state statutes
of limitations with periods between one and two years to remain in force
on the grounds that they had stifled portal litigation.58 ' McGrath re-
sponded for the liberal Democrats by noting that the limitations issue
was completely extraneous to the portal problem since the majority bill
had effectively eliminated such claims for the past. He emphasized in-
stead that a short period would undermine enforcement to the detriment
especially of low-paid unorganized workers.58 ' He then presented data
showing that when FLSA was originally enacted, ninety-five per cent of
covered employees worked in states with applicable statutes of limita-
tions of at least three years; despite the movement toward shorter state
limitations periods,585 almost three-fifths of covered workers worked in
states with periods of at least five years. Thus the two-year period in the
majority bill would reduce the rights of eighty-eight per cent of all cov-
ered workers, while under the House version of one year, ninety-five per
cent would lose and none would gain.586
579. The Senate rejected by a vote of 50 to 39 Holland's amendment to exclude the Walsh-
Healey and Bacon Act from the operation of the bill. Id. at 2367.
580. It was defeated 57-32 on a vote to table. Id. at 2368-69 (introduced by Sen. Myers, Dem.
Pa.).
581. Id. at 2259 (statement of Sen. McGrath, Dem. R.I.).
582. It was rejected 50-39. Id. at 2367 (introduced by Kilgore, Dem. W. Va.).
583. Id. at 2184, 2273-74 (statements by Sen. Holland, Dem. Fla.).
584. Since "the members of organized labor hardly need the protection of" FLSA, McGrath
coyly added that if the latter's protection were destroyed, "we will drive more and more Americans
to the necessity of joining labor unions; not that perhaps any of us have any objection to that .... "
Id. at 2256 (statement by Sen. McGrath, Dem. R.I.).
585. Interestingly, most of the states that shortened the limitations period had no experience of
their own with administering or enforcing minimum wage laws. Id. at 2256-57.
586. Id. at 2257.
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After Senator Holland's amendment was defeated,587 the liberals
sought to maintain the status quo, which was more favorable to employ-
ees, by an amendment deleting the limitations period altogether and rein-
stating applicable state provisions. In an important test of labor's
strength on an issue that related only to the viability of non-portal FLSA
rights, more than two-thirds of those voting rejected the amendment.
588
On the final roll-call vote in the Senate, where fifty-one Republicans
faced forty-five Democrats, and all twenty-two Southern senators were
Democrats,589 the sharp divide along party-sectional lines was only
slightly less prominent than in the House. The Senate passed H.R. 2157
on March 21 by a 64 to 24 vote. Forty-six Republicans supported the bill
and only two voted against it; all eighteen Democratic supporters were
Southerners.59°
4. Conference Bill: Enduring Compromise.
Portal-Pay Ban As Finally Passed Is A Paradise for Chiselers. 91
On the same day that the Senate passed its version of H.R. 2157, it
informed the House that it wanted a conference, which the House on
March 25 agreed to hold.5 92 The conference committee593 issued its re-
port on April 29 recommending a bill that represented an amalgam of
each house's bill.5 94 On May 1, 1947, both chambers agreed to the con-
587. The vote on the bill was 40 to 23. Bizarrely, McCarran, whose own amendment included a
three-year period, voted for the bill. Id. at 2277.
588. The vote was 61 to 28. Id. at 2367-68 (introduced by Sen. Magnuson, Dem. Wa.). The
votes for the bill were artificially inflated by the votes of Holland and Wilson (Rep. Ia.), who were
presumably swayed by the desire to preserve their states' very short limitations periods. Wilson had
introduced S. 307, which was the counterpart to the bill introduced by Gwynne, who also repre-
sented Iowa, a state whose legislature had pioneered in the field of short limitations periods for
FLSA.
589. CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 145-66 (1st ed. 1947).
590. One Democratic supporter was from Maryland. The two Republicans were Aiken of Ver-
mont and Langer of North Dakota. 93 CONG. REc. 2375 (1947). Three Southern Democrats op-
posed the bill, while the most impassioned opponent of the anti-portal legislation, Pepper of Florida,
did not vote. The three were Olin Johnston (S.C.), Lister Hill (Ala.), and John Sparkman (Ala.). On
the backgrounds of these racist prolabor senators, see CURRENT BIOGRAPHY 1951, at 310 (1952)
(Johnston); CURRENT BIOGRAPHY 1943, at 297 (1944) (Hill); CURRENT BIOGRAPHY 1950, at 539
(1951) (Sparkman).
591. United Mine Workers J., May 15, 1947, at 7.
592. HOUSE J. Mar. 21, 1947, at 215.
593, The House managers were Michener, Gwynne, Goodwin (Rep. Mass.), and Walter. The
Senate's managers were Wiley, Donnell, Cooper, and Eastland (Dem. Miss.).
594. See PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT OF 1947, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 326, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947).
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ference report. 595
By far the most important product of the conference was the aban-
donment by the House of its undifferentiated treatment of existing and
future claims. Had the House prevailed on the key provision in its bill,
FLSA would have been virtually repealed since H.R. 2157, which was
not confined to portal claims, eliminated statutory standards in favor of
contract, custom, or practice.596 Violations of FLSA would then have
been reduced to something akin to common-law breaches of contract.
597
The Senate bill closely resembled the House bill with regard to existing
claims,5 98 but differed radically from the House version in that it re-
stricted the relief that it granted employers from liability for future
claims solely to portal claims, which it sought to identify through exam-
ples. By adopting the language of the Senate provision virtually intact,5 99
the conference salvaged FLSA.
Yet in incorporating the language of both bills that defined the "cus-
tom or practice" that would mandate compensation as that of the indi-
vidual employer,' the conference rejected testimony that such a
criterion would favor bad employers and undermine the uniformity of
595. The House agreed on a 173-27 vote. House Journal, May 1, 1947, at 319; Senate Journal,
May 1, 1947, at 227-28.
596. H.R. 2157, § 3.
597. The courts recognized that the all-encompassing nature of the relief that was carried over
to § 2 of the Portal-to-Portal Act was not limited to portal claims. See, eg., Steiner v. Mitchell, 350
U.S. 247, 255-56 (1956) (dictum); Cities Service Defense Corp. v. Dutton, 240 F.2d 113, 115-17 (8th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957); Bauler v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 182 F.2d 357 (7th Cir.
1950); Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 74 F. Supp. 412,416 (D. Md. 1947), aff'd, 168 F.2d 58 (4th Cir.
1948); Miller v. Howe Sound Mining Co., 77 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wash. 1948); Kemp v. Day &
Zimmerman, Inc., 33 N.W.2d 569, 591 (Iowa 1948). The only contrary opinion included in the
national reporter system was Central Missouri Tel. Co. v. Conwell, 170 F.2d 641, 645 (8th Cir.
1948), which held that because the Portal-to-Portal Act did not repeal the overtime provision of
FLSA, plaintiffs were not required to plead a contract, custom, or practice to support a claim for
compensation for nonportal normal worktime. The Eighth Circuit impliedly overruled this decision
in Cities Service Defense Corp. v. Dutton. The courts were swayed by § 2(d) of the Portal-to-Portal
Act, which withdrew from the courts jurisdiction of actions for liability not authorized under § 2(a).
598. Although § 2 of the Senate bill, unlike the House bill, referred to "[r]elief from portal-to-
portal claims," § 5 circularly defined "'portal-to-portal activities'" as meaning "those activities
which section 2.. .provides shall not be a basis of liability" under FLSA. Since the more substantive
illustrations of portal activities in § 6, which governed future claims, did not apply to past claims
under § 2, the Senate bill appeared to offer employers relief from all liability for past claims. As the
discussion in the text of the Senate debates indicates, the bill's supporters conceded that they had
sacrificed existing nonportal claims in order to insure that all existing portal claims were wiped out.
The conference report came to the same conclusion. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 326, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1947).
599. Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 4, 61 Stat. 84, 86-87 (1947).
600. Id. at 85, 87.
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FLSA standards" 1 and colleagues' recommendations that at the very
least an industry-wide standard be applied in order to avoid rewarding
unscrupulous employers in perpetuity either through grandfathering in
their practices or encouraging them to create "dummy" entities that
would be free to establish new practices." 2 Unless many firms in the
industries that were the objects of portal suits actually were paying for
portal activities and thus created an industry-wide standard different
from that to which "chiseling" employers adhered, it is puzzling why
Congress elected to adopt the establishment-based construction "custom
or practice." Although the findings and policy section of the conference
bill adopted the language in the Senate bill concerning the "gross ine-
quality of competitive conditions between employers and between indus-
tries""° , its meaning is unclear. Senator Donnell, whose exposition of
the bill alone occupied two and one-half days of the Senate's debate time,
cast some light on the matter by stating that, unless Congress took action
with regard to future claims:
[T]here is grave likelihood of continued inequality of competitive conditions
as between employers, and between industries, due to the fact, as between
employers, that one employer may have a plant physically so located that
his portal time is greater than that of an employer across the street who,
because of his physical location, does not find the same necessity for long




Underlying Donnell's analysis was a conception of plant layout as a
kind of natural catastrophe or gift wholly independent of human inter-
vention. If some firms built very large plants the economies of scale of
which were in part based on the uncompensated time workers had to
spend walking across huge internal spaces, this was a conscious invest-
ment decision by management." 5 The mere fact that employees could
not muster the strength to compel compensation before the enactment of
FLSA, did not create any moral-let alone legal--entitlement on the
part of employers to preserve such costless operations under FLSA.
Donnell's only justification of the employers' and Congress's position
was a circular or vacuous one:
[I]t is the view of well-informed individuals that there is compensation
granted to every employee in the performance of his duties, if in computing
601. See Portal-to-Portal Wages, supra note 9, at 645 (testimony of Arthur Pettit).
602. See 93 CONG. REc. 2237 (1947) (statement of Sen. Murray, Dem. Mont.).
603. Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 1(a)(3), 61 Stat. 84, 84 (1947).
604. 93 CONG. REc. 2122 (1947).
605. Even the AFL recognized this state of affairs. See Portal-to-Portal Wages, supra note 9, at
145 (statement of Walter Mason, national legislative representative, AFL).
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the hourly figure or the price per piece of his product, the fact that he did
the walking or did the preliminary activities had been taken into
account.... 6
Donnell might have lent empirical support to his claims had he ac-
tually collected data on wages in plants "across the street" from each
other with varying amounts of walking time. If, ceteris paribus, the simi-
larly situated workers with greater portal time actually received higher
hourly or piece rates, then the proponents of portal legislation would
have succeeded in cutting the moral ground from under the CIO's
claims. If, as seems more in accord with the real workings of the labor
market, such time was not compensated at either plant, then the moral
and economic foundations of the employers' position would have
collapsed.
The House conferees yielded on another important point-the one-
year period of limitations-by accepting the Senate bill's provision of a
two-year period for future claims.6 "7 In addition, the Senate ban on rep-
resentative actions,6 "8 to which there was no House counterpart, was
adopted in the Act.' Despite the congressional uproar over the
Supreme Court decisions making the compromise of any claims, includ-
ing liquidated damages, very difficult, 610 the House conferees were also
unable to persuade their Senate counterparts to extend the right to com-
promise to future claims.611 But the House managers did achieve partial
success on a related issue. While the Senate bill had no provision con-
cerning liquidated damages, the House bill had conferred discretion on a
court that found that the employer's violation "in bad faith and without
reasonable ground" to award liquidated damages was not to exceed the
underlying back wages.612 The compromise consisted in shifting the bur-
den to the employer to show that his actionable act or omission was in
606. 93 CONG. REc. 2090 (1947).
607. Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 6(a), 61 Stat. at 87-88 (1947). All existing claims had to be
filed within the shorter of two years after the cause accrued or the period prescribed by the applica-
ble state statute of limitations. Id. § 6(b). This rule was subject to a grace-period proviso that, if a
cause was filed within 120 days of the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act, the action could have
accrued more than two years earlier if the applicable state limitations period extended that far back.
Id. § 6(c).
608. Id. § 8.
609. For analysis of the collective action provisions, see infra § VII.
610. See infra § VI.
611. Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 3, 61 Stat. 84, 86 (1947). The Act contained a further
limitation found in neither the House nor Senate bill: an existing claim could be compromised only
"if there exists a bona fide dispute as to the amount payable" and if the compromise amounts to at
least the minimum wage or time and one-half. Id. § 3(a).
612. H.R. 2157, § 2(g), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
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"good faith" and "that he had reasonable grounds for believing" that it
did not violate FLSA.
613
Both bills had provisions relieving employers of liability where the
act or omission in question was in good-faith reliance on an administra-
tive regulation, order, interpretation, or ruling even where such regula-
tion was later judicially invalidated.614 The minor differences between
them were compromised by not requiring the administrative ruling as to
existing claims to be in writing or to be issued by the Wage and Hour
Administrator.615 The managers narrowed the scope of this relief by not-
ing that an employer's reliance on the statement of an individual agency
official that was not in fact the agency's interpretation would not affect
his liability. 61 6 Moreover, one of the conferees explained to the House
that the defense did not apply where the "employer had knowledge of
conflicting rules and chose to act in accordance with the one most
favorable to him."6 7 A distinct class bias inheres in this good-faith reli-
ance provision in that it in effect makes the Administrator's interpreta-
tions "binding on employees but not on employers." For while the
employer is protected, no employee can "perform certain activities with
the assurance that he will be compensated in accordance with the written
opinion of the Administrator."6 8
5. In Lieu of a Veto: Presidential Legislative History. President
Truman took the entire ten days granted him by the Constitution61 9 to
sign the bill during which he received conflicting advice from his advisers
and cabinet members.620 While his special counsel, Clark Clifford, urged
him to veto the bill and to specify the kind of bill he wanted, the Senate
613. Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 11, 61 Stat. 84, 89 (1947). Congressional interest in this
issue had been sparked by a judicial ruling that, although it would be "a keen injustice for employers
bewildered by strange legislation and confused by divergent authority in the courts" to face addi-
tional liquidated damages where their violation had been committed in good faith, such "harshness"
was mandatory. Missel v. Overnight Motor Transp. Co., 126 F.2d 98, 111 (4th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 316
U.S. 572, 581-84 (1942). On congressional interest, see H. R. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1947).
614. The provision was contained in § 2(e) of the House bill and § 10 of the Senate bill.
615. Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, §§ 9-10, 61 Stat. 84, 88-89 (1947).
616. See H. R. CONF. REP. No. 326, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1947).
617. 93 CONG. REc. 4390 (1947) (statement of Rep. Walter).
618. Note, Fair Labor Standards Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 352, 358
(1948).
619. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
620. During this period a group of liberal reformers and academics, including Elizabeth Bran-
deis, Paul Douglas, Walter Gellhorn, and Hubert Humphrey, sent Truman a letter in which they
couched their opposition to H.R. 2157 in terms of the adverse competitive impact it would have on
scrupulous employers. See 93 CONG. REc. A2172-73 (1947).
1991]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Minority Leader, Barkley, convinced Truman that Congress would not
approve more favorable legislation. While Secretary of Labor Schwel-
lenbach and the vice chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers,
Leon Keyserling, kept urging disapproval, Secretary of Commerce Harri-
man, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and Attorney General Clark all
favored approval.621 In finally signing the bill, Truman, an historian of
the Eightieth Congress has argued, was motivated by the political judg-
ment that,
the issue was not one on which substantial public opinion demanded a veto.
Unorganized workers were politically inarticulate, and a large part of the
population, forgetting about the unorganized workers whom the bill af-
fected, viewed the extravagant portal claims as another attempt by powerful
unions to line their pockets at the expense of consumers. Thus, Truman
found no compelling reason to abandon his conciliatory posture.
622
In signing the bill, Truman avoided antagonizing Congress at a time
when his foreign policy initiatives were pending and preserved his option
to veto Taft-Hartley. Thus, "Truman's approval of the portal bill
marked the end of his appeasement strategy. '623 That end was foreshad-
owed by what may have been a unique presidential exercise in creating
legislative history. For in his message to Congress transmitting his ap-
proval he instructed Congress (and the courts)624 as to what Congress
had meant by certain provisions. In particular Truman insisted that the
legislatiye history of § 4, dealing with future claims,
shows that the Congress intends the words "principal activities" are to be
construed liberally to include any work of consequence performed for the
employer, no matter when the work is performed. We should not lose sight
of the important requirement under the act that all "principal activities"
must be paid for, regardless of contract, custom, or practice. I am sure the
courts will not permit employers to use artificial devices such as the shifting
of work to the beginning or the end of the day to avoid liability under the
law.
625
Congress was not amused. Even Senator McGrath, a Democratic
621. S. HARTMANN, TRUMAN AND THE 80TH CONGRESS 44 (1971).
622. Id. at 45-46.
623. Id. at 46.
624. One court actually took notice. In Mauro v. Slaughter & Co., 14 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
64,299, at 72,720-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), the judge cited Truman's message as authority for the propo-
sition that Congress did not mean to void existing nonportal claims not based on contract, custom,
or practice. In point of fact, Truman did not even take that position.
625. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING His AP-
PROVAL OF H. R. 2157, THE PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT OF 1947, H.R. Doc. No. 247, 80th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 2 (1947).
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opponent of the bill and Truman's former Solicitor General and future
Attorney General, found it necessary to tell his colleagues that presiden-
tial statements did not become part of the legislative history.626 On a
more specific note, Senator Donnell, answering on behalf of the Judiciary
Committee, left no doubt that Truman was right about one matter-it
was unorganized workers who would bear the brunt of the Act. For
Donnell replied that if an employee sewing in a factory prior to enact-
ment had not been compensated for the time she spent waiting for the
production line to start up again during the day and no contract or cus-
tom required payment, the employer would not be liable for back
wages.
627
VI. THE UNWAIVABILITY OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES: STATUTE
TRUMPS BARGAINING
[W]e hope that organized labor will realize that wages ought to be adjusted
by collective bargaining, not by fantastic proceedings at law, and that this
famous issue will be remembered only as a historical curiosity.
6 2 8
One tension that runs throughout the congressional and judicial dis-
putes over portal pay is the relationship of FLSA to collective bargain-
ing. Although FLSA was designed to pre-empt individual or collective
adhesion contracts in favor of statutory standards in order to afford
workers who were not in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis their em-
ployers to receive adequate compensation for their work, many congress-
men and members of the judiciary believed that organized workers were
at best inadvertent and marginal beneficiaries of FLSA.
One member of the judiciary who took this latter position was Jus-
tice Jackson. Two years after his dissent in Jewell Ridge,629 Jackson re-
626. 93 CONG. REc. 6262 (1947).
627. Id. at 7541. Donnell also contradicted Truman on another point that undermined enforce-
ment of FLSA: an employer did not have to show that he had relied on an affirmative action by an
administrative agency. The ruling or policy on which the employer relies "may consist solely of the
absence of action." Id.
628. Judge Picard Reconsiders, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1947, § 4, at 8, col. 1 (editorial).
629. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. had unsuccessfully petitioned the Court for rehearing on unusual
grounds. It challenged Justice Black's qualification to hear the case both because he had been the
most active sponsor of FLSA as a Senator and because he had been a law partner with respondents'
chief counsel. Petition for Rehearing at 2-3, Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, UMW, 325
U.S. 161 (1945). The chief counsel, Crompton Harris, had also represented the union in Muscoda.
Although the Court denied the petition without a statement of the reasons, Jackson, concurring in
the denial, wrote that since the Court was without authority to exclude a Justice from sitting in any
case, the complaint was improperly addressed to the Court. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No.
6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 897 (1945). Jackson's irony became apparent a year later when, unable to
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turned to the subject of the relationship between FLSA and collective
bargaining in a non-portal case, insisting that FLSA was not intended to
regulate labor relations except as to minimum wages and overtime. In-
stead, under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), employers
and employees could give expression to their needs and customs. This
division of labor could best be effectuated without strife by giving deci-
siveness in borderline cases either to the NLRA or to the Wage and Hour
Administrator's rulings. In Jewell Ridge, however, the Court, according
to Justice Jackson, by rejecting both approaches, "foreclosed every
means by which any claim, however dubious, under this statute [FLSA]
or under the Court's elastic and somewhat unpredictable interpretations
of it, can safely or finally be settled, except by litigation to final
judgment."630
Jackson's irritation in Jewell Ridge, which demonstrates the dimen-
sions of the tension between those who believed FLSA trumped contract
and those who did not, had been triggered by two decisions,631 Brooklyn
Savings Bank v. O'Neil and the companion case of Dize v. Maddrix.632
These two cases effectively precluded employees from ever waiving their
rights to liquidated damages under FLSA by preventing an employee
from entering into a purely private settlement agreement with an em-
ployer for back wages releasing him from all other claims.
In Brooklyn Savings Bank the employer, more than two years after
termination of employment, computed the statutory overtime due an em-
ployee and offered it to him in exchange for a release of all his FLSA
rights. After accepting the money, the worker sued for liquidated dam-
ages.6 3 The Supreme Court thus had to resolve "the question whether an
employee subject to the terms of the Act can waive or release his right to
receive from his employer liquidated damages under § 16(b). ' '6 34 In the
factually variant companion case of Dize v. Maddrix, the employer, after
discharging the worker, tendered him back wages that both parties knew
repress his animus against Black any longer, Jackson, while on leave at Nuremberg as chief prosecu-
tor for the United States, castigated Black for having judged his ex-partner's case as well as for
having (unsuccessfully) tried to influence the outcome of a coal strike by urging Murphy to hand
down the decision in favor of the miners without waiting for the opinion or dissent. The press
prominently reported on the unusual eruption. See, e.g., Jackson Attacks Black for Judging Ex-
Partner's Case, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1946, at 1, col. 6; Text of Jackson's Statement Attacking Black,
id. at 2, col. 3; L. Wood, Split of Jackson and Black Long Widening in Capital, id. at 2, col. 4.
630. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 154, 155 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
631. Jackson voted with the majority in the first and did not participate in the second.
632. 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (includes the companion case of Dize v. Maddrix).
633. Id. at 700.
634. Id. at 699.
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to be less than the minimum and overtime wages due. The worker ac-
cepted the money and signed a general release of all his rights under
FLSA. He then hired a lawyer to secure the balance. When the em-
ployer tendered that sum before suit was filed, the worker refused it be-
cause the offer did not include liquidated damages. In both cases the
employers claimed that the release was a defense to the subsequent ac-
tions brought solely for liquidated damages.635
Before proceeding to the central issue, the Brooklyn Court examined
the question of whether the releases were "given in settlement of a bona
fide dispute between the parties with respect to coverage or amount due
under the Act or whether it constituted a mere waiver" of FLSA
rights.636 Because the Court decided that "the release was not given in
settlement of a bona fide dispute between employer and employee, ' 637 it
did not reach the issue of "what limitation, if any, § 16(b) of the Act
places on the validity" of a settlement made "in consideration of a bona
fide compromise.... 638
In the absence of specific consideration and resolution of the issue
by Congress, the Court explored the broader legislative policy behind the
provision. 639 Generally FLSA "was a recognition of the fact that due to
the unequal bargaining power as between employer and employee, cer-
tain segments of the population required Federal compulsory legislation
to prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national
health and efficiency... ."I The Court was of the opinion that the same
policy considerations that prohibited waiver of statutory wages by agree-
ment on the grounds that it "would nullify the purposes of the Act,"
"also prohibit waiver of the employee's right to liquidated damages." 61
The Court then sketched a very expansive view of the congressional pur-
pose behind the provision of liquidated damages as a,
recognition that failure to pay the statutory minimum on time may be so
detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard of living "necessary
635. Id. at 701-02.
636. Id. at 703.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 714.
639. The pertinent statutory language of § 16(b) reads as follows:
Any employer who violates the provisions of § 6 or § 7 of this Act shall be liable to
the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or
their unpaid overtime compensation... and in an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages.
Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (1938).
640. 324 U.S. 697 at 706.
641. Id. at 707.
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for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers" . . that double
payment must be made in the event of delay in order to insure restoration of
the worker to that minimum standard of well-being. Employees receiving
less than the statutory minimum are not likely to have sufficient resources
to maintain their well-being and efficiency until such sums are paid at a
future date. The same policy which forbids waiver of the statutory mini-
mum. .. requires that reparations to restore damage done by such failure to
pay on time must be made to accomplish Congressional purposes. More-
over, the same policy which forbids employee waiver of the minimum statu-
tory rate because of inequality of bargaining power, prohibits these same
employees from bargaining with their employer in determining whether so
little damage was suffered that waiver of liquidated damage is called for.
6 42
The Court also emphasized that "[tihe private-public character" of
the right to liquidated damages precluded waiver, which would under-
mine the intended deterrent effect: "Knowledge on the part of the em-
ployer that he cannot escape liability for liquidated damages by taking
advantage of the needs of his employees tends to insure compliance in the
first place." 3 Finally, the Court mentioned that one of FLSA's func-
tions is to protect employers that can maintain profitability without hav-
ing to resort to certain kinds of exploitation from wage-chiseling
competitors: "An employer is not to be allowed to gain a competitive
advantage by reason of the fact that his employees are more willing to
waive claims for liquidated damages than are those of his competitor."'
Thus, even where he has paid all back wages but in an untimely fashion,
"the employer shall be liable for liquidated damages in an amount equal
to minimum wages overdue; liability is not conditioned on default at the
time suit is begun." 5
The following term the Court seized the opportunity to revisit the
issue of whether employees could bargain away rights under the statute
that had been left open in Brooklyn Savings Bank. Making very short
shrift of the employer's argument, it held that "the remedy of liquidated
damages cannot be bargained away by bona fide settlements of disputes
over coverage" or hours of work or rates of pay. 6 ' In support the Court
cited the reasoning of Brooklyn Savings Bank. Specifically:
the purpose of the Act, which.., was to secure for the lowest paid segment
of the nation's workers a subsistence wage, leads to the conclusion that
neither wages nor the damages for withholding them are capable of reduc-
642. Id. at 707-08.
643. Id. at 709-10.
644. Id. (footnote omitted).
645. Id. at 711.
646. D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114, 115 (1946).
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tion by compromise of controversies over coverage. Such a compromise
thwarts the public policy of minimum wages, promptly paid ... by reduc-
ing the sum selected by Congress as proper compensation for withholding
wages. 647
Extending that incompetence from individual workers to organized
labor, did not, in Jackson's view, redound to the latter's benefit, for as he
had written in dissent in Jewell Ridge, it was "hard to see how the long-
range interests of labor itself are advanced by a holding that there is no
mode by which it may bind itself to any specified future conduct, how-
ever fairly bargained."" 4  The subtext here was that while the pro-labor
majority of the Court may have intended to confer a benefit on unions by
permitting them unilaterally to avoid collective bargaining agreements
that did not comply with the overtime provisions of FLSA, this one-sided
flexibility would eventually provoke damaging countervailing measures
by management. Coming on the eve of congressional debate on the Por-
tal-to-Portal bill in February 1947, Jackson's concurrence in Portland
Terminal served to remind Democrats that it was now legitimate for
New Dealers to question the Cou-t's pro-union bias.
As indicated in § V, the Portal-to-Portal Act as enacted eventually
granted employers a limited defense against mandatory liquidated dam-
ages. Where an employer can show "that the act or omission giving rise
to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for
believing that his act or omission was not a violation of" FLSA, the
court has discretion to award less than full liquidated damages.'r In a
suit solely for liquidated damages, the "act or omission" in question
would refer to the failure or refusal 6 0 to pay liquidated damages. If the
647. Id. at 116 (footnote omitted). In dictum the Court modified the absolute quality of the
ineffectiveness of waivers by noting that "the requirement of pleading the issues and submitting the
judgment to judicial scrutiny may differentiate stipulated judgments from compromises by the par-
ties." Id. at 113 n.8. In a later case it was held that once a claim goes to final judgment, the
employee can compromise by accepting his full back wages and attorney's fees but only nominal
liquidated damages where the employer is insolvent. Bracey v. Luray, 68 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md.
1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1947), cert denied, 332 U.S. 790 (1947).
648. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 161, 195 (1945).
649. Portal to Portal Act, ch. 52, § 11, 61 Stat. 89 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 260 (1982)). The Act also made waivers permissible "with respect to activities engaged in prior to
May 14, 1947." 29 U.S.C. § 253(b) (1947).
650. Presumably demand for payment of liquidated damages would be no more a prerequisite
for filing suit than demand for back wages. "A right to sue for compensation vests whenever the pay
period passes and the employer fails to pay the amounts required by law. Thereafter nothing further
need happen. The cause of action has matured." EXEMPTING EMPLOYERS FROM LIABILITY FOR




late payment of wages was unreasonable or not in good faith, then the
award of liquidated damages would be automatic and ministerial. If,
however, the employer could show good faith and reasonableness with
regard to the late payment of wages, then he could a fortiori show them
with regard to the failure to pay liquidated damages-although even then
the court would have discretion to award full liquidated damages.
Even after enactment of the portal legislation, Congress remained
concerned about the declining volume of voluntary restitution of back
wages. Of the causes of this decline:
Undoubtedly one of the most important... is the fact that an employer
who pays back wages which he withheld in violation of the act has no assur-
ance that he will not be sued for an equivalent amount plus attorney's fees
under the provisions of section 16(b) of the act. One of the principal effects
of the committee proposal will be to assure employers who pay back wages
in full under the supervision of the Wage and Hour Division that they need
not worry about the possibility of suits for liquidated damages and attor-
ney's fees.
651
Consequently, Congress again amended FLSA in 1949 to provide
for involvement by the United States Department of Labor ("DOL"):
The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid
minimum wages or the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any em-
ployee.. ., and the agreement of any employee to accept such payment shall
upon payment in full constitute a waiver by such employee of any right he
may have under subsection (b)... to such unpaid minimum wages or un-
paid overtime compensation and an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages.
652
In the end, then, provided that workers avoid intercession by the
DOL,653 no waiver or release given in a purely private agreement with
the employer can be effective.6 54 Congress, then, contrary to Justice
Jackson's view, appears to have realized that statutory norms should take
precedence over contract.
651. S. REP. No. 640, 81st Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 2241,
2249.
652. Act of Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 736, § 14, 63 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(c)
(1988)).
653. Where a worker signed a receipt and accepted the check tendered by the employer for the
amount determined by the DOL to be owed and then, on advice of counsel returned the check
without having cashed it, it was held that the waiver was effective. Sneed v. Sneed's Shipbuilding,
Inc., 545 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1977).
654. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982).
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VII. THE ELIMINATION OF THE CLASS ACTION THAT NEVER WAS
[I]f we were to enact this legislation... it would probably be the greatest
boon to labor unions they have had in many years, because it would force
the unorganized employees to join a union in order to get a contract and
thereby protect their rights.655
In addition to displaying the tension between statute trumping and
collective bargaining, the Portal-to-Portal Act exerted its most decisive
and lasting impact on capital-labor relations in the unorganized sector by
prohibiting the use of what today would be called opt-out class actions.
This result is ironic because the unions had not conducted the portal
litigation in the form of such class actions, although congressional ani-
mus against that procedural form was based on the mistaken impression
that they had done so. Moreover, the prohibition has not vitally injured
unions, which can continue to resolve FLSA-type claims collectively
through a grievance-arbitration system, but has injured unorganized
workers, who, deprived of the opt-out class action, are remitted to a very
ineffectual means of pressuring employers to comply with FLSA. This
congressional action also laid the basis for excluding FLSA claimants
from the benefits of the expanded class action procedures introduced by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure twenty years later.
The original FLSA of 1938 provided for two varieties of collective
actions. For violations of the minimum wage or overtime provisions an
action could be maintained:
by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves
and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or employees may
designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in be-
half of all employees similarly situated.656
The development of such actions under FLSA was hampered by a judi-
cial bias against this procedural innovation as well as by the courts' per-
plexity as to whether actions brought pursuant to § 16(b) were
additionally subject to the limitations of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,65 7 which had gone into effect only the month before
FLSA in 1938.658 At that time, Rule 23 provided that, where the re-
655. 93 CONG. REc. 2374 (statement of Sen. Aiken).
656. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (1938).
657. See, ag., Lofther v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 45 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ill. 1941). Smith v.
Stark Trucking, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 826, 828 (N.D. Ohio 1943), was unusual in recognizing that "it
would be purposeless to discuss the questions whether this is a true class action as prescribed in Rule
23.... Confusion might arise from an unnecessary discussion of the applicability of Rule 23. The
question for decision is: Does the instant suit follow the pattern delineated in the Act itself?."
658. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect three months after the adjournment
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quirements of numerosity and adequacy of representation were met, so-
called spurious class actions6 9 could be brought "when the character of
the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is... several, and
there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and
a common relief is sought."' Because judgments in spurious class ac-
tions included only those who intervened before a trial on the merits, "no
material advantage" would have accrued to employees from bringing
FLSA actions pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3).661 Indeed, doubt attached to
whether suits under FLSA even rose to the level of spurious class actions
inasmuch as the "common question" or "common relief" might be lack-
ing for individual violations of minimum wage or overtime provisions;
these actions might, it was said, merely be amenable to permissive
intervention.
662
In determining whether FLSA expansively authorized the "virtual
representation" of unnamed employees 663 or was merely designed to en-
able relatively impecunious workers to avoid unnecessary litigation costs
by "join[ing] a series of separate law suits into one proceeding,"' 664 courts
of the second regular session of the Seventy-Fifth Congress. FED. R. Civ. P. 86, as published in 308
U.S. 645, 766 (1939). The third session (which was the second regular session) of Congress ad-
journed on June 16, 1938. See 82 CONG. REc. 3 (1937); 83 CONG. REc. 9612, 9699 (1938). The
Rules therefore went into effect Sept. 16, 1938. The minimum wage and maximum hours provisions
of FLSA went into effect on October 24, 1938, 120 days after its date of enactment (June 25, 1938).
See Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, §§ 6(b) and 7(d), 52 Stat. 1060, 1063, 1064 (1938). As late as
March 1947, an employer, arguing that § 16(b) had gone into effect on June 25, 1938, moved to
dismiss a representative action on the grounds that § 16(b) conflicted with and had been repealed by
Rule 23(a). The motion was denied. McNichols v. Lennox Furnace Co., 7 F.R.D. 40, 41-42
(N.D.N.Y. 1947).
659. Original Rule 23(a) distinguished among true, hybrid, and spurious class actions. The first
is one in which "but for the class action device, the joinder of all interested persons would be essen-
tial." Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307, 314 (1937). The second group
involves a specific property, but the members' interests are several. In the spurious class action, a
common question of law or fact unites the class, but the members' rights are several. Moore, who
was the research assistant to the reporter for the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure,
drafted an unadopted version of Rule 23 that specifically provided that the judgment would be con-
clusive on the class in true class actions, but only on the parties in the other two. See Moore, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 571-72
(1937); Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REV.
555, 556 (1937).
660. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), as published in 308 U.S. 645, 689 (1939).
661. Poole, Private Litigation Under the Wage and Hour Act, 14 Miss. L.J. 157, 165 (1942).
662. See, eg., Saxton v. W.S. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. 519, 521 (N.D. Ga. 1940); Rahl, The
Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 37 ILL. L. REv. 119,
128-32 (1942).
663. Kuligowski v. Hart, 23 Ohio Op. 213, 216, 2 Wage & Hour Cas. 931, 934 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County, 1942).
664. Lofther v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 45 F. Supp. 986, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1941).
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were ostensibly guided by their solicitude for the rights of employers and
of unnamed plaintiffs. The more radical position rejected the legitimacy
of any class action by denying Congress the power "to force one to be-
come a plaintiff against his will or without his consent, or to select for
him an agent or attorney to represent him."66 The more moderate posi-
tion merely denied that Congress intended to permit the adjudication or
preclusion of claims without an employee's knowledge.666
The other due process barrier to judicial acceptance of class actions
(whether under FLSA or not) was the notion that "to afford the absen-
tees all the benefits of winning but to impose upon them none of the
burdens of losing" was simply not fair to employers.667 In other words,
it was not fair to the defendant to permit members to participate after a
decree had been rendered "even though, had the suit been unsuccessful,
they would not have been bound by it."66 Despite the lack of "complete
symmetry between binding the defendant to a favorable decree and bind-
ing the absentee to an unfavorable decree," '669 the courts took a very dim
view of such one-way intervention.670 Consequently, even before the
1947 amendments, the courts limited participation in FLSA actions to
named plaintiffs, intervenors, and consenters who joined the action
before the trial on the merits.
Possible movement toward a conception of class actions under
FLSA that might have transcended the scope of Rule 23(a)(3) emerged
665. Brooks v. Southern Dairies, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 588, 588 (S.D. Fla. 1941).
666. Saxton v. W.S. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. at 521.
667. Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684,
713 (1941).
668. Id. at 711.
669. Id. at 713. Kalven and Rosenfield explained the difference this way:
[Tmhe defendant has been afforded his day in court; he has had the opportunity to pres-
ent his case fully in his own right, and he has lost. He has no more reason to relitigate
the entire controversy against the absentee members than he has to do so against the
immediate plaintiff. But it cannot be said that the absentee has had his day in court to a
comparable degree .... The defendant cannot properly complain about the way in
which he is treated; he can complain only that the absentees are not subjected to the risk
of losing the case. But to the extent that the risk of losing would be greater on them
because they are merely represented, it is only fair that they are not equally subjected to
that risk.
Id. To the extent that the representation was adequate (and free), this argument appears to have
justified the need for opt-out class actions rather than for one-way intervention. See Foster, Jurisdic-
tion, Rights, and Remedies for Group Wrongs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Special Federal
Questions, 1975 wisc. L. REv. 295, 325 (supporting the Kalven-Rosenfield position).
670. Roberts v. Western Airlines, 425 F. Supp. 416, 419 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (one of the primary
purposes of the 1966 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "was to eliminate this
type of 'one way intervention' in spurious class actions").
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when an early influential district court decision, Shain v. Armour & Co.,
held that general principles of class actions that disqualified suits in
which claims were distinct and the subject of independent suits, even
though a common question of law was involved, did not govern FLSA
because such class actions would have nullified § 16(b).671 But the court
also held that only where the interests of the named and unnamed plain-
tiffs were so common and united as to entitle the former to stand in judg-
ment for the latter would constitutional due process requirements permit
making the judgment res judicata for the whole class. FLSA cases, how-
ever, did not meet that requirement because "different members of a class
are free to either assert rights or to challenge them as their individual
judgments dictate and the interests of the representatives of the class are
not necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are
deemed to represent."672
The cogency of this ruling was weakened by the observation that if
fairness was the problem, the threshold requirement of adequate repre-
sentation would have avoided it. If an employee was not adequately
represented, then he would not have been bound by the decision.6 73 The
inability of the class representative to demonstrate typicality of claims
would have compelled the same result. The Shain court's ruling on the
unnamed class members' freedom to join or not could have formed the
basis of a notice and opt-out procedure that would have addressed the
judicial antipathy to one-way intervention. In any event, even before the
Portal-to-Portal Act eliminated whatever expansive potential FLSA class
actions may ever have had, the courts in non-portal litigation had almost
unanimously674 opted for this restrictive approach,6 75 confining and as-
671. Shain v. Armour & Co., 40 F. Supp. 488, 489-90 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
672. Id. at 490.
673. See Comment, FLSA Class Action Limited to Employees Giving Assent, 55 HARV. L. REV.
688, 689 (1942).
674. Only one (semi-reported) decision appears to have approved the bringing of a FLSA action
on behalf of other employees without naming them on the grounds that the "Act was intended to
and does link together all employes who are not paid according to its provisions and as to them
creates a question of common interest. Each is given the right to have his claim presented in the
action of a fellow employe." Clint v. Franklin Bargain House, Inc., 20 Ohio Op. 196, 199, 1 Wage &
Hour Cas. (BNA) 1068, 1071 (C.P. Lucas County, 1941). Intriguingly, the plaintiffs' counsel was
Edward Lamb, who represented the workers in Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. Another semi-reported
Ohio case in obscure language permitted a FLSA action to go forward on behalf of undisclosed
others. Potts v. Stedman Co., 22 Ohio Op. 488, 2 Wage & Hour Cas. 884 (C.P. Athens County,
1942). In Cissell v. Great At]. & Pac. Tea Co., 37 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Ky. 1941), an individual
plaintiff, who, though unnamed, had shared in a settlement in a previous case, sued the employer for
an additional amount on the grounds that the previous judgment "was not binding as to him because
he was not a party to that suit and the subsequent settlement was agreed upon in fear of losing his
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similating such actions to the mere device for permissive joinder6 76 that
spurious class actions had been designed as under the original Rule
23(a).677 The most capacious gloss the courts were willing to put on
workers' § 16(b) rights was the Third Circuit's holding that even subject
to the aforementioned limitations, the spurious class action implemented
an important statutory purpose insofar as "employees, if they wish, can
join in their litigation so that no one of them need stand alone in doing
something likely to incur the displeasure of an employer. It brings some-
thing of the strength of collective bargaining to a collective lawsuit."678
Against this precedential background it is scarcely surprising that:
a reading of the opinions in the period leaves one suspicious that attorneys
for plaintiffs in these private representative actions lacked the resources or
the time to frame up suggestions, built around available precedents, that
job." The court held that the settlement was "binding upon him as one of the class for whom the
plaintiff professed to act as authorized by the very statute which gives him the claim now sued upon
... If he elects to take its benefits, he must accept its restrictions also." It is unclear whether Shain,
which was decided by the same judge, was meant to overturn CisselL
675. For a comprehensive overview of the case law, see Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851,
853-56 (3d Cir. 1945).
676. See Foster, supra note 669, at 324-27; Gerber & Galfand, Employees' Suits Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 95 U. PENN. L. Rlv. 505, 508-09 (1947); Rahl, The Class Action Device and
Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 37 ILL. L. REv. 119 (1942).
677. See 2 J. MOORE & J. FRIEDMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.04-(3), at 2241
(1938).
678. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d at 853. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., elaborated on this inter-
mediary status of FLSA:
In other types, it is usually not worth while to have a class suit at all unless everybody is
bound. Here it may be. Congress has set up an easy way for starting a suit for each of a
considerable number of people with rather small means to claim some money. It saves
expenses to pool. But they might never sue if it were necessary to sign everybody up
first. So a few can begin it. Once a bandwagon gets moving, others can jump on it if
they want to. Still they may not want to.... The very support Congress gives their
claims indicates an unwillingness to let them be barred by what somebody else does.
So a suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act is usually treated as an Invitation To
Come In. This is the best opportunity I know for this type of class suit.... The outsid-
ers hear about the victory and come around asking for money too. Most of the decisions
say they get nothing. It is too late. This is tough on them, but fairer than barring them
if they stay out and the class is defeated. Coming in is somewhat like starting a new
separate suit and probably will be barred after the period of the Statute of Limitations
even if the class suit started in time. The proceeding is really an informal substitute for
permissive intervention.... Perhaps the Invitation To Come In should be confined to a
few situations where a statute, like the Fair Labor Standards Act, expressly authorizes a
class suit....
CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurrY 274-75, 283 (1950). Chafee does not appear to have been
aware of the Portal-to-Portal Act and its consequences for class actions under FLSA. For an earlier
use of the notion of invitation in a non-FLSA context, see Blume, The "Common Questions" Princi-
ple in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 MICH. L. REv. 878, 898 (1932).
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could have led to effective implementation of the representative actions au-
thorized in section 16(b).
679
Employees' attorneys did indeed prosecute the portal litigation in a very
conservative manner. Thus one of the leading plaintiffs' attorneys has
indicated that, to the best of his knowledge, all the suits were filed as opt-
in collective actions because counsel, uncertain how far the courts would
let them push FLSA class actions, were reluctant to embarrass
themselves.680
The opt-in approach may also simply have been dictated by the real-
ity that virtually all of the portal suits were brought by unionized work-
ers as representative actions naming a union official as the representative,
who was not required to be an affected employee or a real party in inter-
est. 681 Those members who wished to name the representative as their
agent had to sign authorization cards, which were filed with the com-
plaint.682 Recovery then ran only to those filing authorizations.683 The
outright prohibition of these representative actions under the Portal-to-
Portal Act,684 even though they had been rather cumbersome procedural
devices, was clearly designed as an attack on union-organized
litigation.685
The driving force behind the congressional animus against class ac-
tions in 1947 was expressed most clearly by the Senate floor leader, Sena-
tor Donnell, in explaining the Senate bill to the members. He justified
679. Foster, supra note 669, at 324 n.103.
680. Telephone interview with Ernie Goodman (Apr. 2, 1990).
681. Lee Pressman, the CIO general counsel who coordinated the portal litigation, testified
before Congress that he knew of no portal suits brought by unorganized workers. Regulating the
Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 166.
682. Thus when Pressman filed a portal suit against Bethlehem Steel, he attached a 535-page
"brief" containing the names of 13,000 workers. Bethlehem Sued for $200,000,000, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 29, 1946, at 3, col. 4. See also Rules Individuals Must Sign, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1947, at 2, col. 6
(court ruling that unless union submits signed declarations of 5,286 employees of Campbell Soup Co.
within twenty days, they will be dismissed).
683. Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 175 (testimony of Lee
Pressman).
684. The Portal-to-Portal Act amended § 16(b) by eliminating the grant of authority to file
representative actions. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Ch. 52, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1947). The
repeal did not affect representative actions. Id. § 5(b).
685. See Note, Fair Labor Standards Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, 15 U. CHi. L. REV. 352,
360 (1948). The Supreme Court got this piece of history wrong when it recently stated that the
Portal-to-Portal Act abolished representative actions in part in response to "excessive litigation
spawned by plaintiffs' lacking a personal interest in the outcome" and required employees to file
written consents. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482, 488 (1989). It was not such
bogus litigation that Congress meant to eliminate, but rather lawsuits in which unions all too dili-
gently signed up all too many members.
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the prohibition of representative actions on the grounds that an "out-
sider, perhaps someone who is desirous of stirring up litigation without
being an employee at all," might create "unwholesome champertous situ-
ations. ' 686 To collective actions Donnell had no objections, provided
that consents, in the manner of an opt-in class action, were filed. The
need for consents he explained by way of a story involving an employee
who files a suit on behalf of himself and all other employees- of the United
States Steel Corporation and then three years later, after the statute of
limitations has run, some of the employees come forward and say:
"Now, we will ratify what this man did in filing suit for us 3 years ago, and
although we would be barred by limitations if we filed our suit ourselves at
the time we now come into court, nevertheless, since he instituted the suit
for us 3 years ago, we now join in that suit.",
6 8 7
Donnell found such a situation unfair because such employees would not
have had any obligation before entering the suit. Once the new consent
provision became operative, it would no longer "be possible for 10,000
men to wait 3 years, with the employers not knowing how many
thousands of dollars or millions of dollars... of claims will be asserted
against them" and then to come forward after they would otherwise have
been time-barred. For Donnell, then,
[o]bviously... this is a wholesome provision, for it is certainly unwhole-
some to allow an individual to come into court alleging that he is suing on
behalf of 10,000 persons and actually not have a solitary person behind him,
and then later on have 10,000 men join in the suit, which was not brought
in good faith, was not brought by a party in interest....
Certainly there is no injustice in that, for if a man wants to join in the
suit, why should he not give his consent, in writing...?688
This entire line of argument makes sense only if interpreted as moti-
vated by a general animus against what in 1966 became Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions.689 For under Rule 23(b)(3), the plaintiff's own affirmative
686. 93 CoNG. REc. 2182 (1947). Although Donnell did not state openly that he had unions in
mind, Senator McGrath asked him whether NAM engaged in champerty when it informed members
of recent Supreme Court rulings entitling them to certain rights. Id. at 2093.
687. Id. at 2182.
688. Id.
689. Thus Senator McGrath, whose knowledge appears to have been formed solely by newspa-
per accounts, charged that the portal suits were "representative of thousands or perhaps millions of
Americans who do not even know they are represented... ." Id. at 2250. Although McGrath
appears to have been misinformed, even if he had been correct, his accusation amounts to nothing
more than a bias against Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. In her zeal to advocate an expansion of class
actions under FLSA, one author has misunderstood the radical character of the Portal-to-Portal
Act. The amendments were not designed to address "[t]he confusion surrounding the binding effect
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duties to prove numerosity, typicality,6 90 and adequacy of representa-
tion,691 in connection with the motion for class certification, bring to
light all the information about which Donnell complained. With such
protections now in place under Rule 23(b)(3), the basis of the Portal-to-
Portal Act's policy supporting the restrictions on opt-out class actions
collapses.692
In the event the Portal-to-Portal Act outlawed opt-out class actions
by inserting a requirement that written consents be filed:
The second sentence of section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act... is
amended to read as follows: "Action to recover such liability may be main-
tained ... by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or
themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a
party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to
become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.
693
Ironically, employees might today be better situated had Congress totally
abolished class actions under FLSA in 1947.694 For when the class ac-
of class action judgments" or to clarify the procedures; nor is it the case that Congress did not intend
to limit non-representative class actions. See McAdoo, The Class Action Notice Under the FLSA:
Denial is a Threat to Effective Remedies in ADEA Actions, 91 DICK. L. REv. 357, 361, 369 (1986).
On the contrary, Congress knew exactly how the CIO had used class actions and wanted to prevent
any repetition. Spahn, Resurrecting the Spurious Class: Opting-In to the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act and the Equal Pay Act Through the Fair Labor StandardsAct, 71 GEo. L.J. 119, 129-30
(1982), similarly underestimates the restrictive political-economic motivations underlying introduc-
tion of the mandatory opt-in provision. This repressive intent is accurately depicted in Dolan v.
Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1984).
690. Or as an early FLSA case held with regard to named class members: "If the evidence does
not sustain the allegation that the other plaintiffs are similarly situated . . ., they will be dis-
missed .. " McReynolds v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 5 F.R.D. 61, 62 (W.D. Ky. 1942).
691. See, eg., Saxton v. W.S. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. 519, 521 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
692. Walter Gellhom, a law professor at Columbia University, misunderstood the meaning of
the prohibition on assignment of claims in the Gwynne bill, which he interpreted as barring the
pooling of claims. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 28, 1947 (letter), reprinted in 93 CoNG. REc. A927-28
(1947). This provision, which reappeared as § 2(e) of the Portal-to-Portal Act as applied only to
existing claims, was designed merely to make it "impossible for anyone (even though permitted to do
so under State law) to buy existing claims which were not compensable under contract, custom, or
practice, with the hope of compromising such claims at a profit...." PORTAL-TO-PORTAL AcT oF
1947, H. R. CONF. REP. No. 326, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947).
693. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Ch. 52, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1947). § 8 of the Portal-to-
Portal Act provided a separate rule governing the applicability of the new statute of limitations to
pending collective actions.
694. In explaining the new rule for determining when an action begins for purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations, the conference committee spoke of "a collective or class action" interchangeably,
merely distinguishing "a collective action" as one "brought by an employee or employees for and in
behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated" from "a class action" as
"described in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." H. R. CONF. REP. No. 326, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947). Such language misleadingly creates the impression that litigants could
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tion provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were liberalized
in 1966, an opportunity was lost to lay the groundwork for the rehabilita-
tion of class actions under FLSA. If the collective action provision of
FLSA had been repealed, Rule 23(b)(3) would have created parity be-
tween employees under FLSA and other litigants. But the Advisory
Committee working on Rule 23(b)(3) made it clear that the amendments
were not intended to affect § 16(b) of FLSA.695
One scholar has taken the position that the Advisory Committee
acted wisely "because the cumbersome procedure for determining the
scope of the judgment in advance of deciding... the employer's liability
under the Act would be no improvement over the group remedies avail-
able now to the Secretary of Labor under section 16(c) and section 17 of
the Act."' 69 6 This judgment, however, rests on an overestimation of the
efficacy of enforcement by the DOL. Moreover, both the absolute and
relative volume of DOL litigation decreased markedly in the 1970s and
1980s. Thus the DOL's share of all FLSA cases filed in federal court
declined from almost four-fifths in the mid-1970s to forty-five per cent by
1989. This decline has chiefly resulted from a massive absolute decrease
in litigation brought by the DOL, the volume of which in the late 1980s
amounted to little more than one-third of the peak attained in the early
1970s.697
Experience in representing very low-paid employees with high turn-
over rates such as migrant farm workers indicates that it is precisely such
workers, whom the DOL fails to reach, whose peripatetic living condi-
tions frequently disable them from opting in to class actions. Yet only if
Congress makes opt-out class actions available to such workers, thereby
overcoming the restrictive individualistic framework imposed by the con-
sent requirement, 698 can the original vision of joint public-private en-
forcement of FLSA 699 come into its own.
elect between the two procedures. In referring to "a collective or class action instituted under"
FLSA, however, § 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act itself suggests that the two terms are used synony-
mously. The federal courts are in agreement that class actions brought under Rule 23 and FLSA
are "mutually exclusive and irreconcilable." La Chapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 289
(5th Cir. 1975).
695. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 104 (1966).
696. Foster, supra note 669, at 342.
697. Calculated according to data in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table C (various years).
698. See Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class and Representa-
tion, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1103 (1980).
699. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 667, at 721.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In the field of wage legislation, the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act is as severe a
blow to workers' rights as the Taft Hartley Act is in the field of industrial
relations.
70 0
What can be learned from the struggle over portal-to-portal pay?
Was Senator Aiken, one of two Senate Republicans to vote against the
bill, right in saying "that labor was extremely unwise in starting the por-
tal-to-portal suits... for the purpose of embarrassing the employer, and
with the mistaken idea that the union was going to make bargaining capi-
tal out of it"? 01 Although it is possible that the C10 instigated the liti-
gation campaign, it is just as plausible that the unions, in responding to a
growing demand by industrial workers for back wages in the wake of the
Supreme Court Mt. Clemens decision, sought to reshape an otherwise
uncoordinated proliferation of suits702 into a bargaining tradeoff for
higher wages. But regardless of whether the unions' role was primary or
mediatory, they must bear the historical responsibility for failing to an-
ticipate the outcome.
By filing portal pay suits, the CIO not only offered employers an
occasion for attacking FLSA frontally, but also unwittingly undermined
whatever political-economic momentum had built up during the war for
expanding the scope and coverage of the Act. Thus employers not only
succeeded in delaying an increase in the minimum wage until 1950 and
scuttling organized labor's more far-reaching amendments proposed dur-
ing the 79th Congress,70 3 but also enacted their own agenda for defusing
FLSA's potential for inflicting significant financial losses on employers.
Employers were able to achieve this end through the abbreviated limita-
tions period and the effective elimination of class actions. The latter was
particularly important because, in addition to their economic impact,
class actions could have served as vehicles for politically mobilizing un-
organized workers around issues of basic working conditions, including
that of who controls the length of the compensable working day.
While Mt. Clemens may not be an illustration of the maxim that
Hard Cases Make Bad (Statutory) Law, union leaders and counsel
700. FINAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE CONGRESS
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 92 (1947).
701. 93 CONG. REc. 2098, 2372 (1947).
702. This is not to say that the workers brought these suits on their own-they did not. The
mere fact, however, that the unions filed the suits for the workers does not resolve the issue of who
induced whom.
703. See supra § V.A.2.
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should nevertheless have taken greater care to distinguish between the
theatrical-symbolic and the monetary-redistributional goals of the litiga-
tion. Had they emphasized this distinction to employers, workers, legis-
lators, and the public at large, unions could have exerted greater leverage
over the early postwar wage-bargaining process. Such a campaign
would, hindsight teaches, have benefited immensely from two tactical in-
novations. First, if the chief purpose was to improve working conditions
in the long run, the litigation should have focused on prospective relief,
not on retroactive pay. Not only would this approach have completely
eliminated the basis of the financial hysteria and moral indignation that
employers and legislators were able to project so effectively, but it also
would have sustained a much more sympathetic political movement.
This focus on better working conditions could have been coordinated
with the second tactic-bringing a test case, with facts considerably more
egregious than those in Mt. Clemens, requesting prospective declaratory
relief. The very lengthy and hazardous walking time in the steel mills
might have been the ideal vehicle.7' In the end, without any congres-
sional intercession on which to rely, large corporate employers might
have been forced not only to acquiesce in future portal pay (or equivalent
arrangements), but also to concede greater wage increases in exchange
for an understanding that unions would bring no suits for back portal
wages. In this connection, the CIO should have generously offered to
sponsor the FLSA amendment that Lee Pressman had in fact pro-
posed-that FLSA compromises be permitted within the framework of
bona fide collective bargaining. 05
The opportunistically instrumental attitude that the CIO and its
constituent unions adopted toward FLSA deprived them of the long-
term strategic perspective that could have contributed toward a transfor-
704. The representative of the United Steel Workers-CIO offered such a vivid picture of the long
and dangerous walk that steelworkers were required to take-across railroad tracks and under over-
head cranes-from the plant gate to the open hearth that he even succeeded in prompting Represen-
tative Gwynne to acknowledge that he advocated payment for many of the activities. Regulating the
Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, supra note 16, at 103-05, 109-10 (testimony of David McDonald,
see'y-treasurer, USW). McDonald stressed that in such large and highly integrated plants compa-
nies "have wrung from the workers an increased contribution to the companies' profits." Id. at 112.
Senator Pepper stated that when he worked in a steel mill, he had to walk three-quarters of a mile
from the gate to the workplace, which he thought should have been compensable. 93 CONG. REC.
2306 (1947).
705. See supra § V. In the continued absence of such a statutory provision, the Supreme Court
has held that, because, even under a collective bargaining agreement, FLSA rights devolve on em-
ployees as individuals rather than as members of a labor union, they are neither waivable nor barred
by previous unsuccessful submission to arbitration. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739-46 (1981).
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mation of FLSA from a minimally intrusive regime into one that might
have intervened much more significantly into managerial prerogatives in
the nonunion sector. Because they failed to recognize the ultimate stakes
as NAM and large industrial capital did, the unions framed the portal
struggle as one over wages instead of raising the issue expressly of what
was compensable work and who made that determination. The reason
for this failure lay in the CIO's ambivalence toward FLSA. Like large
employers, the industrial unions had viewed FLSA as largely directed at
aiding low-paid workers in their struggles with chiseling employers. Be-
cause the CIO either subordinated the portal suits to its postwar bargain-
ing campaign or viewed them as an expeditious and relatively costless
means of securing back wages to compensate for current inflation, it
failed to develop a sustained interest in an incremental litigation strategy
that would have tested the outer limits of FLSA.
Had the unions proceeded in this fashion, confining themselves to
prospective relief, they might have been in a position to settle the princi-
ple that the decision as to when and where the workday begins was not
only not within the discretion of the employer, but was not even commit-
ted to agreement by both parties. Reserved for determination by the
courts (and the Wage and Hour Administrator) as a mandatory norm
and withdrawn from the bargaining process, the definition of worktime
might have encroached upon the unchallenged power of nonunion em-
ployers unilaterally to establish working conditions beyond the statutory
minimum wage and overtime. But the industrial unions showed little
interest in FLSA for its own sake (or for that of the unorganized work
force that depended on it) precisely because they were confident that they
were strong enough to achieve these goals, at least for their own mem-
bers, through collective bargaining.
When demands that are not thought through strategically backfire,
the primary victims of the unanticipated legislative intervention may not
be the initiators. In the case of the portal pay movement, unionized
workers formed the almost exclusive support for portal pay, but low-paid
unorganized employees have ultimately paid the price for the congres-
sional reaction. Consequently, even in the post-Portal-to-Portal Act era,
unions can seek to achieve their goals through collective bargaining;
70 6
706. In point of fact, however, the large industrial unions that were in the forefront of portal
litigation do not have portal-pay provisions in their contracts. Thus under the master contracts of
the United Automobile Workers ("UAW"), United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers
("UE"), and United Steelworkers of America ("USW"), the employer does not pay for the time
during which the employee walks from the outer gate of the plant to the work department. At least
in the electrical industry, the problems may have been alleviated by a shift to smaller plants requir-
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atomized employees, however, have few statutory rights beyond an
abridged FLSA on which to rely.
More ironic still is that even the untoward outcome itself has devi-
ated significantly from the results that the CIO feared most. For while
waiting time (including downtime) during the workday has remained
compensable in the typical industrial setting,707 as have many so-called
preliminary, preparatory, and postliminary activities to the extent that
they are integral to the employees' principal activity,70 8 it is Congress's
preclusion of the opt-out class action that has had the most enduring and
deleterious impact on the minimum wage workers who continue to liti-
gate under FLSA. At the same time, the absolute prohibition of repre-
sentative actions, which was manifestly directed against the industrial
unions, has not prevented unions from pursuing their remedies through
collective bargaining and arbitration.
Because the Portal-to-Portal Act, unlike Taft-Hartley,70 9 no longer
ing less walking time. In the electrical machinery/equipment industry, employees working in the
largest plants (establishments with more than 2,500 employees) as a share of all employees declined
from 33.2 per cent in 1947 to 23.4 per cent in 1982, as the average number of employees in these
largest plants declined from 5,325 to 4,389. Calculated according to data in U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES: 1947, Table 1, 98 (1950); U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, GENERAL
SUMMARY, PT. 2, Table 1 at 1-6 (1985). The UMW, by contrast, has preserved portal pay in all its
contracts, including those controlling surface mining, despite periodic efforts by owners to eliminate
portal provisions. Because travel time can consume as much as three hours daily roundtrip, it is an
issue about which miners feel so strongly that portal wages have become traditional even in nonun-
ion mines. Telephone interviews with the following members of union research departments: Larian
Angelo (UE); Michael Cannon (UAW); Ed Ghering (USW); Don Wallace (UMW) (June 18, 1990).
707. See, e.g., Mireles v. Frio Foods, Inc., 899 F.2d 1407, 1411-14 (5th Cir. 1990). To the
extent that the court denied the workers compensation for waiting time during the workday in this
case, the decision was based on considerations-namely, that the workers could use longer periods of
time effectively for their own purposes-unrelated to the Portal-to-Portal Act.
708. The Supreme Court has interpreted the principal-integral-preliminary-activity nexus
broadly in favor of workers. See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956); Mitchell v. King Packing
Co., 350 U.S. 260 (1956). See also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 750 F.2d 47, 50
(8th Cir. 1984) ("The legislative history of the Portal-to-Portal Act and decisions construing it...
make clear that the terms 'principal activity or activities,' which must be paid for, are to be read
liberally"). To be sure, the lower courts have not always interpreted the provision quite so expan-
sively as the solicitor of the Department of Labor had hoped shortly after the Portal-to-Portal Act
went into effect. See W. Tyson, The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947-Its Effect on Determination of
Time Worked Under the Fair Labor Standards Act After May 14, 1947, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw
YORK UNIVERSrrY FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 541, 572 (1948). For examples of
such cases see E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Harrup, 227 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1955); Hodgson v.
Katz & Besthoff, #38, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1193 (W.D. La. 1973) (preliminary activities of cashiers
not compensable).
709. "[Ihe conclusion is inescapable that Congress was interested less in curing union abuses
than in using them as an excuse for weakening the organized labor movement." J. SEIDMAN, AMER-
ICAN LABOR FROM DEFENSE TO RECONVERSION 268 (1953). B. BERNSTEIN, America in War and
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serves its original vindictive anti-union purpose,710 it should be repealed.
Once that repeal has been accomplished, it may become possible to
demarginalize FLSA, restoring to it the potential that it once possessed
for empowering low-paid workers to embark upon self-organization. 1
Peace: The Test of Liberalism, in TOWARDS A NEW PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 289, 290, 303 (1969), cautions that neither businessmen nor Congress meant to destroy
unions in 1946-47, but merely to weaken them. For a different perspective, which places more re-
sponsibility on Truman, see H. Sitkoff, Years of the Locust: Interpretations of the Truman Presidency
Since 1965, in THE TRUMAN PERIOD AS A RESEARCH FIELD: A REAPPRAISAL, 1972, at 75, 85 (R.
Kirkendall ed. 1974).
710. Ironically, Congress repeatedly heard that the unorganized would bear the brunt of the
amendments. See, eg., 93 CONG. REc. 2265 (1947) (statement by Sen. Thomas, Dem. Ut.). Rather
than applaud this result, supporters of the bill suggested that in this instance part of the baby ("injus-
tice") would have to be thrown out with the bath water. See id. at 2098 (statement of Sen. Donnell,
Senate Floor Leader). Thus when Senator Aiken asked Senator Donnell how a poor and unorgan-
ized worker would be able to go to the expense of showing the statutorily requisite custom or prac-
tice in order to prevail on a claim, Donnell replied that "any plaintiff in any case must make out his
case, no matter how rich or how poor he may be." Id. at 2098.
711. See Linder, The Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J. LEGIS, 151,
161 (1990).
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